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Due Process in Antitrust Enforcement Through the Lens of Comparative Law 
Christopher S. Yoo,† Yong Huang,‡ Thomas Fetzer,* and Shan Jiang** 
 
Abstract 
 
 Due process in antitrust enforcement has significant implications for better 
professional and accurate enforcement decisions. Not only can due process spur 
economic growth, raise government credibility, and limit the abuse of powers 
according to law, it also promotes competitive reforms in monopolized sectors 
and curbs corruption. Jurisdictions learn from the best practices in the 
investigation process, decisionmaking process, and the announcement and judicial 
review of antitrust enforcement decisions. By comparing the enforcement policies 
of China, the European Union, and the United States, this article calls for better 
disclosure of evidence, participation of legal counsel, and protection of the 
procedural and substantive rights of the respondent in the investigation process. In 
conducting evidence review and arriving at punitive decisions, the enforcement 
agency should establish a separation between investigatory and adjudicatory 
functions. Finally, the issued punishment decision should contain more 
comprehensive information and be subject to judicial review of the court. 
 Key words: Antitrust, due process, transparency, procedural fairness, 
judicial review, separation of functions, disclosure of evidence  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A global consensus has emerged recognizing the central role that competition law plays 
in promoting a nation’s prosperity. As the briefing notes on trade and competition policy for the 
2003 Cancún WTO Ministerial acknowledged, there is a “growing realization that mutually 
supportive trade and competition policies can contribute to sound economic development, and 
that effective competition policies help to ensure that the benefits of liberalization and market-
based reforms flow through to all citizens.”1 Although competition law was eventually deleted 
from the agenda of the Doha Round of GATT negotiations, having an effective competition law 
regime has become a de facto prerequisite for joining the WTO.2 The number of competition law 
enforcement agencies has continued to grow, with the membership of the global group of 
competition law authorities known as the International Competition Network (ICN) now 
including more than 130 countries.3 
 Adherence to basic principles of due process has long been recognized as an essential 
aspect of proper competition law enforcement. The rule of law is generally understood to include 
several critical procedural components, such as due process, judicial review by an independent 
judiciary, equal application of the law, and transparency in decisionmaking processes.4 The 
WTO recognized that clarifying “core principles including transparency, non-discrimination and 
procedural fairness” represented one of the key mandates for its Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.5  
 China has also increasingly embraced its importance in the wake of its accession to the 
WTO.6 In 2018, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has also instituted a system of 
independent administrative adjudicators to bring Chinese practice in line with international 
norms. 
 Recent judicial decisions have further underscored the importance of fair procedures and 
adequate judicial review. The Chinese Hainan District Court, for instance, recently reversed an 
AML decision by the local Development and Reform Commission (DRC). Although the Hainan 
High Court later reversed the district court’s decision,7 it further resulted in a retrial by the 
Supreme People’s Court. It was an important sign that decisions by enforcement agencies cannot 
avoid judicial review. Likewise, on September 6, 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) sent 
a competition law case against Intel back to the General Court with instructions to examine all 
 
1 World Trade Org., Dealing with cartels and other anti-competitive practices (Aug. 2003), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief08_e.htm. 
2 Beijing Amends Laws to Prepare for WTO Entry, Xinhua News Agency (Mar. 7, 2001) (quoting Zeng Jianhui, 
spokesman for the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress). 
3 See Member Directory, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx. (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
4 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Promoting the Rule of Law: Cooperation and Competition in the EU-US Relationship, 
27 U. PITT. L. REV. 163, 164 (2010); accord Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY 
1329, 1329–30 (David S. Clark ed., 2007) (concluding that the rule of law includes two primary elements: due 
process and judicial review). 
5 WTO, supra note 1. 
6 See, e.g., Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 319, 345–47, 351–63 (2004). 
7 Case No. 1180 (琼行终 1180号) (Hainan District Ct. 2017). 
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the arguments put forward by Intel.8 Additionally, the ECJ agreed with the ombudsman’s 
conclusion that enforcement authorities must maintain full records of both formal and informal 
meetings with competitors and held that the Commission had erred in merely providing a 
nonconfidential summary of an interview to Intel, although the court concluded error did not 
influence the decision.9 This rare rebuke pushed the Commission to adhere more carefully to the 
procedural rules protecting due process. Both judicial decisions underscore the importance of 
reasoned decisionmaking, internal controls, and transparency associated with fair enforcement 
procedures. 
 The past year has borne witness to an upsurge of interest in due process in the 
competition law community. For example, at its most recent annual meeting, the International 
Competition Network (ICN) adopted its Recommended Practices on Investigative Process, 
which represents the most authoritative type of document the ICN typically adopts,10 and sixty-
two agencies became inaugural signatories of the ICN’s new Framework for Competition Agency 
Procedures (CAP).11 In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) extended its prior work on procedural fairness and transparency12 by conducting 
additional roundtables on the topic,13 and beginning consideration of a Draft Recommendation of 
 
8 See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept. 6, 2017), paras. 129–143, 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014CJ0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
9 See id. paras. 83–107. 
10 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2019), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/portfolio/recommended-practices-for-investigative-process/. 
11 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FRAMEWORK ON COMPETITION AGENCY PROCEDURES (2019), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICN_CAP.pdf. The adoption of the 
Recommended Practice represented the culmination of years of work by the Agency Effectiveness Working Group. 
See, e.g., INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION 
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT (2018), http://icn2018delhi.in/images/AEWG-Guiding-Principles-4PF.pdf [hereinafter ICN 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 
(2018), http://icn2018delhi.in/images/AEWG-Annotated-GIP.pdf [hereinafter ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE]; INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN GUIDANCE ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (2014), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1028.pdf [hereinafter ICN GUIDANCE]; INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS WORKING GROUP, ICN ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION AGENCY 
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS ROUNDTABLE REPORT (2014), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1023.pdf [hereinafter ICN ROUNDTABLE 
REPORT]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT ON INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, 
COMPETITION AGENCY CONFIDENTIALITY PRACTICES (2014), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1014.pdf [hereinafter ICN CONFIDENTIALITY 
PRACTICES]; INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION AGENCY TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES (2013), 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc902.pdf [hereinafter ICN TRANSPARENCY 
PRACTICES]. 
12 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND 
TRANSPARENCY: KEY POINTS (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50235955.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD KEY POINTS]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE, POLICY ROUNDTABLE ON 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: TRANSPARENCY ISSUES IN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
(2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/48825133.pdf [hereinafter OECD ROUNDTABLE REPORT]. 
13 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. AND ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., 
ACCESS TO THE CASE FILE AND PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/access-to-case-file-and-protection-of-confidential-information.htm 
[hereinafter OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON ACCESS TO THE CASE FILE]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. AND ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY COURTS IN 
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the Council on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law laying out principles 
that could serve as benchmark for due process in antitrust enforcement.14 The American Bar 
Association (ABA) Antitrust Section’s International Task Force followed up on the best 
practices issued in 201515 by conducting an assessment of the extent to which different agencies 
were complying with them.16 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)17and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)18 have offered similar guidance.  
 While the existing guidelines and best practices are helpful, they are pitched at a high 
level of generality and stop short of detailed application to national law. This report strives to fill 
that void by engaging in a detailed comparison of procedures employed by competition law 
officials in China, the European Union (EU), and the United States (U.S.) and tracing how each 
relates to the guidelines and best practices identified by the leading multilateral initiatives 
discussed above. Specifically, it breaks down the enforcement process into six major phases, 
including: 
1. Investigations: requests for documents, interviews, and interrogatories  
2. Investigations: Inspections of company premises 
3. Agency deliberations 
4. Issuance of decisions 
5. Settlements 
6. Judicial review of final decisions 
 The report then divides each phase into two-to-six individual steps, for a total of twenty-
eight steps. Within each step, the report examines the current law in all three jurisdictions. 
analyze similarities and differences across the jurisdictions. The report concludes by identifying 
three procedures that are essential to due process and presenting several others that are not 
essential, but remain important. 
 
COMPETITION CASES (June 4, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/standard-of-review-by-courts-in-
competition-cases.htm [hereinafter OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW]. 
14 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. AND ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., 
SCOPING NOTE ON TRANSPARENCY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AS A LONG-TERM THEME FOR 2019–2020 (Apr. 23, 
2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2018)6&docLanguage=
En. 
15 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW INT’L TASK FORCE, BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 
(2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_bestprac_20150522.authc
heckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA BEST PRACTICES]. 
16 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ASSESSMENT OF GLOBAL COMPETITION AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA 
BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (2019), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/sal-procedural-transparency-2019-04-
29.pdf. 
17 See, e.g., ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, ASEAN REGIONAL GUIDELINES ON COMPETITION POLICY (2010) 
[hereinafter ASEAN GUIDELINES]. 
18 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N ON COMPETITION, RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2010), 
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/ICC-International-Due-process-08-03-10.pdf [hereinafter 
ICC BEST PRACTICES]. 
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 It is now a fitting moment to assess the state of enforcement processes. China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML) celebrated its tenth anniversary of implementation in 2018, and China is 
currently considering possible revisions. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
recently revised China’s Administrative Litigation Law to make it more conducive to economic 
growth.19 At the same time, President Xi Jinping led a major anti-corruption campaign designed 
to stop government decisions that are motivated by personal or parochial interests and other 
abuses of power.20 All are part of broader efforts to balance the government-market relationship 
and make enterprises having operations in China more market responsive and efficient. 
II. THE BENEFITS OF STRONG PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
 Before discussing the existing enforcement procedures in China, the EU, and the U.S., it 
is worth considering why jurisdictions should use procedures to limit the discretion of tehri 
enforcers. Although procedural protections can make enforcement more cumbersome, they yield 
numerous benefits to the agency and society. Determining the appropriate level of procedural 
protections thus requires striking a careful balance. 
A. Compliance with Basic Norms of Impartiality 
 The right to be judged by an impartial decisionmaker is a cornerstone of due process. The 
well-established imperative that no person should be a judge in his or her own case is often 
embodied in the Latin phrase, Nemo judex in re sua, a saying with an ancient history, tracing 
from the Justinian Code,21 to coined by the celebrated Lord Coke’s in his landmark decision in 
Dr. Bonham’s Case, and to the present day.22 The historical justification for this principle is that 
serving as a judge in one’s own cause creates an unacceptable appearance of possible bias, 
regardless of whether such bias actually exists. The emerging literature on cognitive psychology 
provides a stronger analytical and empirical foundation for this intuition, revealing that even the 
best-intentioned actors struggle to maintain their objectivity when forced to play the role of both 
advocate and adjudicator.23 Although civil law systems rely on inquisitorial procedures in courts, 
in which the judge both leads the questioning and makes the decision, the safeguards of judicial 
independence do not apply to administrative decisionmaking in which the decisionmaker also 
plays the role of investigator.24 
 Administrative agencies are thus especially problematic as they often combine 
investigatory and prosecutory functions with adjudicatory functions. In the words of Martin 
Redish and Lawrence Marshall “if the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the governmental 
 
19 See generally He Haibo, How Much Progress Can Legislation Bring? The 2014 Amendment of the Administrative 
Litigation Law of PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 1 (2018). 
20 See President Xi Jingping, Keynote Speech at 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Oct. 18, 2017) 
(vowing to let markets play a “decisive role” and “deepen supply-side reforms”). 
21 Code Just. 3.5 (Justinian, 534).  
22 (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.). 
23 Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & 
DECISION MAKING 37 (2010). 
24 Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Judicial Review of Agency Action in the U.S. and Israel: The Choice Between 
Open and Closed Review, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 446, 458–60 (Susan Rose-Ackerman et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2017). 
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body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision will be based on 
considerations other than the merits as developed by the evidence. The government would, in 
effect, be the judge of its own case.”25 European scholars have raised similar concerns in the 
context of competition law. Ian Forrester concludes, “The fusion of investigative and decision-
making functions is incompatible with the notion of ‘an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’ enshrined in Art. 6 of the ECHR.”26 Heike Schweitzer similarly notes, “The 
Commission, vested both with investigative and prosecutorial powers, cannot be considered an 
impartial, quasi-juridical body if one takes the pervasive risk of a decisional bias into account.”27 
 The U.S. Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in its 1950 decision in Wong Yang 
Sung v. United States, in which the Court held that asking “the same men . . . to serve both as 
prosecutors and as judges . . . weakens public confidence” in the fairness of the proceedings. 
“Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being 
rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the commission, in the role of prosecutor, 
presented to itself.”28 
 The concern arises even if every official acts conscientiously and in good faith. Being a 
judge in one’s own cause is a structural conflict of interest that creates the appearance of 
impropriety even when the person adjudicating the dispute remains completely objective. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has recognized that the combination of prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory functions may be cured by plenary judicial review.29 In that case, the 
independence of the appellate judge provides the necessary safeguard against self-dealing. 
B. Greater Accuracy of Decisions 
 Although difficult to verify empirically, the conventional wisdom holds that procedural 
protections lead to more accurate decisions. Professors Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall 
conclude in the Yale Law Journal that the purpose of due process “is to ensure the most accurate 
decision possible. . . . The rights to notice, hearing, counsel, transcript, and to calling and cross-
examining witnesses all relate directly to the accuracy of the adjudicative process.”30 Redish 
later observes that “[t]he connecting link between accuracy and due process is the belief that the 
adjudicator is more likely to find the facts correctly if the parties possessing both the strongest 
interest in the outcome and the greatest access to the relevant information are provided a 
meaningful opportunity to present their cases to the fact finder.”31 Harvard Law Professor 
Richard Stewart draws the same conclusion, noting that administrative procedures are “designed 
 
25 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986). 
26 Ian Forrester, Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures, 34 
EUR. L. REV. 817, 837 (2009). 
27 Heike Schweitzer, Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ANTITRUST LAW: 
ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE 491, 508 n.71 (Damien Geradin & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). 
28 339 U.S. 33, 42 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37 (1937)). 
29 See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. II-9, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106438. 
30 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986). 
31 Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 
18, 20 (1996). 
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to promote the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative 
directives.”32 Vanderbilt Law Professor Edward Rubin similarly finds that “a consensus exists 
about the purpose of [due process]: to ensure accurate decisionmaking in government 
adjudications.”33  
 Modern psychology and the related field of behavioral economics have identified certain 
common cognitive heuristics that cause decisionmakers to reach inaccurate decisions, 
summarized succinctly by Ian Forrester and Professor Wouter Wils.34 First, officials tend to 
identify with the agencies in which they serve and feel pride when their agency succeeds. 
Second, as Daniel Zimmer, former Chairman of the German Monopolies Commission, 
recognizes, human reasoning is subject to confirmation bias, defined as the tendency to accept 
conclusions consistent with one’s beliefs and to search for evidence that confirms those beliefs.35 
To the extent that confirmation bias is an innate quality of all humans, initial conclusions formed 
during the early stages of an investigation are difficult to dislodge even in the face of 
contradictory evidence. Third, people are also subject to hindsight bias, which is the tendency to 
believe after the fact that the outcome could not have unfolded any other way. Therefore, any 
finding that the second phase of an investigation was unjustified would conflict with one’s 
confidence in the officials’ judgment in opening the case, causing considerable cognitive 
dissonance.36 The desire to avoid such dissonance can motivate participants to pursue the 
investigation in order to avoid discovery that the original investigatory decision was erroneous.37 
Zimmer thus concluded that “it is all too human for decision-makers who in an initial situation 
have evaluated a factual circumstance in a certain manner to stick to their original assessment 
even after a proceeding has been held.”38 Wils regarded an empirical study— which found that 
of the eighteen competition cases that had been fully adjudicated, courts had overturned twelve 
of the cases in their entirety and two of the cases in part, with only four cases having withstood 
judicial scrutiny—as corroborating the problem.39 
 At the same time, there are countervailing considerations that may counterbalance the 
need for accuracy. For example, investigations may need to be kept secret during their early 
stages in order to prevent the destruction of evidence and the integrity of the investigation. This 
justification for a lack of transparency, however, is temporary. As the investigation approaches 
completion, the need for secrecy disappears and must give way to the respondents’ need for 
disclosure and the opportunity to contest any factual findings or legal conclusions. 
 Procedural protections are costly and must be balanced against other considerations like 
the government’s interest. In the words of Harvard Law Professor Richard Fallon, under certain 
 
32 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975). 
33 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1102 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
34 Forrester, supra note 26, at 836, 841; Wouter P.J. Wils, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial 
Function and the Adjudicative Function, 27 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 202, 214–18 (2003); accord 
James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. 
ECON. 41 (2012). 
35 See Daniel Zimmer, Competition Law Enforcement: Administrative Versus Judicial Systems, in PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 255, 259–60 (Paul Nihoul & Tadeusz Skoczny eds., 2018). 
36 Id.  
37 Wils, supra note 34, at 216–18. 
38 Zimmer, supra note 35, at 260. 
39 Wils, supra note 34, at 214 (citing Frank Montag, The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure 
Under Regulation 17, 8 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 428 (1996)). 
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circumstances, “the individual's interest in fair and accurate results [must be balanced] against 
the governmental interest in efficient and expeditious decisionmaking.”40 The U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized this need to compromise between accuracy and efficiency in its landmark 
decision in Mathews v Eldridge.41 That said, subsequent decisions building on Mathews have 
tended to give controlling weight to the need for accuracy.42 And in any event, due process 
typically requires notice, the opportunity to present reasons why a particular action should not be 
taken, and the right to present evidence and to know opposing evidence.43 
 Although due process requires some increase in enforcement costs, it does provide some 
compensating benefits. Research suggests that entities sanctioned by the government have 
greater compliance when they perceive the procedures as being fair.44 Procedural protections and 
transparency can also reduce future enforcement costs by allowing agencies to communicate 
their expectations to the regulated individuals or companies, thereby promoting greater 
compliance with the law.  
C. Stronger Economic Growth 
 Economists have long recognized that due process and the rule of law play key roles in 
promoting economic growth. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776, “Commerce and manufactures, in 
short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the 
justice of the government.”45 Nobel Laureate Douglass North similarly noted that one of the 
greatest threats to a predictable and stable economic environment is a lack of institutional 
restraints on a powerful, discretionary state and that a non-restrained state will struggle to make 
consistent commitments to economic actors, making economic growth more difficult.46 
 Modern scholarship concurs with Smith’s observation, confirming that the rule of law is 
either an important or the most important, statistically-significant factor that drives economic 
growth.47 A groundbreaking article by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer found that protection of 
property rights has a positive effect on investment and economic growth.48 This was followed by 
the landmark work of Robert Barro finding that the rule of law, as measured by the International 
Country Risk Guide, had a positive effect on economic growth.49  
 
40 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
943 n.166 (1988). 
41 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
42 Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2705, 2731 (1992). 
43 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
44 Daniel Kaufmann et al, Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, 1999), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/665731468739470954/pdf/multi-page.pdf; ALEXANDRA A. WRAGE, 
BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY (2007); CHONGHAO WU, 
REGULATING GOVERNMENT ETHICS: AN UNDERUSED WEAPON IN CHINA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN (2016). 
45 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 387 (Thomas Nelson 
and Peter Brown eds., 1827) (1776).  
46 DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 20 (1981). 
47 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131 (2004). 
48 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative 
Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995). 
49 ROBERT BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY (1997). 
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 Other corroborating studies s drew similar conclusions. Robert Rigobon and Dani Rodrik 
found that the rule of law has a strong positive effect on income.50 Stephen Haggard and Lydia 
Tiede attempted to disaggregate the concept of the rule of law into different measures. Their 
survey of the empirical literature indicated that the rule of law has a positive impact on economic 
performance regardless of whether it is conceived of as protection of personal security, 
protection of property rights, checks on executive discretion, or limits on corruption. Their own 
empirical study found that the World Bank’s aggregate rule of law measure and the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index both had a significant impact on 
economic growth.51  
 Although these studies do not measure due process directly, the extent to which due 
process and the rule of law are correlated suggests that greater due process protections would 
help promote economic growth. 
D. Increased Respect for the Government 
 Due process increases the perception among citizens that legal proceedings are fair. 
Procedural fairness in turn increases the perceived legitimacy of the government.52 In 1975 
Thibaut and Walker published a simulation in which they varied the procedural protections given 
to hypothetical participants charged with illegal business espionage to measure which 
proceedings participants saw as most fair and legitimate. They found that participants were more 
likely to accept as legitimate: adversarial proceedings over inquisitorial ones, proceedings where 
there are rigorous procedures regulating the admission of evidence, and proceedings where their 
attorney was aligned with the defendant instead of the government.53 In another study, Leventhal 
identified six key characteristics of fair procedures: consistency, suppression of bias, 
decisionmaking accuracy, the correctability of errors, the presence of representation, and the 
ethics of the decisionmakers.54 Additional empirical studies confirm that representation and 
decisionmaker impartiality are essential factors for proceedings to be perceived as fair.55 
 Prohibiting the same agency officials from serving as both prosecutor and adjudicator 
further enhances respect for the government. As the President’s Committee on Administrative 
Management (commonly known as the Brownlow Committee) concluded in 1937, allowing “the 
 
50 Robert Rigobon & Dani Rodrik, Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the 
Interrelationships, 13 ECON. TRANSITION 533 (2005). 
51 Stephan Haggard & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where Are We?, 39 WORLD DEV. 673 
(2011). 
52 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Caron Beaton-Wells, Substance and Process in 
Competition Law and Enforcement: Why We Should Care if It’s Not Fair, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN 
COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 3, 7–9 (Paul Nihoul & Tadeusz Skoczny eds., 2018); Robert J. MacCoun et al., 
Alternative Adjudication: An Evaluation of the New Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program (RAND Inst. for Civil 
Justice Report R-3676-ICJ, 1988), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3676.html; E. Allan Lind et al., Outcome 
and Process Concerns in Organizational Dispute Resolution (Am. Bar Found. Working Paper No. 9109, 1991). 
53 See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
54 See G.S. Leventhal, Jurgis Karuza Jr. & William Rick Fry., Beyond Fairness, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL 
INTERACTION: EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 167 (Gerold 
Mikula ed., 1980). 
55 See JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); ALLAN LIND & TOM TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Ellen Cohn et al., Distributive and Procedural Justice in Seven Nations, 24 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 553 (2000). 
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same men . . . [to] serve both as prosecutors and as judges . . . not only undermines judicial 
fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private 
rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings 
which the commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself.”56 
 Due process protections also lead citizens to perceive the government—and not just 
particular legal proceedings—as fair. In a survey administered to over 1,500 people who had 
interacted with a local police department and the courts, Tom Tyler found that the following 
factors had significant impacts on participants’ perceptions of the government: whether 
authorities behaved ethically, whether a participant could be represented by counsel, the quality 
of decisions made, whether procedures were in place to correct errors, and whether procedures 
were consistent and nonbiased.57 Other studies have reached similar conclusions, finding the 
consistency of decisionmaking to be particularly important in the levels of fairness citizens 
ascribed to the government.58  
 A perception that the government is fair produces numerous beneficial consequences. 
Studies suggest that procedural unfairness causes people to perceive others as responsible for 
results that occurred. Indeed, “holding someone else accountable for injustice, and directing 
responses toward the accountable party, emerges as an overall integrative theme across various 
theories of justice.”59 In contrast, when government procedures are fair, citizens are more likely 
to take responsibility for their own actions, even with outcomes that are unfavorable to them.60 
This research suggests that due process procedures encourages people to take more responsibility 
for their actions, transforming them into better citizens.  
 The perception of fairness generates higher degrees of satisfaction with the government. 
Although it seems counterintuitive, citizens may care more about whether procedures are fair 
than their substantive outcomes. In their studies of interactions between citizens and the police, 
Tyler and Lind discovered that some citizens who received erroneous, but favorable outcomes—
for example, when the traffic court dismissed a ticket for making an illegal turn despite the 
existence of footage showing the driver actually did so—were less satisfied with the court and 
perceived the proceedings as less legitimate than did citizens who received negative, but fair 
outcomes.61 Another study by Tyler showed that fair procedures had a greater positive impact on 
respect for law than did the favorableness or fairness of the outcome.62 Studies indicate that 
procedural fairness also plays a key role in shaping views of the legitimacy of executive 
decisionmaking as well.63 Other studies have drawn similar conclusions.64 
 
56 PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., supra note 28, at 36–37. 
57 See Tom Tyler, What Is Procedural Fairness?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988). 
58 See Jerald Greenberg, Reactions to Procedural Justice in Payment Distributions: Do the Means Justify the Ends?, 
72 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 55 (1986); B.H. Sheppard & R.J. Lewicki, Towards General Principles of Managerial Justice, 
1 SOC. JUSTICE RESEARCH 161 (1987). 
59 See ROBERT FOLGER & RUSSELL CROPANZANO, ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 174 (1998).  
60 See Joel Brockner, Procedural Fairness, Outcome Favorability, and Judgments of an Authority’s Responsibility, 
92 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1657 (2007).  
61 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 55 
62 TYLER, supra note 52. 
63 Tom R. Tyler, Kenneth A. Rasinski & Kathleen M. McGraw, The Influence of Perceived Injustice on the 
Endorsement of Political Leaders, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 700, 715, 717 (1985). 
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E. Better Compliance with the Law 
 The perception of fairness can make citizens more likely to comply with the law, 
particularly in borderline situations where they otherwise would not. Modern scholarship has 
cast doubt on the notion that the mere threat of punishment can effectively deter lawbreaking.65 
Instead of simple threats, the more productive strategy obliges citizens to desire to comply with 
the law. As Paul Robinson explains in the criminal law context, if the law “earns a reputation as 
a reliable statement of what the community perceives as condemnable, people are more likely to 
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline 
cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the 
actor.”66  
 Empirical studies have confirmed that procedural fairness increases compliance with the 
law. Tyler’s landmark survey found that stronger procedural fairness by the courts and policy 
increased adherence to the law.67 A study by Raymond Paternoster et al. focusing on domestic 
violence cases similarly found that the use of fair procedures reduced the rate of recurrence.68 
Other analyses found that procedural fairness has a similar impact on compliance with arbitral 
and mediation awards.69 Thus, procedural fairness thus has the additional benefit of increasing 
compliance among the regulated.  
F. Better Control of the Bureaucracy 
 Procedural fairness also reduces the risk that lower-level bureaucrats will use their broad 
discretion to pursue priorities different from those of agency leaders. Some scholars hypothesize 
that agency bureaucrats maximize discretion, minimize work, minimize risk, or take other steps 
that maximize their prestige within their chosen field and prioritize the interests and concerns of 
their colleagues over those of agency leaders or the public.70  
 More generally, lower-level officials may have different visions for how the agency 
should operate than agency leaders. Research suggests that since agency employees typically 
join a particular agency because they identify with its mission, they can develop tunnel vision.71 
And since agency officials tend to analyze issues in ways reflecting their training, experience, 
 
64 For a survey, see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SWISS J. ECON. & STAT. 
219, 225–27 (1997). 
65 See, e.g., Beaton-Wells, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
66 PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 162–63 (2013). 
67 TYLER, supra note 52. 
68 Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1997). 
69 E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision 
Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, LAW & HUMAN 
BEHAV. 313 (1993).  
70 See Alberto Dávila et al., Immigration Reform, the INS, and the Distribution of Interior and Border Resources, 99 
PUB. CHOICE 327 (1999); Edward Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression and its Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 291, 316–17 
(2012). 
71 See Bo Vesterdorf, Due Process Before the Commission of the European Union? Some Reflections Upon Reading 
the Commission Draft Paper on Best Practices in Antitrust Proceedings, CPI ANTITRUST J. 3–4 (2010), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/0d358061e11f2708ad9d62634c6c40ad/VesterdorfAPR-
101.pdf. 
11 
and professional norms, they sometimes make decisions without critically examining the limits 
of the assumptions underlying those heuristics or considering alternative perspectives.72 
Furthermore, experts tend to overestimate their abilities in areas where they believe they have 
superior knowledge or where their profession has already identified most of the problems and the 
likely solutions.73 Psychologists have subsequently criticized experts as being “often wrong but 
rarely in doubt.”74  
 Individual officials’ desire to advance their own careers is another potential source of 
biased decisionmaking. The risk has long existed that agency bureaucrats may engage in 
overzealous enforcement to promote their professional advancement even when doing so 
threatens fair adjudication.75  
 Conversely, a staff member working on an action that ultimately proves meritless may be 
cognitively and professionally reluctant to concede that they have devoted several years to a 
matter that will ultimately amount to nothing, even when terminating the action would be the 
proper course as a matter of justice.76 Bringing enforcement actions is generally an essential part 
of promoting an agency official’s career, and terminating an investigation after recommending 
that it proceed to the second phase can be embarrassing.77 
 As noted above, overly aggressive prosecution can be the product of cognitive dissonance 
as well. As General Court Judge Ian Forrester observed, “When diligent and honest officials 
investigate a case over a period of time, say four years, and then issue a statement of objections 
once the case is, say, 80 percent concluded, it is fully understandable that officials are reluctant 
to be persuaded that they were wrong.”78 Former European General Court Judge Bo Vesterdorf 
similarly observed, “It is . . . I think a well known fact that, once you have been working 
intensively and sometimes for a very, very long time on a particular case, it is easy to acquire a 
sort of ‘tunnel vision,’ not seeing the forest for the trees.”79 Or, in the words of the U.S. Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, “A man who has buried himself on one side 
of an issue is disabled from bringing to [his] decision that dispassionate judgment . . . 
demand[ed] of officials who decide questions.”80 It is simply human nature for anyone who has 
invested significant time and energy into a case to find it hard to conclude that all their effort was 
for naught. 
 
72 See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 549, 579–80 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard-Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic 
Decisionmaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 559, 564 (1997).  
73 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 72, at 559–61, 579–80. 
74 See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992). 
75 See Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 869, 992 (2009); Damien Geradin & Nicholas Petit, Judicial Review in European Union Competition 
Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment 13–14 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-088, 2011), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1698342; Forrester, supra note 26, at 841. 
76 See Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 564; Geradin & Petit, supra note 75, at 13–14. 
77 Wils, supra note 34, at 218–19. 
78 Forrester, supra note 26, at 841. 
79 Vesterdorf, supra note 576, at 4. 
80 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 56 (1941). 
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G.  Restraints on the Influence of Special Interest Groups 
 Procedural protections can also counter undue pressure by special interest groups. In 
addition to cognitive and institutional biases that may exist within agencies, decisions may 
likewise be affected by outside forces acting on agencies. In one of the most cited articles in U.S. 
administrative law,81 then-Harvard Law Professor Richard Stewart advanced an “interest 
representation” model of agency action, which concludes that rather than acting as faithful 
servants of the legislative process, agencies strengthen minority and special interest voices.82 
 Other scholars have built on this work to explore how pressure from special interest 
groups can distort agency decisionmaking. Special interest groups in general, and industry 
groups in particular, can disproportionately influence agency decisions because they possess 
significant resources and stakes in the outcome of agency decisions.83 Special interests also often 
serve as the primary source of information for agency decisionmaking.84 Moreover, many 
agency staff come from industry groups and may have ambitions to return to them after leaving 
the government.85 In extreme cases, the agency may become so responsive to industry concerns 
as to become effectively “captured” by the industry.86 Stewart’s solution to this problem is to 
increase parties’ rights of participation and to enhance judicial review.87 
H. Countering Corruption 
 Finally, unchecked power and discretion in the hands of officials magnify the risk of 
corruption. Unbridled discretion creates the risk that administrators will base their decisions on 
personal preferences or connections. Even more problematic is the potential that administrative 
decisions will be based on political influence or monetary contributions. To cite one celebrated 
example, in the 1970s, allegations emerged that the U.S. settled a major antitrust case against 
International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT) in part because of ITT’s promise to provide financial 
support for the 1972 Republican National Convention, although those charges were never 
proven.88 Similarly, in a speech at the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
Chinese President, Xi Jinping, acknowledged that corruption was a major issue for the Chinese 
government, especially at the regional level.89 Transparent enforcement procedures and public 
 
81 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1550 (1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The 
Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767 (1996); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited 
Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2012). 
82 Stewart, supra note 32. 
83 See Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22 
(2010).  
84 See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1331 
(2010). 
85 See KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 342 (1986); 
Nicholas Bagley & Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 
1284–85 (2006); Barkow, supra note 83, at 22; Wagner, supra note 84, at 1331. 
86 Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997). 
87 Stewart, supra note 32, at 1748–60. 
88 See Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 
594 (1973). 
89 See Xi Jingping, President of China, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in 
All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Delivered at 
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participation will make it harder for lower- or mid-level bureaucrats to act corruptly, as higher-
level agency leaders will be able to notice deviations from established practices more easily.90 
III. COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES IN CHINA, THE EU, AND THE U.S. 
 This report analyzes antitrust enforcement processes in China, the EU, and the U.S. The 
analysis is based around the six-phase framework listed above of (1) investigations: document 
requests, interviews, and interrogatories, (2) investigations: inspections of company premises, (3) 
agency deliberations, (4) issuance of decisions, (5) settlement, and (6) judicial review, with each 
phase being broken down into two-to-six smaller steps. After discussing the chosen steps for 
each phase, this report will analyze the similarities and differences across jurisdictions. Finally, 
the report will argue that three procedures are essential to due process, while presenting several 
other important ones. Ultimately, the desirability of a procedure depends on a system’s values 
and priorities. In our analysis, we recommend procedures that promote reasoned decisionmaking, 
fairness to the parties, and transparency. We believe a system that achieves these ends will reap 
the benefits of due process. 
 Differences in enforcement structure make comparisons across the three jurisdictions 
somewhat challenging. In China, the State Council, the most senior executive body, created the 
Anti-Monopoly Committee (AMC), responsible for researching and formulating competition 
policy, organizing investigation and evaluation of the overall competitive landscape, publishing 
evaluation reports, drafting and publishing antitrust guidelines, and coordinating administrative 
enforcement efforts.91 The AML gives the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority (AMEA) 
responsibility for the day-to-day enforcement of the AML.92 In the first decade following the 
implementation of the AML, enforcement was split among three agencies: the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was responsible for price-related monopolistic 
conduct, including price monopoly agreements of undertakings and price-related abuse by 
undertaking with dominant market position to exclude or limit competition;93 the State 
Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) was responsible for enforcement against 
nonprice-related monopoly agreements and non-price-related abuses of dominant market 
position;94 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was responsible for the review of 
 
19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm (“The people 
resent corruption the most, and corruption is the greatest threat our party faces.”). 
90 See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609–10 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that the “first step” towards curbing graft, 
corruption, and other abuses of governmental office is “require[ing] adherence to the standards of due process”); 
WU, supra note 44, at 1; WRAGE, supra note 44, at 27. 
91 See Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 9 (adopted on Aug. 30, 2007 by the twenty-ninth 
session of the Tenth National People’s Congress Standing Committee) [hereinafter the AML].  
92 See AML, supra note 91, art. 10. 
93 See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures (PRC National Development and Reform Commission Decree No. 7, published 
Dec. 29, 2010) Article 3 [hereinafter NDRC Anti-Price Procedures]. 
94 See Procedural Rules by Administration of Industry and Commerce Regarding Investigation and Handling of 
Cases Relating to Monopoly Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Market Position art. 8 (Decree No. 53 enacted by 
SAIC on May 26, 2009) [hereinafter SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases]. 
14 
concentration of undertakings.95 The Development and Reform Commission (DRCs) or 
Administrations of Commodity Prices (ACPs) and Administrations for Industry and Commerce 
(AICs) at provincial level (or autonomous region or municipality) may conduct antimonopoly 
enforcement activities duly authorized by the State Council antimonopoly enforcement body.96 
The delegation of power by NDRC to local DRCs or ACPs is a blanket authorization, whereas 
the SAIC delegates its power to local AICs on a case-by-case basis.97 In the new round of 
institutional reform of 2018, antitrust functions were centralized by a single agency called the 
State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). Concurrent with the reshuffling, the office 
functions of the State Council Antimonopoly Commission shifted onto the State Administration 
for Market Regulation.98 The SAMR Notice on Antimonopoly Enforcement Authority issued on 
December 28, 2018, also unified the authorization criteria and adopted blanket authorization. 
Provincial-level Market Regulation Administrations (MRAs) may investigate and penalize 
monopolistic conduct in their respective jurisdiction in their own name.99 For the purpose of this 
report and for retrospective analysis, we largely stick to the previous agency names and their 
regulations.  
 In Europe, responsibility for enforcing competition laws is divided between the European 
Commission and the enforcement agencies of individual member states.100 The European 
Commission has established the Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp), which is 
Europe’s primary competition enforcement agency.  
 Each member state also has its own national enforcement agency, known as a National 
Competition Authority (NCA). NCAs are considered well placed to deal with cases that 
substantially affect competition mainly within a single country’s territory based on national 
competition laws, as they are better situated to gather the evidence required to prove and 
effectively eliminate the infringements of competition law whose effects are confined to one 
member state. Parallel actions by two or three NCAs may be appropriate when an agreement or 
practice has substantial effects on competition mainly in their respective territories and the action 
of only one NCA would not be sufficient to eliminate the entire infringement and/or to sanction 
it adequately. In the early 2000s, the Commission decided to decentralize EU competition 
enforcement, adopting Regulation 1/2003, NCAs not only enforce national competition laws but 
also EU competition law unless the Commission decides to take a case itself because it effects 
the European common market significantly, which is mainly the case for markets “where there 
are only a few players, where cartel activity is recurrent, or where abuses of market power are 
generic.”101 DG Comp is additionally primarily responsible for cases involving agreements or 
practices that have effects on competition in more than three member states.102 
 
95 See MOFCOM Concentration Notification Measures (MOFCOM Decree 2009 No. 11, reviewed and passed by 
the twenty-sixth ministerial affairs meeting on July 15, 2009), art. 2. [hereinafter MOFCOM Concentration 
Notification Measures]. 
96 See AML, supra note 91, art. 10. 
97 See SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases, supra note 94, art. 3. 
98 See National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Institutional Reform Plan (Mar. 
18, 2018), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/18/content_2050371.htm. 
99 See SAMR Notice on Antimonopoly Enforcement Authority (SAMR Antimonopoly (2018) No. 265). 
100 See generally Forrester, supra note 26. 
101 Communication from the Commission: A Pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe, at 16, COM 
(2004) 293 final (Apr. 20, 2004). 
102 Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition Authorities, arts. 5–15, 2004 O.J. (C 
101) 43. 
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 However, the European Commission may initiate a proceeding sua sponte based on 
Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU at any time based on a complaint or ex officio.103 Since Articles 
101 and 102 of TFEU are only applicable if an agreement or abusive behavior affects the internal 
market, the Commission cannot take purely national cases. However, since the effect on the 
internal market only needs to be a “potential” one, the Commission’s authority to take cases is 
rather broad. Once the Commission has decided to initiate a proceeding the NCAs are banned 
from initiating or continuing a parallel proceeding.104 Moreover, at that point, the NCAs are no 
longer able to apply their national competition law to a case.105 An advisory committee 
“composed of representatives of competition authorities from the member states”106 ensures 
consistency and cooperation between the European Commission and the NCAs. 
 In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and private litigants, all share antitrust enforcement power.107 The 
FTC is an administrative body agency primarily responsible for civil violations of the antitrust 
laws. It can initiate proceedings in court or adjudicate them administratively.108 The DOJ has 
exclusive authority to prosecute criminal violations of the antitrust laws and can also bring civil 
cases. Unlike the FTC, it cannot enforce the antitrust laws administratively. Instead, it must 
proceed exclusively in court.109 Private litigants, who sue under the antitrust laws about ten times 
more often than government enforcers, can seek damages or injunctive relief for violations of the 
laws.110 
 Comparisons are somewhat complicated by broad differences in the three jurisdictions’ 
legal systems. The U.S. legal system has a long adversarial tradition wherein judges are 
supposed to be neutral arbiters between opposing parties. This adversarial system is sometimes 
carried over to U.S. agencies; however, many U.S. agency proceedings, such as Social Security 
Administration disability hearings, are inquisitorial – meaning that the adjudicator participates 
more actively by soliciting information from the parties before them.111 In contrast to the U.S., 
China’s legal system is predominantly inquisitorial.112 While some EU countries’ legal systems, 
like that of the United Kingdom, are adversarial, most are inquisitorial.113 Further, EU agencies 
rely on the inquisitorial model.114 Although we acknowledge the broad differences between the 
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three jurisdictions’ legal systems, we follow the American Bar Association’s (ABA) approach to 
them:  
Because antitrust enforcement is embedded in such an enormous variety of 
indigenous legal systems found in different jurisdictions, the Report identifies 
practices that are sufficiently “generic” to be capable of inclusion within any basic 
approach to antitrust law enforcement. Thus, the Report does not presume the 
superiority of any particular legal system – administrative or 
prosecutorial/judicial, adversarial or inquisitorial, whether civil-law or common-
law based.115  
A. Investigations: Document Requests, Interviews, and Interrogatories 
 In all three jurisdictions, competition enforcement authorities have the power to initiate 
investigations of companies by ordering them to supply documents, submit to interviews, or 
answer questions in writing, known as interrogatories. 
 In China, pursuant to the Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty Procedures 
Relating to Market Supervision and Administration published by the State Administration for 
Market Regulation (SAMR) on December 21, 2018, antimonopoly cases may begin due to 
investigations ex officio, upon reporting or whistleblowing by private parties, or following a 
transfer from other agencies or an assignment by higher-level agencies.116 The first two make up 
the bulk of the antimonopoly cases. Under the AML, with respect to whistleblowing, if the tip is 
made in writing and accompanied with supporting facts and evidence, the enforcement agency 
must perform necessary investigation.117 As previously stated, NDRC adopts blanket 
authorization to its local offices whereas SAIC follows a case-by-case approach for the 
delegation of power. In a whistleblowing case, a local ACP may initiate investigation directly. A 
local AIC needs to review whether the tip points to suspected monopolistic conduct taking place 
predominantly within its jurisdiction and report such review findings, and its decision regarding 
whether or not to initiate a case, to the SAIC.118 Cases can also originate if a cartel member 
submits a leniency application. 
 Prior to the creation of SAMR, MOFCOM oversaw merger control in accordance with 
Article 21 of the AML.119 Parties intending to conduct a transaction that constituted a 
concentration under the AML (including merger, obtaining of control over another entity through 
acquisition of shares or assets or based on contracts, etc.) that exceeded State Council’s 
stipulated thresholds had to notify MOFCOM about the proposed transaction and submit certain 
documents.120 The process was broken down into one informal phase (the pre-acceptance 
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period)121 and two formal phases (Phase I – Preliminary Review and Phase II – Further 
Review).122 At a maximum, Phase I could last about thirty days; Phase II could last about ninety 
days, but could be extended for an additional sixty days. Requests for documents could occur 
during any of these phases. Parties could also submit materials voluntarily.123 If the notification 
of the proposed merger transaction was incomplete, MOFCOM could request that the parties 
revise or supplement it before a case is officially accepted.124 
 In the EU, the European Commission can initiate a proceeding based on a complaint, an 
agency-initiated investigation, or a leniency application (in the case of cartels), a method that has 
become increasingly common.125 The Commission and NCAs encourage citizens to report 
suspected infringement of competition rules by submitting a complaint form or description in 
email.126 Formal complaints must satisfy several formal requirements.127 They need to be 
submitted in writing, and need to specify the presumed evidence for the violation of EU 
Competition law. Agencies initiate investigations with requests for information.128 EU law 
authorizes simple requests for documents, which are voluntary, and complex or binding requests, 
which are compulsory. Although the European Commission has the power to take statements by 
witnesses, it cannot demand their testimony.129 Interviewees must give their consent to be 
interviewed and cannot be forced to answer questions. At the beginning of the interview, the 
interviewing agent must state and confirm the voluntary nature of the interview, as well as the 
right to an attorney.130 Therefore, in the EU, interviews are more an opportunity for the party 
under investigation to present its views through its employees and have this testimony entered 
into the record as opposed to an investigative tool for the Commission. However, the 
Commission’s ability to request information during an inspection is a significant tool. If the 
Commission inspects a company’s premises, it has the right to ask company staff for an 
explanation of certain facts or documents relating to the investigation and may record their 
answers.131 Company staff must answer the Commission’s questions to fulfill their legal duty to 
cooperate with the investigation.132 If the company had not authorized the questioned staff 
member to provide explanations it has a right to submit rectifications, amendments, or 
supplements to the staff member’s explanations.133  
 The foregoing procedures likewise apply to the EU merger control regime, whereby the 
Commission requires notification from parties if a proposed transaction exceeds a certain 
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threshold level.134 The European Commission reviews the proposed transactions in a single 
procedure under the EU’s “one-stop-shop” principle.135 Qualifying parties are required to file a 
notification with the Commission prior to consummation of the proposed transaction136 or a 
Short Form if the proposed transaction is unlikely to raise competition concerns.137 After 
reviewing the information submitted in the notification and potential subsequent requests for 
information or inspection, the Commission will decide that (1) the proposed transaction is not 
within the scope of the Commission’s merger control regulations, (2) the proposed transaction 
does not raise anti-competitive concerns, or (3) the proposed transaction raises doubts about anti-
competitive effects.138 In the first two instances, it will issue a decision declaring so. In the third 
instance, it will initiate an investigation (Phase II investigation).139 
 In the U.S., the FTC or DOJ can gather information by issuing a subpoena or a civil 
investigative demand (CID) requesting testimony, documents, written reports, and written 
answers.140 The agencies sometimes have the power to share information with each other or 
Congress, but otherwise the information must be kept confidential and is exempt from the 
Freedom of Information Act.141  
 The agencies may also demand documents in a merger review process. In a merger 
review proceeding, the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act requires parties to file a notification form 
with both agencies if their proposed merger transaction exceeds certain thresholds for asset size 
or transaction value.142 Parties must wait thirty calendar days (which may be extended at the 
agency’s discretion) before consummating the proposed transaction to allow the agencies to 
review the proposed transaction and determine whether or not a preliminary investigation is 
required.143 Parties can shorten the thirty-day period, however, by requesting “early 
termination,” which is usually granted in about two weeks.144 The agencies request documents in 
three ways: (1) in the HSR filing, (2) in a “voluntary access letter” during the initial waiting 
period,145 or (3) in a Request for Additional Information and Documentary Material (known as a 
“second request”), should the agency decide to investigate.146 
 This section breaks down the process of conducting investigations through requests for 
documents, interviews, and interrogatories into five separate steps: 
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1. Basis for believing that investigations are justified 
2. Internal high-level review of requests to investigate 
3. Description of the documents to be produced 
4. Presence and advice of legal counsel during interviews 
5. Judicial review of requests for documents, interviews, and interrogatories 
1. Procedural Steps of Document Requests, Interviews, and Interrogatories 
a. Basis for believing that investigations are justified 
 Each jurisdiction requires the relevant authorities to have some basis for believing that 
there has been an antitrust violation before beginning an investigation, although the laws in each 
jurisdiction differ slightly. 
China 
 Article 38 of China’s AML obligates enforcement officials to investigate possible 
violations of anti-monopoly law, but does not explicitly state that the basis under which an 
investigation is justified. However, Chinese agencies must state the grounds for their 
investigatory actions. For instance, when an agency takes certain types of action, such as seizing 
property, Article 18 of the Administrative Enforcement Law requires officials to simultaneously 
give reasons for the action. Likewise, development and reform commissions initiating 
investigations, pursuant to the Price Law147 and the Provisions on the Procedures for Price-
related Administrative Penalties,148 must adhere to certain procedures. The investigators may 
issue an Inspection Notice to (1) interview the people concerned or related personnel and 
demand evidence or other materials relating to price violations; (2) examine and duplicate 
accounts, bills, vouchers, documents and other materials related to price violations and verify 
banking data associated with such price violations; (3) check property related to the price 
violations and, where appropriate, order the people concerned to suspend business operation; (4) 
and document and preserve evidence that is liable to be destroyed or lost or become inaccessible 
for which the people concerned or related personnel must not remove, conceal or destroy.149 The 
Inspection Notice is issued by the head of the price regulatory body,150 and (among other things) 
states the nature of the investigation. 
 
147 Price Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted in the twenty-ninth session of the eighth National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee on Dec. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Price Law]. 
148 Provisions on the Procedures for Price-Related Administrative Penalties (NDRC Decree No. 22, revised and 
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149 See Price Law, supra note 147, art. 34. 
150 See Provisions on the Procedures for Price-Related Administrative Penalties, supra note 148, art. 20. 
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European Union 
 EU law requires that investigators who wish to initiate an investigation have reasonable 
grounds for suspecting a violation of competition rules.151 What constitutes reasonable grounds 
has yet to be defined, although in evaluating reasonable grounds to initiate an investigation, 
courts have emphasized the need for some affirmative showing. The mere fact that a confirmed 
conspirator in one market cannot deny the possibility that an anti-competitive scheme has spread 
to another market does not justify the Commission launching a new investigation into that other 
market.152  
 Article 17(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 describes circumstances under 
which the Commission may engage in a sector inquiry.153 Specifically, it may conduct an 
investigation into a sector of the economy and certain types of agreements across various sectors 
(such as e-commerce or pharmaceuticals) if the Commission believes a market may not be 
functioning as it should be, possibly due to competition violations.154 The Commission may then 
publish a report of their findings and invite comments from interested parties.155 A sector-inquiry 
can then become the source for initiating proceedings against specific parties provided that the 
inquiry produces evidence that a violation of competition law is likely. 
 The EU also requires the Commission to describe the nature of the conduct constituting 
the alleged antitrust violation. Article 18(2) of Regulation 1/2003, which details regulations on 
requests for information, requires the Commission to state a “legal basis and purpose” of the 
investigation request before proceeding.156 The level of detail the Commission must provide is 
lower for a voluntary simple request than for a decision, which is binding. When the 
Commission issues a binding decision, it cannot simply describe the purpose of their 
investigation in a succinct, vague, and generic way. The notice must additionally describe both 
the alleged violating conduct and the geographic and product market under investigation.157 
 Although the Commission is required to communicate to the party under investigation the 
presumed facts that it intends to investigate, it is not required to communicate the evidence upon 
which its suspicions are based in the initial stages of the proceeding.158 If a request is challenged 
in Court questioning the reasonableness of the Commission’s grounds to investigate, the Court 
may require the Commission to show its evidence to the Court.159 
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 Finally, in a merger review, the Commission receives documents from parties proposing 
a merger transaction.160 Upon initial review, the Commission can issue either a simple request or 
a binding decision for additional materials.161 The Commission must state the legal basis and 
purpose of its request, specify the information requested, delineate a time period during which 
the parties must comply, and disclose penalties for incorrect or misleading information, or non-
compliance.162 
United States 
 U.S. law imposes similar requirements to the EU. The handling of antitrust investigations 
is split between the FTC and DOJ, and each agency’s process to initiate a preliminary 
investigation differs slightly. Prior to authorizing an initial investigation, investigators at the FTC 
must submit a recommendation to the Bureau Director “explain[ing] why [an] investigation is 
warranted.”163 In an initial investigation, investigators typically do not use any compulsory 
techniques (such as issuing CIDs, subpoenas, or access orders), but instead develop their case 
through voluntary requests for information, interviews, and interrogatories.164 Any request for 
information, whether voluntary or compulsory, must be accompanied by notification to the 
investigated of the “purpose and scope of the investigation, the nature of the acts or practices 
under investigation, and the applicable provisions of law.”165 If seeking approval to launch a full 
investigation beyond the initial phase, FTC investigators must first submit for approval a 
memorandum detailing their justification for the investigation, legal analysis of any novel legal 
points, the impact of the suspected conduct on consumers, and the extent of consumer injury, 
among other information.166 To issue a CID or subpoena, FTC investigators must first obtain 
approval from the Commission by submitting a memorandum detailing what information is 
needed, “the reasons why the information is relevant to the inquiry,” and the cost and burden the 
request will impose on the parties.167  
 Prior to authorizing a preliminary investigation, the DOJ must have a “reason to believe” 
an antitrust violation has occurred.168 Particular attention is given to the amount of commerce 
affected, whether an investigation would duplicate or interfere with other government efforts, 
and resource allocations.169 The DOJ will consider whether the violations are sufficient enough 
to be investigated criminally, and whether the case is significant enough to warrant an 
investigation and potential grand jury subpoena. The DOJ may issue a CID if it has “reason to 
believe” an antitrust violation has occurred that is within the scope of the DOJ’s authority.170 The 
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“reason to believe” standard is not particularly demanding. The requirements to issue a CID 
“[do] not imply that the Commission must possess a minimum quantity of evidence before it 
issues a CID.”171 Rather, a complaint by customers can be a sufficient basis to issue a CID. The 
DOJ does not need to satisfy the heightened criminal law “probable cause” standard to issue a 
CID.172 When issuing a CID or subpoena, both agencies must have a “reason to believe” that the 
receiving party may have documentary material or information “relevant to a civil antitrust 
investigation.”173 
 A CID must state in general terms the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged 
antitrust violation and the applicable provision of law applicable thereto.174 The statement must 
be sufficient enough for the recipient to determine whether or not the documents demanded are 
relevant.175 This requirement is not intended to be overly restrictive. A description such as, 
“restrictive membership and other anticompetitive practices,” was adequate when the DOJ 
informally communicated with the recipient prior to the issuance of the CID.176 Even a fairly 
general description such as “possible violation of Section l of the Sherman Act by a ‘contract or 
combination in unreasonable restraint of trade’” was sufficient, where the DOJ communicated 
with the recipient prior to and after the issuance of the CID.177 
 U.S. law does not require advance disclosure of the factual basis underlying the 
investigation.178 The requirements to issue a CID “[do] not imply that the Commission must 
possess a minimum quantity of evidence before it issues a CID.”179 However, if the CID 
recipient does not produce the requested documents and the agency moves to enforce the CID in 
court, or the recipient seeks to quash the CID, the agency must provide an explanation of the 
factual and legal basis for enforcement of the CID.180 If the recipient seeks to nullify the CID on 
grounds that its issuance was based on improper motives, then an affidavit from the Assistant 
Attorney General explaining the agency’s reasoning is typically sufficient to sustain the CID.181 
 In a merger review process, the FTC and DOJ will request documents in the form of a 
required HSR notification form, voluntary access letter during the 30-day waiting period, or 
second request after an investigation has been launched.182 The HSR filing is mandatory 
according to the HSR Act. During the waiting period, the agencies are not required to justify a 
request for additional documentation, but “should contact the parties to discuss competitive 
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concerns and request information.”183 Agencies may also issue CIDs during the initial 
investigation phase and will adhere to the practices described above.184 If the agencies decide to 
initiate a full investigation, they will issue a second request for more materials.185 The agencies 
are held to the standard that additional requests for materials must not be “unreasonably 
cumulative, unduly burdensome, or duplicative.”186 
International norms 
 International authorities generally agree that enforcement agencies should give parties 
under investigation notice of the nature of the legal basis and the conduct that is the focus of the 
investigation, but that such considerations should be balanced against the need to preserve the 
integrity of the investigation. For example, the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process, Article 
5.2, states that “[t]o the extent that it does not undermine the effectiveness of an investigation, 
agencies should notify parties as soon as feasible that an investigation has been opened, and 
identify its legal basis, the conduct under investigation, and, if possible, the expected timing of 
the investigation.”187 Article 5.3 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process provides that 
enforcement authorities “should inform parties of the basic facts and nature of evidence gathered, 
as well as the agency’s theories of competitive harm.” As the ICC’s recommended framework 
for international best practices in competition law enforcement proceedings similarly 
emphasizes, “[a] firm cannot defend itself appropriately unless the competition authority informs 
the firm of the allegations, the claims, and the evidence supporting the claims.”188 The ICC best 
practices framework recommends that, “[u]pon initiation of an investigation, the competition 
authority should inform the Respondent(s) of the fact of the investigation and the legal authority 
(that is, the specific statutory and regulatory provisions) under which the agency may 
proceed.”189 The ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task Force also included that agency 
officials should clearly identify to parties the legal, factual, and economic basis of the 
investigation.190 
b. Internal high-level review of requests to investigate  
 In China, the EU, and the U.S., enforcement agents are required by statute to seek 
approval from high-level officials before proceeding with an investigation. However, the 
approval systems vary widely across the three jurisdictions. Most notably, the U.S. procedure is 
rather formal and laid out in administrative manuals in considerable detail, while the approval 
process in China and the EU is less formal and involves fewer procedural steps. 
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China 
 In China, development and reform commissions (DRCs), administrations of commodity 
prices (ACPs), and administrations for industry and commerce (AICs) at the provincial level (or 
an autonomous region or municipality) may conduct antimonopoly enforcement activities duly 
authorized by the State Council antimonopoly enforcement body.191 The delegation of power by 
NDRC to local enforcement agencies was a blanket authorization,192 whereas SAIC followed a 
case-by-case approach.193 However, before an investigation can proceed, an Inspection 
(Investigation) Notice must be authorized by the head of the authority or an authorized 
organization and affixed with the organizational seal.194 SAMR adopts a blanket authorization 
for local market supervision authorities. Before case initiation, an Initiation Approval Form shall 
be filled out. The case handling agency shall assign two or more case handlers to the case.195 
European Union 
 Within the European Commission, the approval requirements vary depending on whether 
the request is a simple request, which is not compulsory for the parties, or a binding decision, 
which is compulsory. DG Comp consists of roughly forty different units, each specializing in a 
different subject matter. A Head of Unit or case manager can authorize a simple request for 
information. The Commission can also directly adopt a binding decision compelling a company 
to provide information. A formal decision to investigate must be issued first before sending out a 
binding decision to supply information. The European Commission delegates the authority to 
issue that decision to the Competition Commissioner,196 who in turn sub-delegates the authority 
to DG Comp.197 The Commission then decides whether or not to open an investigation based on 
a report prepared by the case team and a discussion with the case team, senior management, the 
Commissioner, and the Commission’s legal team. 
United States 
 U.S. antitrust enforcement employs a multitier system of internal approvals, with the 
process following different paths in the FTC and the DOJ. Antitrust enforcement within the FTC 
is handled by the Bureau of Competition, which is headed by the Bureau Director, three Deputy 
Bureau Directors, and nine Assistant Bureau Directors. FTC staff must obtain the approval of the 
Assistant Bureau Director, to whom they report, before initiating an investigation.198 The 
Assistant Bureau Director will prepare and send a recommendation and request to the Bureau of 
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Competition’s Office of Policy and Coordination,199 where it is reviewed by an Evaluation 
Committee consisting of the Bureau Director, high-level and litigation staff from the Bureau of 
Competition, and high-level staff from the Bureau of Economics. The Evaluation Committee 
then issues an advisory recommendation to the Bureau Director, who ultimately makes the final 
determination on whether to launch an investigation. When a matter advances from the initial 
phase to a full investigation, the Evaluation Committee and the Bureau Director must review the 
case once again. A full investigation, which involves the adoption of investigative resolutions to 
issue CIDs and subpoenas, requires the approval of one of the Commissioners, and each 
subpoena or CID must be signed by a Commissioner.200 
 The DOJ follows a slightly different multi-tiered process. The Antitrust Division consists 
of six civil litigation sessions, two criminal sections, and three field offices, each headed by a 
chief and two or more assistant chiefs. When a DOJ staff attorney has developed a sufficient 
factual and legal basis to support a formal civil investigation, the attorney must consult with a 
staff economist in the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) and seek approval by the section or field 
office chief before commencing the investigation.201 A notification of the proposed investigation 
is sent to all chiefs and assistant chiefs. When a DOJ staff member would like to issue 
compulsory process or open a grand jury investigation, the Antitrust Division Manual advises 
them to consult with the section or field office chief and the relevant EAG chief to discuss the 
results of their preliminary investigation.202 Any staff recommendations to proceed by grand jury 
investigation, second request, or CID must be processed through the appropriate Director of 
Enforcement and the assigned Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and require the approval of 
the Assistant Attorney General.203 
 In a merger review process, second requests are prepared by staff attorneys and 
economists. The Bureau of Competition management must review all second requests to ensure 
they are accurate and narrowly tailored before the request can be issued to the investigated 
parties.204 
International norms 
 The emerging international consensus supports requiring some type of high-level 
approval before an investigation can proceed. Paragraph 2.1 of the ICN Guidance on 
Investigative Process includes “appropriate internal agency review” as one of the “appropriate 
limitations on the use of investigative tools.”205 More specifically, paragraph 3.1 recommends 
that “Compulsory agency requests for information should be subject to internal review prior to 
being issued.”206 The ICN Roundtable on Competition Agency Investigative Process reiterates 
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this directive and emphasizes “the need for staff to seek higher level agency approval for 
compulsory requests to help ensure appropriateness and consistency.”207 
c. Description of the documents to be produced 
 All three jurisdictions require enforcement officials to provide some level of advance 
notice to investigated parties of the types of documents being sought, although the level of notice 
required varies across enforcement agencies in China and across the three jurisdictions. 
China 
 China’s AML describes only the documents required in a case of concentration of 
undertakings, but in practice NDRC, SAIC and their sub-national agencies often produced a “list 
of evidence for pickup” during investigations. MOFCOM also, in practice, clearly described to 
the parties the documents required in the review of their proposed transaction. MOFCOM 
developed detailed guidance on what documents and information had to be submitted for review 
of concentration transactions that exceeded stipulated thresholds, (e.g., legal and factual issues, 
such as how the parties are defining relevant product and geographic markets, specific 
agreements, etc.).208 In both merger review phases, MOFCOM conducted ongoing discussions 
with the parties to assist incomplete applications and collected necessary information for their 
review.209 
European Union 
 Under EU Law, the Commission is obliged to indicate as precisely as possible the 
evidence being sought.210 In part, this is an expression of the general requirement that the 
Commission’s demands must be proportional. However, this does not indicate that all documents 
or files need be individually and precisely identified in advance, as this would render the 
Commission’s power to investigate ineffective.211 The European Commission thus enjoys a 
degree of discretion in deciding what evidence is necessary for their investigation.212 
Nevertheless, the Commission must not engage in a so-called “fishing expedition.”213 
Commission requests had been quite narrowly tailored in the past, but have become broader in 
more recent investigations—partially because modern technology has enhanced the 
Commission’s ability to analyze the documents. For example, in practice, the Commission will 
request all the communications of a specific person within a certain time frame. Under Article 
28(1) of Council Regulation EC No 1/2003, information obtained during investigations must not 
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be used for purposes other than those indicated in the decision requesting the information.214 
Additionally, only those documents coming within the scope of the subject matter of the 
inspection can be requested. 
United States 
 U.S. law is analogous to EU law. Governing statutes and regulations require that every 
CID must describe the type of information being sought “with such definiteness and certainty as 
to permit such material to be fairly identified.”215 The DOJ’s Antitrust Division Manual 
recommends that CIDs have a narrow scope not just because of procedural requirements, but 
also because a narrower CID can encourage a faster response.216 Courts have refused to enforce 
CIDs that (1) are “too indefinite,” “unduly burdensome” or “unreasonably broad,” (2) “threaten[] 
to unduly disrupt or seriously hinder normal operations of a business,” or (3) seek information 
not “reasonably relevant” as “measured against the scope and purpose of the . . . investigation.217 
Merger review second requests adhere to the same standards so as to not be ineffective and delay 
the merger review process.218 Similarly, a subpoena must “be narrowly drawn and directed at 
material information regarding a limited subject matter and shall cover a reasonable, limited 
period of time.”219  
International norms 
 International groups that have studied antitrust enforcement procedures generally 
recognize the need for restrictions on the scope of document requests. Section 3.1 of the ICN 
Guidance on Investigative Process endorses the need for “appropriate limitations on the use of 
investigative tools,” including “due consideration of relevance” and “proportionality.”220 The 
ICN Roundtable on Competition Agency Investigative Process “emphasized the efficiency value 
of ‘focused’ evidence gathering.”221 The Report further recommended, “[a]gencies should, to the 
extent possible, focus their request on information that is potentially relevant to the investigative 
theories, consider their requests against less intrusive alternatives, and be willing to engage with 
parties on the theories of harm and requests for information that are used to test those 
theories.”222 Similarly, the ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task Force recommends that 
agencies design practices that take into consideration the burden upon targets and ensure that 
practices are “proportionate to the expected value of the evidence sought.”223 
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d. Presence and advice of legal counsel during interviews 
 The three jurisdictions differ regarding the right to have legal counsel present during 
interviews and the role that legal counsel can play during those interviews. EU and U.S. law 
recognizes such a right; Chinese law does not explicitly advise on the presence of legal counsel 
during interviews, and the practice varies. 
China 
 In China, there are no clear regulations on the presence of legal counsel in antitrust 
investigations, and the law neither forbids nor guarantees the presence of lawyers. It is worth 
stressing however, that China considers in-house lawyers to be company employees, despite 
having the license to practice. China also requires lawyers to have a license to practice law in 
China. Domestic Chinese lawyers who work for Chinese law firms are permitted to advise 
during an investigation and speak on behalf of an interviewee concerning legal issues during an 
interview. Interviewees must speak on their own behalf on factual issues. 
 At the provincial and local levels, there are random cases in which agencies are 
sometimes hesitant to have legal counsel present during an interview because counsel sometimes 
advise clients to refuse or hinder the authority’s investigation, despite this being a clear violation 
of the law.224 The maximum fine for obstruction of an investigation— like refusing to produce 
documents, hiding evidence, declining to be interviewed—is 100,000 RMB for individuals and 
1,000,000 RMB for companies, which is often too low to induce cooperation.225 Thus, both 
companies and legal counsel are not sufficiently deterred from refusing to comply, making it 
difficult for the agency to conduct a proper investigation. 
 As a general matter, the relevant statute draws a distinction between domestic Chinese 
lawyers and foreign lawyers. Foreign lawyers without a Chinese lawyer’s license are not 
permitted to practice Chinese law. They therefore cannot act as domestic counsel during an anti-
monopoly investigation. Additionally, in-house counsel acting as company staff are considered 
employees. 
European Union 
 Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly recognizes a general right 
to legal assistance during legal proceedings.226 The ECJ has held that the right to legal 
representation must be respected starting in the preliminary inquiry stage. This includes 
interviews during investigations.227 
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United States 
 In the U.S., when the FTC engages in a nonadjudicative investigation (i.e., before issuing 
a complaint), it can compel a witness to appear in person in a deposition or investigational 
hearing. Such witnesses have the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel 
subject to some limitations.228  
International norms 
 International organizations widely recognize the right to representation by counsel. 
Paragraph 6.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Procedures provides, “[p]arties should be 
allowed to be represented by counsel of their choosing during the investigation, and should be 
permitted to present their views via counsel, their employees, and outside experts.”229 Paragraph 
2.4.9 of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Recommended Framework for 
International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings states, “The agency 
should allow counsel for the party to be present . . . during interviews of a party’s employees and 
potential witnesses.”230  
e. Judicial review of document requests, interviews, and interrogatories  
 China, the EU, and the U.S. differ as to whether an agency’s request for documents or 
interviews is subject to preliminary judicial review. 
China 
 In China, administrative investigations and inspections, including anti-monopoly 
enforcement, are within the scope of accepted cases under the Administrative Litigation Law.231 
Investigative measures, including seizure of property during investigations, constitute 
administrative compulsion, but typically are subject to judicial scrutiny on as part of the overall 
antimonopoly litigation for administrative penalty. At the same time, minor procedural violation 
may not necessarily result in the revoking of a decision made by an enforcement agency. The 
Administrative Litigation Law concludes that where the administrative action’s procedures were 
slightly unlawful, but did not cause actual impact on the rights of the plaintiff, the people's court 
shall make a judgment confirming illegality, but not revoking the administrative act.232 
European Union 
 In the EU, any Commission decision compelling the submission of information is subject 
to judicial review in an action for annulment in the General Court under Article 263(4) of the 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).233 This right must be explained in the 
inspection decision itself.234 Parties may appeal the judgment to the ECJ.235 Simple requests for 
information or interview requests are not reviewable as they are not mandatory. 
United States 
 In the U.S., parties receiving requests for documents, requests for interviews, or 
interrogatories may obtain judicial review of those requests. A party may object to a CID or 
subpoena by filing a petition to limit or set aside the request with the agency in the case of FTC 
requests or with the district court when the DOJ seeks information.236 If a party fails to comply 
with a CID or subpoena (either without filing a petition to quash or after a duly filed petition is 
denied), the FTC and the DOJ may seek enforcement in federal district court.237 Courts review 
such requests to ensure that they are within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too 
indefinite, and the information is reasonably relevant to the agency’s inquiry.238 Any final order 
entered by a district court is appealable to a federal court of appeals.239  
 In merger review, agencies may seek information beyond that included in the HSR filing 
by issuing a second request. If a party believes the second request to be unreasonably cumulative 
or unduly burdensome and has exhausted efforts to narrow the request through negotiation, the 
party may file an appeal with either the General Counsel (for the FTC) or the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General (for the DOJ), who do not have direct responsibility over the investigation.240 
The outcome of this administrative appeal is not subject to judicial review. 
International norms 
 International organizations have generally concluded that investigatory tools, such as 
document requests, should be subject to judicial review. Paragraph 2.1 of the ICN Guidance on 
Investigative Process includes “external review by courts” in its list of “appropriate limitations 
on the use of investigative tools” and emphasizes that respondents should have the “ability . . . to 
contest unlawful use of investigative tools.”241 Specifically, the ICN recommends respondents 
have recourse to an “independent court, tribunal, or administrative agency” to contest 
investigative decisions.242 The ICN’s Roundtable Report similarly included the need for “a 
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mechanism to challenge or question requests for information” as one of the “basic safeguards” of 
good investigative process.243  
2. Differences in Law and Practice 
 Enforcement authorities in each jurisdiction approach the request for documents, 
interviews, and interrogatories phase of the investigation slightly differently. 
Differences in law 
Basis for believing investigation is justified. All three jurisdictions provide parties with notice of 
the legal basis of the proceeding and the conduct in question. They vary in the extent to which 
they are obligated to do so by statute or simply do so as a matter of practice. The jurisdictions 
also vary in regard to the specificity required to fulfill these obligations, which can be critical in 
preventing arbitrary agency action and allowing parties to adequately represent themselves. 
General statements, such as “an investigation for violations of competition law” are vulnerable to 
arbitrary conduct by investigators and do not provide the party being investigated with enough 
guidance to comply with the request or prepare a defense. Again, this requirement need not be 
overly onerous to achieve these goals. A general statement of the nature of anti-competitive 
conduct should suffice. 
Description of the documents to be produced. Although China’s anti-monopoly laws do not 
formally require a description of the documents to be produced, NDRC, SAIC, and MOFCOM 
do so in practice. EU authorities are required to specify as precisely as possible all the documents 
requested. The U.S. similarly requires CIDs and subpoenas to be narrowly drawn and directed 
necessary at material information.  
Allowance of legal counsel during interviews. China does not have a statutory requirement to 
ensure the presence of legal counsel during interviews, but agencies handling national level 
investigations often encourage lawyers to participate in practice. Chinese agencies generally 
allow counsels to speak on legal issues but require respondents to speak unaided on factual ones. 
The EU recognizes a general right to legal counsel during interviews, as does the U.S. in 
nonadjudicative proceedings, subject to some limitations. 
Judicial review. China does not permit preliminary judicial review of requests for documents or 
interviews unless officials take a specified compulsory action, like seizing property. Further, 
China permits challenges to such requests as part of judicial challenges to final decisions after 
completion of the investigation and the issuance of a penalty. In the EU, any binding decision 
can be challenged in an action for annulment in the General Court, including those made during 
investigations. In the U.S., a party can obtain judicial review of CIDs and subpoenas in non-
merger investigations but cannot do so in merger investigations. 
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Differences in practice 
Internal approval by a high-level official. China, the EU, and the U.S. require agency staff to 
seek approval from a high-level official before initiating a formal investigation. For China, 
before the reshuffling of the enforcement agencies, provincial and local-level agencies must 
submit a report to their national counterparts and obtain approval before proceeding with an 
investigation. In the EU, a Head of Unit or case manager can issue voluntary simple requests, but 
binding decisions must be reviewed by a team consisting of the case team, senior management, 
the Commission’s legal team, and the Commissioner, who makes the ultimate decision regarding 
whether or not to initiate an investigation. The U.S. employs a multi-tiered system of internal 
approvals in both the FTC and DOJ that is more extensive than that required in China and the 
EU. 
B. Investigations: Inspections of Company Premises 
 Competition authorities investigating possible violations of competition law can inspect 
the premises of the suspected company to look for and potentially seize evidence of wrongdoing. 
 In China, Article 39 of the AML grants competition authorities the right to conduct 
inspections of the investigated parties’ premises. China’s Administrative Enforcement Law 
predominantly governs inspections of company premises.244 Inspections must be conducted by 
two or more law enforcement personnel from the agency, the investigated party must be notified 
to be present, and inspections cannot be conducted at night, except in emergency situations.245 
China’s AML and the relevant agency regulations also specify that enforcement authorities must 
keep confidential any commercial secrets they access in the course of their enforcement.246 Both 
SAIC and NDRC developed additional regulations in 2010, laying out the procedures to govern 
inspections in more detail. Specifically, NDRC promulgated the Regulations on Administrative 
Procedures for Law Enforcement on Anti-Price Monopoly,247 and SAIC promulgated its 
Procedural Rules by Administration of Industry and Commerce Regarding Investigation and 
Handling of Cases Relating to Monopoly Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Market Position.248 
MOFCOM exclusively oversees merger proceedings and therefore does not usually partake in 
inspections of company premises, although it can do so if necessary. MOFCOM obtains 
information about the parties primarily before Phase 1 (above) or in the pre-acceptance phase 
predominantly through submissions by the parties.  
 The European Commission is empowered to enter the premises of suspected parties to 
examine their records and potentially seize relevant evidence.249 In order to ensure proper 
coordination between the European Commission and an individual member state’s NCA, the 
Commission must notify the NCA about any inspections and is in turn entitled to support from 
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national officials in carrying out the inspection. The European Commission can also involve the 
local police to ensure the inspection is carried out without resistance. The investigated company 
is obliged to assist the Commission in its inspection, but is not required to actively support the 
investigators by submitting evidence without request.  
 Such company inspections are often called “dawn raids” because agencies prefer to 
conduct them early in the morning. For an international antitrust case, inspections of company 
premises in other jurisdictions are often executed simultaneously to avoid warning subsidiaries 
or branches in other countries before they can be inspected. Under certain circumstances the 
Commission can likewise search premises of third parties if there is reason to believe that 
relevant evidence can be found there.250 
 U.S. law typically permits searches only for investigations of criminal law and, unlike EU 
law, generally requires prior judicial approval before conducting them. Moreover, in civil cases, 
agencies must obtain prior judicial approval before conducting administrative inspections of 
private companies.251 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to this rule 
that permits warrantless administrative inspections for “closely regulated” industries that are 
“long subject to close supervision and inspection” in which an owner or operator of commercial 
property “has a reduced expectation of privacy,” such as liquor sales, firearms dealing, mining, 
and automobile junkyards.252 The Court later characterized these industries as involving 
activities that are “intrinsically dangerous” and that “pose[] a clear and significant risk to the 
public welfare.”253 General rules that are “more akin to the widely applicable minimum wage 
and maximum hour rules” do not constitute the type of close regulation associated with the 
exception.254 In addition, the warrantless inspection regime must satisfy three criteria: (1) The 
government interest furthered by the inspection must be substantial, (2) the inspection “must be 
necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme,” and (3) “the statute’s inspection program, in terms 
of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant.255 To meet the third criterion, the regulatory “statute must be sufficiently 
comprehensive and defined” to “limit[] the discretion of inspectors,”256 such as by providing for 
periodic annual inspections or inspections on a “regular basis” in order to “sufficiently . . . 
constrain [inspectors’] discretion” so as to substitute for individualized review.257 The Court held 
that claims that the inspection is necessary to further regulatory scheme are belied by the fact that 
officials concerned about the destruction of evidence may conduct a surprise inspection by 
obtaining an ex parte warrant or may guard the property while obtaining a warrant 
telephonically.258 Antitrust investigations are not restricted to companies involved in intrinsically 
dangerous activities and do not involve the type of certain and regular inspection program and 
limits on discretion needed to justify foregoing individualized judicial review. Enforcement 
officials who want to protect against the destruction of evidence may obtain from a court an ex 
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parte warrant authorizing a surprise inspection or to obtain a telephonic warrant from a court 
while guarding the premises. 
 Inspections are often described as one of the most effective investigative tools for 
gathering incriminating evidence because they minimize the opportunity for document 
destruction and concealment. They play a particularly important role when enforcement officials 
have concerns that parties will destroy evidence rather than fulfill the request in good faith. At 
the same time, inspections represent a significant intrusion into the company’s operations. 
Inspections often interrupt the everyday business of the company and require expenditure of 
resources to accommodate the agency’s efforts. Additionally, the physical intrusion into 
company premises endangers the companies’ interests in maintaining business, trade secrets, and 
their general privacy. Because the intrusion into private property often involves constitutional 
issues and the constitutional approaches vary across jurisdictions, the differences in procedural 
protections that are afforded can vary substantially. 
 This section breaks down the process of conducting investigations through inspections of 
company premises into four separate steps: 
1. Description of the factual basis for conducting the inspection 
2. Description of the places to be inspected and the evidence to be seized 
3. Allowance of legal counsel during the search 
4. Judicial review of requests to inspect company premises 
1. Procedural Steps of Inspections of Company Premises 
a. Description of the factual basis for conducting the inspection 
 China, the EU, and the U.S. differ as to the extent to which agencies must set forth the 
factual basis justifying the inspections that they wish to conduct. Although each jurisdiction 
requires its agencies to adduce some factual predicate before conducting an inspection, the 
specific requirements vary in terms of degree. 
China 
 In China, an Inspection Notice is required before entering an undertaking’s premise to 
conduct an inspection. Law enforcement personnel must catalog any evidence that is extracted, 
and both the respondent and law enforcement personnel must sign the manifest. The Inspection 
Notice contains a summary of the enforcement exercise.259 
European Union 
 EU law requires that investigators have reasonable grounds for suspecting that a violation 
of the competition rules has occurred before undertaking any coercive investigatory measures.260 
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Such grounds may be presented after the inspection.261 The law also requires the Commission to 
state the reasons underlying the decision for an investigation by stating its subject matter and 
purpose.262 This enables the investigated party to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate and 
to safeguard their rights of defense.263 
United States 
 In the U.S., searches to investigate criminal antitrust violations and administrative 
inspections to enforce civil regulatory regimes typically require prior judicial approval in the 
form of a warrant. In these cases, a search warrant must be supported by an affidavit setting forth 
the factual basis justifying the search and containing sufficient credible facts to establish 
probable cause that a violation has occurred and that evidence of the violation is at the search 
location.264 Warrantless administrative inspections do not require any factual predicate, but are 
not available for antitrust enforcement. 
International norms 
 An international consensus has emerged that requiring officials to have an evidentiary 
foundation before conducting an inspection helps provide an important safeguard against abuses 
of agency discretion. The ICN Guidance on Investigative Process provides that enforcement 
authorities “should inform parties of the basic facts and nature of evidence gathered.”265 
Paragraph 6.2.5 of the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy similarly requires a 
“reasonable suspicion that evidence related to the subject matter of the investigation is kept,” as 
well as “reasonable grounds for believing that the person has in possession any document which 
has a bearing on the investigation.”266 Given the invasive nature of inspections, the expectation is 
that the evidentiary threshold should be as high, if not higher, than the threshold required for 
document requests. 
b. Description of the places to be inspected and the evidence to be seized 
 Another area where Chinese, EU, and U.S. law differ is with respect to providing an 
inspection plan to the investigated party. Chinese and EU law do not require such an inspection 
plan, while U.S. law requires some specification of the location and scope of the inspection. 
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China 
 Chinese law does not require the enforcement agency and its personnel to provide 
investigated parties with an inspection plan, but before the commencement of the inspection, 
they must request an Inspection Notice from the agency approved by its chief executive. Further, 
officials must collect evidence in a comprehensive, objective, and impartial manner throughout 
the inspection.267 Enforcement personnel breaking the procedural rules may be punished under 
the Trial Measures on Fault Liability Claims in Price-related Administrative Penalties.268 Before 
leaving the undertaking’s premise, inspectors are required to prepare a written description of any 
documents, materials and evidence seized during the inspection, signed by the investigated party.  
 
European Union 
 EU law similarly does not require enforcement officials to describe the locations to be 
inspected or the documents to be seized. Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003 generally limits the 
geographic scope of an investigation to the premises of the investigated party. However, the 
Commission is authorized to carry out inspections at a third party’s premises provided that a 
reasonable suspicion exists that evidence relevant to a serious violation of Article 101 or Article 
102 TFEU can be found there.269 Officials are required to describe the purpose of the inspection 
as precisely as possible at the time of the inspection,270 which provides limits to the documents 
that can be seized. Enforcement officials may not use any information obtained during 
inspections for purposes other than those indicated in the inspection decision.271 Thus, an 
inspection may be made only for those documents coming within the scope of the subject matter 
of the inspection. If enforcement officials look for documents outside of the scope of this 
investigation, courts will set aside any follow-up inspection decisions based on the infringement 
of the investigated party’s rights of defense.272 
United States 
 As noted above, antitrust enforcement does not fall within the exception for warrantless 
administrative inspections recognized under U.S. law. As a result, U.S. civil antitrust 
investigations rely on document requests, interviews, and interrogatories. For criminal 
enforcement, any inspections and searches must comply with the constitutional requirement that 
the warrant describe with the places to be searched and the things to be seized.273 This 
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requirement “ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not 
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to 
prohibit.”274 The degree of specificity with which the warrant must describe the documents to be 
seized and the location of the search may vary depending on the circumstances. When seeking 
business records, it is typically sufficient for the warrant to describe records of a type usually 
maintained by the business at the business location. 
c. Allowance of legal counsel during the inspection 
 Neither Chinese, EU, nor U.S. law gives legal counsel the explicit right to be present on 
site during the execution of an inspection. However, the similarity of de jure law masks practices 
that are quite different. 
China 
 China’s regulations do not explicitly grant the right for legal counsel to be present during 
an inspection.275 In many cases, however, legal counsel is encouraged to be present to ensure due 
process, advise the investigated party of their rights, and promote cooperation with the legal 
obligation to comply with the enforcement measure. Legal counsel may also be permitted to 
videotape the inspection for the investigated party’s record. Attorneys are not permitted to 
interfere with the inspection and may not speak on behalf of the company or any personnel 
regarding facts in the case. Further, in-house lawyers are considered “employees” of the 
company rather than lawyers.  
European Union 
 In the EU, Article 47(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes the right to 
legal assistance.276 The ECJ has held that the right to legal representation begins during the 
preliminary inquiry stage. This investigations that may be decisive in providing evidence of the 
unlawful nature of conduct.277 While it had been a practice of the European Commission to wait 
for counsel to arrive on site before starting an inspection, this is not legally required,278 and EU 
officials sometimes begin their inspections immediately upon arrival.279  
United States 
 In the U.S., company representatives may ask the inspecting agents to wait until counsel 
arrives. Inspecting agents retain the right to decide whether to wait. Although agents do not 
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always wait for legal counsel, they usually allow counsel to be present on site once they arrive so 
long as they do not interfere with the search.280 
International norms 
 International authorities support permitting the presence of legal counsel during on-site 
inspections. For example, Paragraph 2.4.9 of the ICC Recommended Framework for 
International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings determines that “[t]he 
agency should allow counsel for the party to be present at on-site inspections of a party’s 
premises.”281 
d. Judicial review of requests to inspect company premises 
 The three jurisdictions differ is with respect to judicial involvement in authorizing and 
reviewing inspections. Chinese law does not provide for any prior judicial approval of 
inspections, but does permit a party to apply for administrative reconsideration of the inspection 
or to file an administrative lawsuit. EU law does not require prior authorization, but does permit 
inspected parties to bring an action to annul the inspection immediately afterwards. U.S. law 
both requires prior judicial authorization of searches and allows for post-search judicial 
proceedings to return the property and to suppress any evidence obtained. 
China 
 In China, judicial authorization is not a prerequisite for the commencement of an 
inspection, but the approval of the agency and the agency chief is a must.282 Administrative 
compulsion used in the investigation such as sealing and seizing property can be included in the 
administrative litigation against penalty decisions on the grounds of procedural violations. At the 
same time, minor procedural violations may not necessarily require that an agency determination 
be set aside. The Administrative Litigation Law provides, where the procedures underlying the 
administrative action were slightly unlawful but did not have an actual impact on the rights of the 
plaintiff, the people’s court shall make a judgment confirming illegality, but not revoking the 
administrative act.283 
 
European Union 
 In the EU, Council Regulation EC No 1/2003 does not require judicial approval prior to 
enforcement officials conducting an inspection. However, a warrant might be necessary if the 
company refuses the inspection, the Commission asks the local authorities to impose coercive 
measures, or if national law requires a warrant in such a case.284 Even then, the national judicial 
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authority has no right to control the legitimacy of the inspection itself and can only check if the 
Commission’s decision to inspect is authentic and that any plans for coercive measures are not 
excessive. In a merger control proceeding, the Commission need only deliver notice containing 
the purpose and subject matter of the inspection to relevant authorities (which may include 
various authorities from Member States). Following an inspection, EU law permits the party 
under inspection to bring an action to annul the Commission’s decision ordering the inspection 
under Article 263(4) TFEU. This right must be explained in the inspection decision itself.285 
Annulment only concerns the inspection order. Measures carried out by the Commission during 
an inspection (e.g., copying of documents) can be challenged in court only through a challenge to 
the final Commission decision ending a proceeding.286 
United States 
 As noted earlier, U.S. law typically requires enforcement officials to obtain a court-issued 
warrant before conducting a search to enforce criminal antitrust law or an administrative 
inspection of a company’s premises. The exception permitting administrative inspections without 
a warrant does not apply to antitrust enforcement. Courts will issue warrants only on probable 
cause that a search will result in evidence of a violation being discovered.287  
 U.S. law gives any person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or the 
deprivation of property the right to move in court for the property’s return.288 If the court grants 
the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable 
conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings. In addition, if the 
search is found to be improper, courts typically suppress any evidence obtained during the search 
or as the result information obtained from the search from any subsequent criminal trial.289 
People who were subject to an unlawful search or seizure may also sue for damages.290 
2. Differences in Law and Practice 
 Within inspections of company premises in the three jurisdictions, three steps are 
different in law, and one step is different in practice. 
Differences in law 
Description of the factual basis for conducting the inspection. Although China’s Administrative 
Enforcement Law requires officials to disclose to an investigated party its basis and reasons for 
conducting an investigation, this disclosure can vary from vague to more specific. The EU 
requires investigators to have reasonable grounds before commencing an inspection and to 
communicate that basis to the investigated party. It does not require disclosing specific facts to 
the investigated party. In U.S. law, inspections are not used for civil enforcement. Searches to 
 
285 See id. art. 20(4). 
286 See Nexans France SAS v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:596 (Nov. 14, 2012), paras. 125,132, 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62009TJ0135&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
287 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
288 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g). 
289 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C) and 41(h). 
290 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
40 
enforce criminal antitrust law require a warrant supported by evidence establishing probable 
cause. 
Description of the places to be inspected and the evidence to be seized. Chinese agencies are not 
required by law to provide a description of their inspection plan to an investigated party, but are 
required to collect evidence in a comprehensive, objective, and impartial manner. They are also 
required to prepare a report of any materials seized during the inspection and allow the 
respondent to sign the report. Further, officials are prohibited from using coercive measures or 
conducting an inspection beyond the scope of their investigation. EU law similarly requires no 
inspection plan, but does require officials to describe the purpose behind their inspection, which 
has a limiting effect on the scope of property they may seize. Moreover, the threshold for 
inspecting third parties’ premises is higher than for premises of the investigated party. Under 
U.S. law, inspections are not used for civil enforcement, warrants authorizing searches to enforce 
criminal antitrust laws must detail with specificity the premises to be search and property sought. 
 The lack of some ex-ante restriction on the scope of any searches creates opportunities 
for enforcement officials to exercise unfettered discretion. Therefore, specification of the scope 
of the search allows courts to ensure that the intrusiveness of the investigation is proportional to 
the extent of the potential harm indicated by the evidence. 
Judicial review. In China, judicial authorization is not required to commence an inspection. 
Judicial review of inspections is available if the agency performs an act of administration 
compulsion or in the respondent’s challenge to the final decision.291 The EU likewise does not 
require judicial review prior to an inspection, but allows investigated parties to bring an action to 
annul the inspection immediately after its completion. In some cases, a warrant may be required 
if the company refuses the inspection, the Commission asks the local authorities to impose 
coercive measures, or if national law requires a warrant. Such warrants are also subject to limited 
judicial review. Under U.S. law, inspections are not used for civil enforcement, and courts must 
authorize any searches conducted to enforce criminal antitrust laws prior to their 
commencement. Investigated parties may additionally bring an action in court after the search to 
suppress any evidence obtained through an illegal search, obtain the return of the property, and 
for damages. 
Differences in practice 
Allowance of legal counsel during inspection. None of the three jurisdictions give investigated 
parties the statutory right to have legal counsel present during an inspection. However, in 
practice, enforcement official in China have the discretion to permit legal counsel to be present 
during inspections. Legal counsel are encouraged to do so in national-level cases and sometimes 
discouraged in provincial or local-level cases for fear of their potential interference with the 
inspection. However, even at local level, some authorities actively asked attorneys to be involved 
since the inspectors could hardly explain technical issues to the investigated parties, for which 
purpose attorneys can be helpful. The EU’s Charter of Fundamental rights recognizes a right to 
legal counsel during all legal proceedings, which courts have interpreted to include during an 
inspection. Enforcement officials sometimes wait for counsel to arrive, but ultimately have the 
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discretion to determine how long they will wait for counsel to arrive. Similarly, U.S. law allows 
legal counsel to be present during inspections so long as counsel does not interfere with the 
inspection, but officials have the right to begin an investigation without legal counsel being 
present or to refuse their entry. 
C. Agency Deliberations 
 After completing its investigation, the enforcement agency must evaluate the evidence, 
analyze the legal issues, and decide whether a violation of the competition laws has occurred. 
This process is internal to the agency and thus is inherently open to the possibility of bias and 
abuse. Consequently, many jurisdictions impose transparency and participation requirements 
during this process. This is advantageous because providing notice to the investigated parties 
avoids a surprise decision for the parties and allows them to submit evidence relevant to the 
investigation. It also improves the quality of decisionmaking, fairness to the parties, and 
transparency—all necessary for a jurisdiction to reap the benefits of due process. 
 This section breaks down the process of agency deliberations into six separate steps: 
1. Disclosure of the evidence upon which the agency wishes to rely 
2. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
3. Disclosure of the legal, economic, and factual bases underlying the 
agency’s investigation 
4. Opportunity for the respondent to submit responses to the allegations and 
exculpatory evidence 
5. Representation by legal counsel during agency deliberations 
6. Protection of sensitive information  
1. Procedural Steps of Agency Deliberations 
a. Disclosure of the evidence upon which the agency wishes to rely 
 All three jurisdictions require their agencies to disclose the evidence upon which they 
wish to rely to respondents.  
China 
 In certain situations, China’s Administrative Penalty Law entitles respondents to access 
to the evidence upon which the agency is relying. First, in an oral hearing, the agency must 
disclose the evidence it is using.292 Second, the agency must disclose such evidence when issuing 
its final decision.293 It is not clear, however, how much detail Chinese agencies must provide. It 
is also uncertain whether they do so at an early enough point to enable respondents to defend 
themselves effectively. In a merger control proceeding prior to the consolidation of the three 
enforcement agencies, when MOFCOM determined that the proposed transaction may cause a 
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restriction of competition, it notified the parties of its findings and disclosed the potential 
competition concerns.294 
European Union 
 The European Commission must disclose any evidence on which it wishes to rely to the 
respondent. The Commission prepares a description of its evidence in its Statement of 
Objections, which represents the formal charges against the respondent.295 The Commission may 
submit new evidence either by way of a Supplementary Statement of Objections or, if the new 
evidence corroborates previously disclosed objections, in a simple document known as a Letter 
of Facts.296 Only evidence cited or mentioned in the Statement of Objections, Supplementary 
Statement of Objections, or Letter of Facts are considered evidence on which the Commission 
can base its final decision.297 In addition, any party addressed with a Statement of Objections has 
the right to access the file of the European Commission.298 Information covered by the obligation 
of professional secrecy299 and documents containing business secrets are exempt from this right 
to access.300 As a general rule, parties are not given access to the replies to the Statement of 
Objections submitted by the other parties involved or to the internal files of the Commission. As 
discussed below, parties can access confidential information necessary to their defense under 
certain circumstances.301 Any refusal to grant the applicant access to the file violates its rights of 
defense if giving access to the applicant could have led to a different disposition.302 
 The EU’s access-to-file system has triggered some controversy. First, postponing access 
until after the Statement of Objections is sent out can limit the respondent’s ability to defend 
itself. Moreover, the exemptions to the right to access the file can lead to arguments about which 
documents must be disclosed. The parties have a right to see all evidence necessary to prove an 
infringement of competition law,303 but an effective defense could require access to information 
that the Commission does not deem “necessary.” Denied requests for access can be brought 
before the Hearing Officer but this process does not fully solve the problem because the Hearing 
Officer makes only a non-binding recommendation to the Competition Commissioner in 
response.304 In Intel, however, the European Court of Justice decided that the Commission must 
also disclose exculpatory evidence to the respondent.305 
 The Commission must similarly disclose the evidence upon which it wishes to rely in the 
merger context. In the United Parcel Service case, the General Court recently annulled the 
 
294 See AML, supra note 91, art. 30 
295 See DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, ch. 11.3, para. 2. For merger control, see Commission Regulation 
802/2004, art. 12(1), 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1. 
296 See DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, chs. 8.1–8.2. 
297 See id. ch. 1.2.2.1.2. 
298 See Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 15(a), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18. For mergers, see Commission Regulation 
802/2004, art. 17, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1. 
299 See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 28(2), 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC). 
300 See Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 15(1), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18. 
301 See infra note _ and accompanying text. 
302 See DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, chs. 12.2.1–12.2.2. 
303 See id. 
304 See id. ch. 12.2.3. 
305 See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept. 6, 2017), 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014CJ0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
43 
Commission’s decision to block a proposed merger between UPS and TNT Express NV because 
the Commission failed to disclose the economic models upon which it relied its final decision, 
thus infringing the merging parties’ right of defense.306 This decision additionally articulated the 
relatively unforgiving standard that courts will annul Commission decisions for withholding 
evidence if “there was even a slight chance that [the respondent] would have been better able to 
defend itself” but for the non-disclosure.307  
United States 
 In the U.S., defendants in criminal antitrust cases are entitled to full access to the 
evidence contained in the prosecution’s case files.308 When the DOJ or FTC brings civil 
enforcement actions in court, the government is obligated to make initial disclosures of evidence 
and of witnesses “likely to have discoverable information.”309 Similarly, in administrative 
adjudications, the FTC must make a mandatory initial disclosure of the names of any individual 
likely to have information relevant to the allegations of the FTC’s complaint310 as well as a 
description of any document, transcripts of investigational hearings and depositions, and any 
tangible things serving the same purpose.311 All agencies are forbidden from concealing or 
misrepresenting evidence.312 In a merger review, prior to the issuance of a second request, 
agency staff will endeavor to host consultation meetings with the parties to discuss both the 
parties’ and the agency’s views on the transaction and possible areas of concern.313 Once a 
second request is issued, agency staff will, again, hold a second request conference with the 
parties to have a “frank exchange of ideas and [review] evidence that allows both sides to 
identify and test the competitive theories for and against the transaction.”314 
International norms 
 There is an international consensus that enforcement agencies should provide parties 
charged with antitrust violations with complete access to the factual record. Paragraph 5.4 of the 
ICN Guidance on Investigative Process provides, “After formal allegations of competition 
violations and presentation of legal arguments are made, parties should be provided with access 
to the evidence relied upon as the basis for the agency’s allegations.”315 Likewise, the ABA 
Antitrust Section’s International Task Force advises officials to disclose “all potential 
contentions of infringement and (in reasonable detail) the underlying evidence, analysis and 
argumentation relevant to the defense.”316  
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 The OECD Policy Roundtable on Procedural Fairness similarly observes, “Many 
agencies offer the parties an opportunity to examine the evidence—subject to legitimate 
confidentiality concerns—forming the basis for the agency’s conclusion that a violation of the 
competition laws has occurred,” particularly where sanctions may be imposed.317 The OECD 
further states, “A right to access the evidence used to support the allegations against them 
ensures that parties to an antitrust proceeding have full knowledge of the case and details 
concerning the alleged violations against them, allowing them to substantially respond before a 
decision is taken.”318 The OECD notes that agencies commonly do not provide such access until 
“after the main investigation has taken place and the written document setting out the allegations 
has been issued.”319 The OECD Secretariat Background Note on Access to the Case File 
emphasizes that “access to the case file is essential to protect the rights of the defence of the 
parties, given that it provides them with the opportunity to examine the abasis on which the 
agency or court, depending on the competition enforcement system, will adopt its decision.”320 
 The ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in Competition Law 
Enforcement Proceedings echoes this idea when it recommends that “all complaints, documents 
and other evidence relating to the subject matter of the investigation . . . should be disclosed to 
the Respondent” with the additional recommendation that such disclosure occur “prior to 
preparation of any written statement of the charges against the parties.”321 
b. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
 Although there is a duty to actively disclose exculpatory evidence in the U.S., the EU and 
China have not embraced the obligation to do so. 
China 
 Under Chinese law, there is no duty to actively disclose exculpatory evidence. Chinese 
officials emphasize that they consider all evidence—both favorable and unfavorable to the 
respondent—and adjust their decisions accordingly. For example, Chinese officials cited cases 
where they dropped charges against a defendant after it produced documents proving it was not 
involved in a cartel.322  
 Moreover, respondents can gain access to exculpatory evidence by requesting a hearing. 
First, pursuant to the Administrative Penalty Law, before reaching an administrative penalty 
decision involving a large fine, the administrative agency must advise the parties concerned of 
the right to request a hearing. When the parties so request, a hearing shall be arranged by the 
administrative agency and the parties shall not bear the expenses for the hearing organized by the 
administrative agency.323 In accordance with the Rules for the Administrations for Industry and 
Commerce on the Hearing of Evidence in Administrative Penalty Cases, the parties may present 
evidence in the hearing to justify their claims, and the moderator shall admit it. The parties and 
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the investigators may, with the permission of the moderator, conduct examination on the 
admissibility of the evidence submitted by their counterparts, or may question witnesses, forensic 
experts, and inspectors present.324 In accordance with the Provisions on the Procedures for Price-
related Administrative Penalties, price authorities shall review the facts, reasons and evidence 
presented by the parties in statements, defense or hearing, and may make additional investigation 
and evidence collection where necessary.325 It is worth noting that since the enforcement agency 
also produces evidence extraction lists or on-site transcripts while pulling evidence on the 
premise of the investigated party, even if the enforcement agency is suspected of selectively 
applying the evidence, the respondent could question such motif in the hearing by comparing the 
evidence introduced in the hearing with the entirety of evidence extracted. After the 
consolidation of anti-monopoly enforcement agencies, the State Administration for Market 
Regulation (SAMR) issued the Interim Provisions on the Procedures for Administrative 
Supervision of Market Supervision and Administration on December 21, 2018. These provisions 
and the Interim Measures for Administrative Penalty Hearings in Market Regulation provide that 
the enforcement authority is obligated to inform the parties of the right to a hearing.326 When 
informing the parties of their right to a hearing, the authority shall also inform in writing the 
facts, reasons, and basis on which they intend to make a penalty decision.327 Such regulations 
took effect on April 1, 2019, at which time, the Rules for the Administrations for Industry and 
Commerce on the Hearing of Evidence in Administrative Penalty Cases was abolished.328 
European Union 
 While EU law does not impose an explicit obligation on the Commission to actively 
disclose exculpatory evidence, it does give the parties the right of access to the entire case file, 
which includes both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.329 Indeed, in its recent Intel decision, 
the European Court of Justice rebuked the Commission’s failure to disclose an interview with a 
complainant, articulating a rule that the Commission must record all interviews “in full” and that 
it erred in not doing so.330 The court emphasized that this rule was necessary to preserve the 
respondent’s right of defense. However, if an exculpatory document has not been communicated 
during a request to access the file, the respondent must establish that the nondisclosure was 
prejudicial and relevant to the disposition before a court will reverse the Commission decision.331 
This is puzzling because it leaves the respondent with a burden of proof, which is hard to satisfy 
if the respondent does not know about the existence of exculpatory evidence. Moreover, the 
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agency cannot exclude evidence that is necessary for the defense from the file because it contains 
business secrets.332 
United States 
 In U.S. criminal antitrust proceedings, the prosecutor has the obligation to turn over any 
exculpatory evidence333 as well as any evidence tending to impeach any material witness.334 
Civil enforcement actions brought by the DOJ or the FTC in court should also result in the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.335 As noted 
above, in administrative adjudications, the FTC is obligated to make a mandatory initial 
disclosure of the names of any individual likely to have information relevant to the defenses of 
the respondent.336 It similarly must disclose a description of any document, transcripts of 
investigational hearings and depositions, and other tangible things serving the same purpose.337 
This standard applies to all covered evidence, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. 
International norms 
 Paragraph 2.1.4 of the ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in 
Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings recommends that enforcement authorities disclose 
all evidence to respondents “whether inculpatory or exculpatory.”338 Similarly, paragraph 2.4.14 
suggests, “The agency’s obligation to disclose both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence to the 
Respondents should continue following the submission of the Report through the close of the 
hearing.”339 Moreover, the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process advises, “Agencies should 
ensure that all of the evidence and information, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, obtained 
during an investigation receive appropriate consideration during the agency decision-making 
process.”340 The OECD Secretariat Background Note on Access to the case file and protection of 
confidential information emphases that access to the case file must include both incriminating 
and exculpatory evidence.”341 
c. Disclosure of the legal, economic, and factual bases for the agency’s investigation 
 By law, the enforcement agencies in China, EU, and U.S. are all required to inform the 
parties under investigation about the legal and factual bases of their investigation. Although, this 
requirement is generally fulfilled, the details of the notification can differ widely in practice. 
 
332 See Commission Notice on the Rules for Access to the Commission File (2005) para. 24, http://eur-
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340 ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 7. 
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China 
 In China, before DRCs and AICs take a penalty decision, they shall issue an Advance 
Notice of Administrative Penalty to the respondent, stating the legal, economic and factual basis 
on which the investigation is based. Upon receipt of an Advance Notice, the concerned party 
shall have three days to request an opportunity for statement, defense and hearing.342 If a party 
formally requests a hearing, the agency shall organize it within thirty days and disclose in writing 
the time, location, format, and moderator’s name to the parties no later than seven days before 
the hearing.343 In other words, the parties will have from day 7 until day 30 to prepare the 
examination on the admissibility of the evidence submitted by their counterparts in accordance 
with the Advance Notice. The AIC hearing rules require that the AIC confirm the hearing 
moderator within three days upon receipt of the party’ request for hearing,344 and the case 
investigators shall transfer the case file to the hearing moderator within three days of the date 
confirming the hearing moderator.345 The hearing moderator shall then, finalize the time and 
place of the hearing within five days of receipt of the case file transferred from the investigators 
and notify the party no later than seven days before the hearing.346 This means the party will 
have from day 7 to day 21 to prepare evidence questioning in accordance with the Advance 
Notice.  
 Following the consolidation of anti-monopoly enforcement agencies, the deadline for the 
party to request a hearing was changed to no more than 3 days after receipt of the Advance 
Notice.347 This change took effect on April 1, 2019. Apart from the hearing, the respondent can 
also consult with the law enforcement agency. For example, in the Qualcomm case, the NDRC 
Anti-monopoly Bureau and Qualcomm held twenty-eight rounds of consultation, eight of which 
involved Xu Kunlin, the then Director-General of the Anti-monopoly Bureau. Qualcomm’s 
president came to the first round of talks accompanied by six vice presidents, who introduced 
their business model mainly for explanatory and defensive purpose. The law enforcement agency 
also came fully prepared and raised issues pertaining to facts, evidence, conflicts, and what is 
reasonable.348 
European Union 
 The European Commission must provide a description of the legal and economic bases 
and factual allegations underlying the agency’s investigation once it opens formal proceedings. 
The Commission opens formal proceedings when the initial assessment leads to the conclusion 
 
342 See Provisions on the Procedures for Price-Related Administrative Penalties, supra note 148, arts. 35 and 36. 
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that the case merits further investigation, that is, when there is a reasonable indication of a likely 
infringement and where the scope of investigation has been sufficiently defined.349 
 When the Commission decides to issue a Statement of Objections, it must provide a 
written copy to each of the parties concerned.350 The Statement of Objections includes a 
description of the legal and economic bases and factual allegations underlying the agency’s 
investigation. If the Commission discovers new evidence after issuing the Statement of 
Objections, it supplies either a Supplementary Statement of Objections or, if the new evidence 
simply corroborates concerns in the Statement of Objections, a simple Letter of Facts to the 
parties and the opportunity for them to respond.351 
 This obligation likewise exists in the merger context. In the 2017 United Parcel Service 
case, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision to block a merger when the 
Commission failed to disclose an updated version of the economic model on which it ultimately 
relied.352  
United States 
 For administrative proceedings before the FTC, the Commission must advise anyone 
compelled or requested to furnish information about the purpose and scope of the investigation, 
the nature of the activities under investigation, and the applicable provisions of law.353 Towards 
the end of the investigation, both FTC and DOJ staff are expected to contact the respondent 
before making their final recommendation and offer them the opportunity to submit their 
views.354 
 When the FTC initiates a formal administrative enforcement proceeding, it issues a 
complaint, which includes a “recital of the legal authority and jurisdiction for institution of the 
proceeding, with specific designation of the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated” 
and a “clear and concise factual statement sufficient to inform each respondent with reasonable 
definiteness of the type of acts or practices alleged to be in violation of the law.”355 As discussed 
in greater detail below in the discussion of judicial review, agencies must also disclose any 
economic models on which they wish rely and the evidence corroborating or showing the limits 
of the model.356 After the respondent has filed its answer, a scheduling conference will be held at 
which factual and legal theories are addressed.357 Before the commencement of the evidentiary 
hearing, a final prehearing conference is held, during which the respondent and the agency 
exhibit and witness lists are and designate testimony to be presented by deposition.358 The result 
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is that the FTC provides full discovery well in advance of an evidentiary hearing and pre-hearing 
briefing. At the evidentiary hearing, the FTC bears the burden of proof and must therefore 
present the evidence it relies upon.359 
 When the U.S. antitrust laws are enforced in court, the complaint should inform the 
defendant of the factual allegations and the legal and economic theories that form the basis for 
the charges.360 Courts provide the parties with full discovery and a pretrial conference where the 
agencies must identify the witnesses, documents, and expert testimony on which it plans to 
rely.361 
International norms 
 International authorities universally recognize disclosure of the legal, economic, and 
factual bases underlying the agency’s investigation as an essential part of fair procedures. 
Paragraph 4.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process explicitly states that “the agency 
should, subject to appropriate protection for confidential information, provide a publicly 
available version or summary which explains the agency’s findings of fact and legal and 
economic analysis.”362 The OECD Key Points on Procedural Fairness and Transparency 
similarly notes that “during the investigative stage, many agencies advise parties under 
investigation of the legal and economic bases and factual allegations underlying the agencies’ 
investigations, as well as the agencies’ theories of harm.”363 
 Moreover, Paragraph 2.1.4 of the ICC Recommended Framework for International Best 
Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings stresses that “as soon as the 
investigators have completed their initial evidence gathering and assessment of the case, they 
should provide the Respondent(s) with a description of the factual basis for the charges, the 
evidence and the economic theories and legal analysis proposed, along with copies of the 
complaints, supporting materials and evidence assembled to date, both inculpatory and 
exculpatory.”364 The respondents should be given the opportunity to address the evidence and 
discuss the proposed charges, evidence, economic theories, and legal analysis with the agency.365 
Similarly, the ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task Force envisions agencies disclosing 
their economic rationales so that respondents can respond with economic arguments.366 Together 
these analyses encourage enforcement agencies to disclose the factual allegations, legal theories, 
and economic rationales on which they are relying. 
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d. Opportunity for the respondent to submit exculpatory evidence and responses to the 
allegations  
 All three jurisdictions provide a formal right to submit a response and present 
exculpatory and rebuttal evidence. While the parties in the U.S. have a right to a trial-like 
hearing, the EU and China have different kinds of hearings. 
China 
 In China, companies under investigation are entitled to make statements and defenses 
regarding the investigation.367 They are further warranted to request an oral hearing,368 where 
they can defend themselves and make arguments.369 Respondents may also submit exculpatory 
evidence in writing, a right guaranteed by Chinese law.370 Chinese officials emphasize that they 
have internal procedure and practices of submitting an Advance Notice/Hearing Notice on 
Administrative Penalty to respondents and inviting responses. In administrative penalty hearings, 
the relevant parties can conduct examination on the admissibility of the evidence submitted by 
their counterparts. After receiving the respondent’s response, the agencies will issue a final 
decision. Similar procedures apply to MOFCOM merger control investigations.371  
European Union 
 EU law gives respondents two opportunities to present their arguments to the 
Commission. First, respondents can inform the Commission of their views in writing.372 This 
right encompasses the right to submit exculpatory evidence.373 The Commission can base its 
decision only on the grounds to which the parties had an opportunity to respond.374  
 Second, the parties can request an oral hearing in their written submissions, and they have 
the right to be heard in a nonpublic, recorded hearing by a Hearing Officer.375 However, this 
hearing is not comparable to a U.S. hearing. The parties can present their views, but they do not 
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have the right to cross-examine the Commission’s witnesses. Additionally, the hearing officer 
has no decisionmaking power, but only serves as a procedural safeguard. The Commission’s case 
team and other Commission officials are often present at the hearing.376 The hearing officer 
makes a report of the substantive issues raised at the hearing, but this report is not available to 
the parties and is not binding in any form. 
 Further, at these hearings, complainants and other competitors may have the chance to 
express their views in addition to the accused company, at the hearing officer’s discretion.377 In a 
situation where most of the market participants have little reason to support the accused 
company, respondents sometimes consider hearings to be counterproductive. However, the 
OECD observed that most respondents take advantage of the hearings.378  
United States 
 In the U.S., the defending party in a judicial enforcement action enjoys the full 
procedural benefits associated with jury trials. A respondent in an administrative adjudication 
has a right to a hearing to “show cause why an order should not be entered.”379 For that purpose, 
the respondent can file an answer within 14 days after being served with the complaint.380 At the 
evidentiary hearing itself, every party has the right of due notice, cross examination, presentation 
of evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all the other rights essential to a fair hearing.381 In 
a merger review, agency staff will discuss the contents of the second request with the parties, and 
the parties are encouraged to negotiate limitations and modifications to the request.382 Parties can 
present evidence to reduce the scope of the second request, in what is called a “quick look” 
investigation.383 Agency staff may ultimately determine the parties’ compliance with parts or the 
entirety of the second request is not necessary, and may close the investigation.384 
International norms 
 An international consensus is emerging in support of giving respondents the right to 
submit a response to charges. The ICN features the opportunity to respond to adverse evidence as 
one of its nine fundamental fairness principles.385 Further, Paragraph 5.4 of the ICN Guidance on 
Investigative Process recognizes that enforcement authorities should provide subjects of formal 
allegations with “an effective opportunity to respond” after “presentation of legal arguments are 
made” and the “parties [are] provided with access to the evidence relied upon as the basis for the 
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agency’s allegations.”386 Paragraph 6.4 of ICN Guidance further provides, “Parties under 
investigation should be given the opportunity to exercise their rights of defense and respond to 
agency concerns and evidence. Parties should be permitted to express views, present factual, 
legal, and economic evidence to the agency and make substantive submissions during the 
investigation.”387 The ICN Roundtable Report similarly endorses giving charged parties the 
“opportunity to meet with the agency and provide additional arguments and insights.”388 
Likewise, the ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task Force states there should be 
“reasonable opportunities to present such responses in face-to-face meetings with officials 
conducting the investigation and with officials managing the investigation.”389  
 The OECD discussion on the final decisionmaking stage recognizes that “most agencies 
provide parties the right to a hearing,” although some rely on written responses and informal 
discussions.390 The fifth finding of the OECD Roundtable similarly notes, “Jurisdictions reported 
allowing the subjects of competition enforcement proceedings to respond orally or in writing to 
the allegations against them before a decision is taken.391 These opportunities allow the subjects 
of the proceeding to present evidence and rebut opposing claims and arguments.”392 The OECD 
further notes that “[s]ome jurisdictions also allow parties to review and comment on key 
submissions by third parties contained in the case file, or submit memoranda or observations at 
any point during the investigation stage.” 393 Moreover, “[s]ome jurisdictions allow parties to 
submit counter evidence and question any witnesses that have been called.”394 
 The OECD Policy Roundtable also recommends that “defendants should have the right to 
a hearing before the decision-maker(s) or fully empowered agents” in addition to the opportunity 
to respond in writing.395 The Roundtable Report continues: 
The purpose of this hearing is to provide the defendant with the opportunity for a 
live, in-person presentation of their response to the charges, for the defendant to 
question the evidence and witnesses relied upon by the investigators, including 
any complainants and others who have provided evidence on which the agency 
relies, to question the investigators and bring forward witnesses for the defence, 
who will also be available for questioning.396 
 The OECD emphasizes that “merely providing a perfunctory hearing . . . does not in itself 
constitute adequate due process.”397 Other mechanisms include “more informal discussions 
between the agency and the party.” 398 Together these authorities represent a strong endorsement 
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of extending to defendants the right of a full opportunity to interrogate the arguments and 
evidence submitted against them. 
e. Representation by legal counsel during agency deliberations 
 The jurisdictions additionally diverge with respect to representation by legal counsel 
during hearings and other stages of agency deliberations. 
China 
 In China, the procedural rules clearly provide that the respondent can be represented by 
legal counsel in a hearing. Pursuant to the Rules for the Administrations for Industry and 
Commerce on the Hearing of Evidence in Administrative Penalty Cases, the parties and third 
parties may entrust one or two persons to participate in the hearing on their behalf.399 The 
hearing procedure also regards “the parties and their proxies making representations and 
defense” as a necessary procedure.400 According to information publicized by Chinese law firms, 
lawyers have actively participated in and represented the investigated parties in anti-monopoly 
enforcement cases. The biography page of lawyer Ma Chen of Han Kun Law Offices indicates 
that he has “represented many well-known international and Chinese clients in China . . . in 
responding to cartel investigations.”401 The profile of Dentons lawyer Deng Zhisong similarly 
shows that “Lawyer Deng has represented a number of multinational firms in responding to 
investigation on monopoly agreement and abuse of dominant market position initiated by the 
NDRC and SAIC. He is familiar with the investigative procedures and experienced in developing 
strategies for response.”402 The profile page of lawyer Cen Zhaoqi of Zhong Lun enumerates his 
involvement in anti-monopoly investigations, stating that he has “represented a Fortune 500 IT 
firm and provided legal counsel in an SAIC anti-monopoly investigation, represented a Fortune 
500 communications firm and provided legal counsel in a NDRC anti-monopoly investigation, 
represented a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company and provided legal counsel in a NDRC anti-
monopoly investigation, represented a state-owned gas company and provided legal counsel in 
an anti-monopoly investigation by the Jiangsu AIC, represented a private gas firm and provided 
legal counsel in an anti-monopoly investigation by the Shandong AIC.”403 This indicates that 
involving legal counsel in anti-monopoly investigations is common practice.  
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European Union 
 As noted earlier, Article 47(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes the 
right to legal assistance. The ECJ has held that the right to legal representation must be respected 
during any stage that may be decisive in providing evidence of the unlawful nature of conduct.404 
United States 
 Under U.S. law, criminal antitrust defendants are guaranteed right to counsel, including 
the appointment of counsel at the public expense if the defendant is too indigent to afford paid 
counsel.405 Defendants in civil court actions have the right to be represented by counsel as 
well.406 In order to represent a client in the U.S. District Courts, counsel must be admitted to the 
bar of that court. The local rules usually restrict practice in front of these courts to attorneys who 
are members of the bar of a U.S. state. Attorney fees can be awarded to the winning party of an 
adversary adjudicative proceeding if it fulfills certain conditions, such as being a small 
business.407 
 The right to counsel is also statutorily guaranteed in FTC administrative proceedings.408 
As noted earlier,409 representation by counsel is presumed in all stages of the proceeding starting 
at the prehearing procedures,410 when filing motions,411 when requesting witness testimony,412 or 
when filing for an appeal from initial decision of the hearing officer to the Commission.413 
Representation in front of the Commission is possible by any member of the bar of a federal 
court or of the highest court of any state or territory of the United States and all persons who are 
qualified to practice law in a Member State of the European Union.414 The U.S. allows licensed 
in-house counsel to represent clients in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. 
International norms 
 There is an international consensus that representation by counsel is essential to fair 
processes. Paragraph 6.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process provides, “Parties should 
be allowed to be represented by counsel of their choosing during the investigation, and should be 
permitted to present their views via counsel, their employees, and outside experts.”415 Paragraph 
2.4.7 of the ICC Recommended Framework for International Best Practices in Competition Law 
Enforcement Proceedings suggests, “The agency should allow the parties to be represented not 
only by counsel licensed to practice in the agency’s jurisdiction, but should also allow counsel 
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licensed in other jurisdictions to participate in such representation before the agency, acting in 
conjunction with the former.”416  
f. Protection of sensitive information  
 Chinese, EU, and U.S. agencies all handle confidential information differently. The most 
common types of confidential information involved in competition proceedings include customer 
lists, prices paid by customers, sales data, production statistics, internal business strategies, 
information about new projects/products, and proprietary information.417 There are two distinct 
confidentiality problems worth examining. First, how do agencies preserve the confidentiality of 
information they collect from respondents? Second, how do agencies preserve the confidentiality 
of information provided by third parties without compromising respondents’ right to create an 
effective defense? 
China  
 Both the NDRC and SAIC were statutorily required to preserve the confidentiality of 
trade secrets obtained during an enforcement proceeding.418 Both agencies derived their 
provisions for confidentiality from Article 41 of the AML.419 MOFCOM had a more developed 
law on confidentiality and scheduled private hearings for parties wishing to disclose confidential 
information.420 While the NDRC and SAIC regulations bound agency officials only to the 
confidentiality of only “trade secrets,” MOFCOM’s regulations imposed broader obligations, 
requiring agency officials, the declarant, other related organizations, and individuals to keep 
confidential “any trade secrets and other necessary confidential information revealed.”421 Unlike 
the EU and U.S., China does not have an obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
parties, and thus confidentiality in this respect is not addressed in its regulations. 
EU 
 Several sources of EU law establish general principles of confidentiality that bind the 
European Commission.422 DG Comp has taken several steps to preserve confidential 
information. First, it has appointed Authorized Disclosure Officers to ensure “confidential 
information is being transmitted in an appropriate way” between NCAs and DG Comp.423 
Second, it has exempted “confidential documents, including business secrets,” from the 
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respondent’s broad right to access the case file.424 Third, it has established rules protecting the 
identity of informants during investigations.425  
 However, DG Comp also recognizes that the need to prove infringement or the 
respondent’s right of defense may outweigh the interests of confidentiality.426 Indeed, DG Comp 
has developed factors that it weighs in making such determinations: the relevance and probative 
value of information in determining whether an infringement has occurred, the indispensability 
of the information, the harm that would result from disclosure, and the preliminary view of the 
seriousness of the competition infringement.427 When it decides to release confidential 
information, DG Comp usually sets up a data room where the parties and their lawyers get access 
to the Commission’s file under certain restrictions.428 While DG Comp has discretion not to 
disclose confidential information, it is limited in its ability to use non-disclosed confidential 
information in its final decision.429  
United States  
 U.S. law features a strong default commitment to confidentiality. There is a general 
recognition in U.S. law that confidentially protections make parties less hesitant to share 
information with courts and agencies.430 The FTC maintains several practices consistent with 
this commitment. First, the FTC requires that the existence of investigations be kept 
confidential.431 Second, the FTC appoints custodians to care for confidential information.432 
Third, the FTC has a highly specific list of procedures for processing, storing, and returning 
documents. For example, the FTC must log confidential documents and catalog the date, name of 
custodian, the submitter, and the extent to which the submitter has asserted confidentiality.433 
Furthermore, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not reach such documents, as it 
exempts “trade secrets” and “privileged or confidential” information.434 When they issued 
memorandums on FOIA, the Bush and Obama Administrations both emphasized that sensitive 
business information was protected from disclosure.435  
 Additionally, the FTC’s discovery regulations give respondents access to any information 
relevant to their defense or that the agency could use against them. However, the regulations also 
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acknowledge the power of the FTC’s administrative law judges to issue protective orders to 
prevent “improper” disclosure of confidential information and protect third parties.436  
International norms  
 First, there is a strong international norm in favor of protecting confidential information 
against accidental disclosure. The ICN recognizes confidentiality protections as one of its nine 
essential enforcement principles437 and states that “the protection of confidential information is a 
common component of competition enforcement frameworks.”438 The ICC counsels that this 
protection should apply both to information submitted by the respondent and third parties.439 The 
OECD encourages competition agencies to protect the confidentiality of business secrets, trade 
secrets, and personal information.440 Relatedly, the ABA Antitrust Section’s International Task 
Force recommends that agencies keep the investigation itself confidential.441 
 Second, it is an international norm to allow respondents limited access to confidential 
information necessary to mount an effective defense.442 On the one hand, agencies must ensure 
respondents do not obtain “competitively sensitive information about their rivals.”443 On the 
other hand, agencies must ensure respondents can access the information they need to mount an 
effective defense. Other policy-based considerations may also come into play. Elaborating on 
one of its nine essential enforcement principles, the ICN states that the “decision to disclose 
confidential information should include consideration of the confidentiality claims, rights of 
defense, rights of third parties, incentives to provide information, effects on competition, and 
transparency to the public.”444 
2. Differences in Law and Practice 
 There are currently no similarities between the three jurisdictions in law and practice; 
three differences in law; and three areas where the law is similar, but practices are different.  
Differences in law 
Disclosure of exculpatory evidence. EU and U.S. law require agencies to disclose or make 
available to respondents the exculpatory evidence they have gathered, while Chinese law does 
not impose a similar obligation. However, Chinese agencies sometimes disclose information if 
the respondent requests a hearing. Further, Chinese agencies will disclose information informally 
while interacting with respondents.  
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Representation by legal counsel. As we saw during the investigatory stages, EU and U.S. 
agencies consistently allow participation by legal counsel throughout the decisionmaking process. 
While Chinese law allows respondents to be represented by an agent during hearings, such 
agents are usually allowed to speak only on legal issues, not factual ones. Further, Chinese 
agencies do not allow foreign lawyers to represent clients before them and Chinese agencies 
generally consider companies’ in-house lawyers acting as staff to be employees, not attorneys. 
Protection of confidential information. While China, the EU, and the U.S. all require the 
preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive information, the EU and U.S. have developed 
more robust systems. China’s laws required NDRC and SAIC officials to maintain 
confidentiality only of trade secrets, while MOFCOM employs broader confidentiality 
regulations capturing generally all relevant parties and all confidential information disclosed 
during a review or investigation. The EU and U.S. maintain strong commitments to 
confidentiality through various measures, such as designating disclosure officials and custodians 
of confidential information. Additionally, both the EU and U.S. allow respondents access to 
exculpatory evidence with varying degrees of restrictiveness on what kinds of documents may be 
viewed.  
Differences in practice 
Disclosure of the evidence upon which the agency wishes to rely. Although all respondents in all 
three jurisdictions are entitled to the evidence on which the agency is relying, China often 
discloses it later in the process after a tentative decision has been made or at formal hearings. 
Further, Chinese agencies sometimes disclose information during exchanges with the respondent 
during the investigation.  
Disclosure of the legal and economic theories and factual allegations underlying the agency’s 
investigation. Formally, all three jurisdictions require their agencies to disclose the legal, 
economic, and factual bases underlying their investigations. However, Chinese agencies usually 
wait to make such disclosures until they reach a tentative decision on the disposition of the 
investigation. Chinese officials emphasize that they provide these disclosures and the tentative 
disposition to respondents and that they are open to changing their minds on the disposition. 
However, some companies have asserted that the agencies do not disclose enough to allow them 
to prepare effective defenses. 
Opportunity for the respondent to submit exculpatory evidence and responses to the allegations. 
All three jurisdictions recognize respondents’ right to defend themselves by responding to 
arguments and submitting exculpatory evidence. To effectuate this, all three jurisdictions allow 
respondents to request hearings. However, the three legal systems operate differently in practice. 
In allowing responses to the agency’s allegations, the U.S. provides the most robust hearings, 
which include the right to cross-examine, submit evidence, and make arguments. While China 
and the EU formally allow hearings, the utilization differs. In China, there is no cross-
examination according to current procedure law, but similar institution has been provided by 
relevant rules in hearing process. Chinese agencies allow arguments to be heard and debated, and 
permit examination on the admissibility of the evidence submitted by both parties. The EU does 
not allow cross examination at its hearings and it allows industry rivals to make appearances to 
criticize the respondent. Consequently, respondents in China and the European Union usually 
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rely primarily on submitting their arguments and evidence in writing. Chinese officials 
emphasize that they want to hear respondents’ views. 
D. Issuance of Decisions 
 Once the agency has collected all the relevant information and has given the parties an 
opportunity to present their views and evidence, it must decide whether a violation of the 
competition rules has occurred and, if so, what action it will take. The agency then 
communicates its decision to the parties and to the public. 
 The Chinese agencies have historically followed a multi-level system. At the different 
AICs, investigators who had concluded their investigations submitted an investigation 
completion report to the legal affairs division, which reviewed it and assigned a case-handling 
staffer to examine it. The legal affairs body then offered its written opinions and suggestions. 
The person in charge of the agency then reviewed these opinions, which included a draft of the 
administrative punishment decision. After reviewing the arguments by parties and consulting 
with various people, including both agency non-agency officials, the person in charge of the 
agency then made a decision whether to impose an administrative punishment. When the 
decision concerned a major or complicated case, the decision was made through collective 
deliberation at the relevant meeting of the administrative AIC.445 NDRC and MOFCOM 
followed similar procedures.446  
 Following the creation of SAMR, the Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty 
Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and Administration provide that upon conclusion of 
an investigation, the case-handling agency shall prepare an investigation conclusion report, and 
submit together with the case files to the review body for review.447 The review shall be 
performed by the legal department or other relevant departments of the market supervision and 
administration authority, not the case-handlers.448 After the review is complete and the case files 
are returned, the case handling agency shall submit the case files, the proposed administrative 
penalty and the re-examination result to the principal of a market supervision and administration 
department for approval decision.449 The SAMR administrative penalty procedure took effect on 
April 1, 2019.  
 In the EU, the principle of collegiality450 formally requires that all decisions of the 
European Commission be taken collectively by all Commissioners after a confidential 
discussion. In practice, the other Commissioners typically defer to the Competition 
Commissioner’s judgment.451 
 When U.S. antitrust laws are enforced in court, the case follows the normal judicial 
litigation process. In U.S. administrative adjudication, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) files 
an initial decision after conducting an evidentiary hearing. This decision can be appealed to the 
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Commission as a whole,452 and the Commission can then review the issues in question de novo. 
After that, the decision may be challenged in court.453  
 We divide this phase into six steps.  
1. Separation of investigatory and decisionmaking staff 
2. Publication of decisions 
3. Description of the essential facts upon which decision is based 
4. Disclosure of economic evidence, assumptions, and methodology 
underlying decisions 
5. Obligation to give reasons in the decision 
6. Obligation to respond to relevant and significant arguments made by the 
respondent 
1. Procedural Steps of the Issuance of Decisions 
a. Separation of investigatory and decisionmaking staff 
 The three jurisdictions offer a range in the extent to which they separate investigatory and 
decisionmaking staff, a principle called the separation of functions. Although none of the 
jurisdictions provide a complete separation of investigatory and decisionmaking staff, the U.S. 
generally observes a stricter separation of functions than China or the EU. 
China 
 In enforcement agencies, the procedural requirements and related provisions of the AML 
exist in accordance with the procedural requirements and related provisions of the 
Administrative Penalty Law. It is worth noting that although anti-monopoly enforcement 
agencies do not assign investigatory power and review power to different departments, the 
officials responsible for investigation are often different than those making the final decisions. 
As Article 38 of the Administrative Penalty Law provides, following the conclusion of the 
investigation, responsible persons of the administrative agency shall examine the findings of the 
investigation. Then, before imposing more hefty administrative penalties on complex or 
aggravated violations, the leading members of the administrative agency shall discuss and decide 
collectively454(often called a “case review meeting” internally). Article 38 also declares that 
before the responsible persons of the administrative agency reach a decision, review shall be 
performed by the people engaged in the review of administrative penalty decisions (review by 
the legal division of the anti-monopoly bureau within the former NDRC and by the department 
of laws and regulations within the former SAIC). The personnel who are involved in 
administrative penalty decision for the first time in the administrative agency shall have passed 
the national bar examination and have obtained a license to practice law.455  
 
452 See 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b) (2017). 
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 Following the creation of the State Administration for Market Supervision (SAMR), the 
Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty Procedures Relating to Market Supervision and 
Administration also dictate a collective panel of department heads456 and a recusal system 
whereby personnel on the case with direct conflict of interest vis-à-vis the interested parties shall 
recuse themselves from administrative penalty decisions. The recusal of any principal 
department head shall be discussed and decided collectively by all principal department heads; 
the recusal of other heads of a department shall be decided by the principal department head; the 
recusal of other personnel shall be decided by a department head.457 However, even though all 
administrative enforcement agencies are required to comply with the Administrative Penalty 
Law, their organizational structure may not be exactly the same. For example, although the anti-
monopoly enforcement agencies do not assign investigatory and review powers to different 
departments, CSRC had separated the investigative power from the punishment power as early as 
2002 and created separate departments. Enforcement investigation is the responsibility of the 
general inspection team, whereas review and punitive decisions fall under the responsibility of 
the administrative penalty committee (APC). The APC hires professionals with relevant trial 
experience, as well as lawyers. 
European Union 
 Like many European National Competition Agencies (NCAs), DG Comp operates as an 
integrated agency—in which the same staff that conduct the investigations issue the Statement of 
Objections and make the final agency decision about liability.458 The European Court of Human 
Rights ruled that this arrangement does not violate the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights so long as full judicial review of the agency decision is 
possible.459 The Court emphasized that competition law investigations are administrative in 
nature and, therefore, need not satisfy the same procedural safeguards as criminal investigations, 
but that fact does not render Article 6 inapplicable.460 The ECJ has held that the standard of 
review applied by the General Court satisfies the requirements to guarantee a fair trial.461 A 
Hearing Officer oversees proceeding in DG Comp, but this official simply ensures that all of the 
necessary procedures are followed and does not participate in the substantive decision.462 Indeed, 
the final decision on the disposition of a particular case is formally made by the collective 
twenty-eight Commissioners of the European Commission, although in practice the other 
Commissioners defer to the Commissioner handling the particular case.463 Apparently, the 
Commissioners are known to lobby each other over and horse trade on the outcomes of these 
cases.464 
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 Subsequently, EU law does not require any separation of investigatory, prosecutorial, and 
adjudicatory functions. Like China, DG Comp employs some internal checks on agency 
discretion. For example, DG Comp uses “devil’s advocate” teams in an attempt to recreate an 
adversarial process, though the team’s members are still DG Comp officials.465 Moreover, the 
Legal Service of the Commission is consulted during all stages of an investigation for a second 
opinion. Nevertheless, the decision not to require a separation of functions within DG Comp 
remains controversial. Leading academics have criticized the use of the same personnel for 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication.466 Reform suggestions include separating 
investigatory and adjudicatory teams, turning the hearing officer into an independent decision 
maker, or having the Commission litigate its cases in front of a court. 
 The EU does employ some internal checks on agency discretion. If the parties so request, 
DG Comp normally offers the respondent and the complainant the opportunity to discuss the 
case with either DG Comp staff, the Deputy Director General for antitrust, or if appropriate, with 
the Commissioner responsible for competition.467 Before submitting a draft for a decision to the 
Commission for a vote, DG Comp must consult with the Legal Service of the Commission and 
other interested Directorates General and give them an opportunity to respond to the draft.468 
However, the Competition Commissioner—who, in practice, makes the decision—rarely attends 
the hearing, which means she depends on briefings from staff previously involved in the 
investigation.469  
United States 
 The U.S., in contrast, generally provides for greater separation of investigatory and 
adjudicatory personnel. During the 1930s, when the separation of functions was less common in 
U.S. agencies, the ABA harshly criticized the threat the agencies posed to due process, arguing 
agency decisionmakers could not fairly review their colleagues’ decisions due to an espirit de 
corps which emphasized political loyalty.470 Indeed, the legislative history of the APA reflects 
the overriding concern of the drafters on the importance of the separation of functions.471 Just a 
few years after the APA’s passage, Justice Jackson (who, as Attorney General, was a key player 
in drafting the APA) affirmed the essential importance of the separation of functions under the 
APA.472  
 For criminal and civil enforcement actions brought in court, the adjudicatory 
decisionmaker is a judge nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate who has 
complete independence from the agency. In administrative adjudications at the FTC, the initial 
decision is made by a duly qualified Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), with Commissioners 
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sitting as ALJs on rare occasions.473 While ALJs are nominally part of a particular agency, they 
exercise substantial independence because they hold tenured positions and can only be 
discharged by the Merit Systems Protection Board for good cause.474 Further, ALJs are selected 
through a competitive examination475 and not subject to supervision by anyone in the agency.476 
Their compensation and advancement is decided by the Office of Personnel Management, a 
government office outside the agency.477  
 Once the Commission votes to issue a complaint, any communication between 
investigative or prosecuting staff and the ALJ or any other employee involved in the 
decisionmaking process is prohibited unless made on the public record.478 The ALJ’s decision 
may be appealed to the full Commission,479 in which case the Commissioners hear submissions 
from the FTC staff as well as the accused company.480 When members of the Commission sit as 
the ALJ, they typically recuse themselves from voting on the complaint or the appeal.481 The 
result is a fairly strong division of authority between investigatory and prosecutorial staff and 
adjudicatory staff. However, it is worth noting that the Commissioners both vote to issue a 
complaint and decide on appeals from the ALJs.482 In practice, the Commissioners rarely 
overturn an ALJ’s decision, a practice that legal scholars have criticized.483 
International norms 
 An international norm exists supporting the separation of functions. For example, the 
OECD recognizes “establishing a clear separation between the role of the investigators and those 
making enforcement decisions” as one of the leading methods adopted by competition agencies 
to ensure transparency and fairness in enforcement processes.484 Similarly, Paragraph 2.4.3 of 
the ICC Recommended Framework supports assigning prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions 
to separate and independent departments or at least employing factfinders who are independent 
of investigatory and prosecutory personnel, with strict limits on ex parte contacts after the report 
is issued.485 
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b. Publication of decisions 
 The three jurisdictions differ with respect to the obligation to publish decisions. While 
there is an obligation to publish all fully adjudicated decisions in the EU and the U.S., Chinese 
law only requires its agencies to publish decisions concerning merger review decisions. However, 
the other two agencies also routinely publish decisions in practice, with increasing amounts of 
detail and legal reasoning. 
China 
 China’s AML stipulates that, after the AML enforcement agency investigates and verifies 
the alleged violation and establishes that it constitutes monopolistic conduct, it shall take a 
decision according to law and publicize it.486 The AML also stipulates that the anti-monopoly 
enforcement agency shall publicize its decision to prohibit a concentration or attach restrictive 
conditions on concentration to the general public in a timely fashion.487 Clearly, the AML has 
slightly different requirements on the three former antimonopoly agencies in terms of publicizing 
decisions. Decisions of prohibition and clearance with restrictive conditions attached “shall” (i.e. 
must) be publicized and publicized in a timely fashion. However, for other cases involving 
suspected violations, the law says “may” (i.e. selectively) publicize, which works in favor of the 
company. For companies, punishment by the government already incurs an economic loss, 
publicizing the decision would be a second punishment likely more serious than economic fines. 
Therefore, if the enforcement agency believes that the penalty has served its purpose, it will 
likely relent on publicizing the decision.488 There is no mandatory provision for publicizing the 
decision under the AML, but the Interim Provisions on Administrative Penalty Procedures 
Relating to Market Supervision and Administration published by the State Administration for 
Market Regulation establish public disclosure as a statutory requirement in administrative 
enforcement.489 When the enforcement agency announces the final results after reaching a 
penalty decision, the public can then see that the respondents had disagreement or objection 
during the investigation, and that the enforcement agency has documented and responded to such 
disagreement or objection in the penalty decision.490 In general, Chinese agencies have started to 
publicize decisions with increasing frequency. 
European Union 
 The European Commission is required to publish in the Official Journal of the European 
Union (O.J.) the main content of the decisions that it takes pursuant to Articles 7 through 10, 23, 
and 24 of Council Regulation EC No 1/2003.491 This publication must contain a summary of the 
decision that consists of the name of parties and the main content of the decision. This includes 
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any penalties imposed, a final report of the Hearing Officer, and the opinion of the Advisory 
Committee (if recommended).492 Additionally, the European Commission will publish online 
versions of all documents published in the Official Journal as well as the full text of the non-
confidential versions of its decisions as soon as possible on its website.493 
United States 
 In the U.S. the FTC is required to make all final opinions available for public inspection 
in an electronic format.494 The FTC also publishes a bound volume of its decisions and orders 
entitled Federal Trade Commission Decisions, usually covering a period of six months and 
containing all final orders of the Commission, along with any Commission opinions and the 
initial decision of the ALJ in the case. The decisions are likewise available on the FTC’s website. 
The FTC additionally frequently publishes analyses of its reasons for terminating major 
investigations. 
 In merger reviews, HSR filings, second request materials, and information provided 
voluntarily are all confidential. However if an early termination is granted, the identity of the 
parties and the fact that a filing was made are disclosed.495 If the agencies challenge the proposed 
transaction in court after complying with a second request, there will be a public record of the 
case in the court filings.496 
International norms 
 There is a strong international norm favoring the publication of decisions. Paragraph 4.2 
of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process provides, “Competition agency decisions to 
challenge or prohibit conduct should be transparent and the agency should, subject to appropriate 
protection for confidential information, provide a publicly available version or summary which 
explains the agency’s findings of fact and legal and economic analysis.”497 The OECD similarly 
concludes that “[t]ransparency with respect to enforcement decisions is also achieved by agency 
publication of outcomes and performance data, and by providing public access to information 
about ongoing investigations” and that “[t]he publication of decisions is strongly connected to 
transparency.”498 In addition, the publication of “details and justifications when a case is closed” 
via a short press release can help educate the public.499 
c. Description of the essential facts upon which each decision is based 
 In China, the EU, and the U.S., the competition agency must describe the essential facts 
upon which its decision is based. However, their practices of doing so differ. 
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China 
 Chinese agencies are obligated to describe the facts upon which their decisions are 
based.500 However, in practice the decisions are comparably relatively short. Often in the past, 
the agency would only refer to the kind of evidence, such as, generically referring to “business 
documents,” followed by a standard phrase. Recently, Chinese agencies have begun to make 
their decisions more detailed. For example, in the decision on the Tetra Pak case of abuse of 
dominant market position, the essential facts have been discussed at great length. 
European Union 
 Similarly, Article 296 TFEU obligates the European Commission to include a description 
of the facts in its decisions. In practice, Commission decisions meticulously list and describe 
every note and business document found and each meeting between the conspirators that can be 
proven. As a result, Commission decisions can be hundreds of pages long. For mergers, the 
Commission’s published decision must contain the “names of the parties and the main content of 
the decision.”501 
United States 
 In court proceedings initiated by the FTC or DOJ, courts must spell out their factual 
findings so that their judgments can survive judicial review. An appellate court can review the 
record and set aside lower court findings if it is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”502 In an administrative adjudication at the FTC, the initial decision 
must include a statement of findings of fact with specific page references to principal supporting 
items of evidence in the record.503 The decision must be based on the record before the 
agency.504 The agency may defend its decision on judicial review only on the basis of evidence 
and rationales that were explicitly considered and relied on by the agency in its final decision.505 
International norms 
 Some international guidance documents encourage competition enforcement agencies to 
describe the essential facts upon which their decisions are based. Paragraph 4.2 of the ICN 
Guidance on Investigative Process provides that competition agencies “should, subject to 
appropriate protection for confidential information, provide a publicly available version or 
summary which explains the agency’s findings of fact and legal and economic analysis.”506 
 
500 For SAIC, see SAIC Admin. Penalty Procedures, supra note 369, art. 56; Admin. Penalty Law, supra note 267, 
art. 39; SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases, supra note 94, art. 19. 
501 See Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 20(2), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC). 
502 Pullman Standard v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 284–85 n. 14 (1982). 
503 See 16 C.F.R. § 3.51(c)(1) (2017). 
504 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
505 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1942). 
506 ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 3. 
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d. Disclosure of economic evidence, assumptions, and methodology underlying decisions 
  Each jurisdiction varies in the extent to which agency decisions disclose and analyze 
economic evidence, assumptions, and methodology. 
China 
 China does not require its AML enforcement agencies to explain and defend their use of 
economic evidence. In general, Chinese agencies have been utilizing economic analysis in 
complicated merger reviews and started to include more economic evidence in their opinions 
concerning other monopolistic conduct. For example, SAIC earned praise for its recent Tetra 
Pak decision, in which it described the economic evidence and methodology in great detail.507 
All three national Chinese enforcement agencies and enforcement officials on the local level 
often consulted outside experts to help them understand and respond to complicated economic 
issues; and they have already included economic information in some decisions.508  
European Union 
 EU law requires the agency to disclose the economic evidence, assumptions, and 
methodology upon which a decision relies. In the 2017 United Parcel Service case, the General 
Court held that the right of defense required the Commission to disclose the final version of the 
economic model it relied on to the respondent.509 Further, the obligation to state reasons 
generally leads DG Comp decisions to include a description of the economic evidence and the 
analytical methodology.510 
United States 
 Under the U.S. doctrine of “hard-look” review, agencies must provide complete 
disclosure and an analytic defense of the assumptions, evidence, and methodology upon which 
every decision is based. The agency must adduce all empirical data that can readily be 
obtained511 and the agency cannot use grossly inaccurate methodology512 or a methodology that 
is predicated on an unverified, untested hypothesis.513 If the problem is new or of a nature that no 
empirical data is available, the agency must disclose its assumptions in a candid manner.514 
Agencies must also subject their analyses to public comment and respond to major objections 
with a reasoned presentation.515 
 
507 Tetra Pak Case (竞争执法公告 2016年 10号利乐滥用市场支配地位案)(State Admin. for Indus. and 
Commerce 2016). 
508 Chinese enforcement officials recounted this to us. 
509 Case T-194/13, United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:144 (Mar. 7, 2017), paras. 198–
210, curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62013TJ0194&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=.  
510 See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept. 6, 2017), 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014CJ0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
511 See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
512 See Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 972 (9th Cir. 2002). 
513 See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 752 (9th Cir. 2004). 
514 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474–76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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International norms 
 Prominent international organizations endorse encouraging competition enforcement 
agencies to disclose the evidence, assumptions, and economic theories upon which their 
decisions are based. Paragraph 4.2 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process states that 
competition agency decisions should “explain[] the agency’s findings of fact and legal and 
economic analysis” as a basic matter of transparency.516  
e. Obligation to give reasons in the decision 
 While the U.S. and EU require the agency to present and support the reasoning behind its 
decision in a clear manner capable of judicial understanding, Chinese law contains no similar 
requirement. 
China 
 Chinese law is developing in providing reasons in the decision, even though it does not 
require agency decisions to include the same degree of reasoning as does EU and U.S. law. 
Chinese officials emphasize that ongoing communication between the parties and the 
enforcement authorities helps to ensure that the parties understand the agencies’ thinking.517 
Although these efforts are governed by internal procedures, Chinese agencies are becoming more 
consistent in this area. However, Chinese agencies sometimes release written decisions that 
resemble press releases asserting that the relevant reasoning is in the case file, rather than 
provide detailed, reasoned considerations of the respondents’ arguments. 
European Union 
 Article 41 of the European Fundamental Rights Charter obligates government agencies to 
give reasons for their actions.518 Article 296 of TFEU enshrines this obligation.519 Furthermore, 
the DG Comp Antitrust Manual explicitly states that “the legal basis of the decision should be 
indicated” in the published decision.520 The ECJ has held that the statement of reasons must 
disclose the rationale underlying each decision in a clear and unequivocal fashion.521 For the 
Commission, this process should follow from its obligation to give reasons in its Statement of 
Objections. As DG Comp acknowledges, the purpose of the Statement of Objections is to 
provide respondents with “all the information they need to defend themselves effectively and to 
comment on the allegations against them.”522 This is even more relevant for final Commission 
 
516 See ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 3. 
517 Chinese officials emphasized this in our interactions with them.  
518 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 41(2)(c), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 404. 
519 TFEU art. 296. 
520 DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, ch. 19.7. 
521 See Case C-417/11 P, Council of the European Union v. Bamba, ECLI:EU:C:2012:718 (Nov. 15, 2012), para. 50, 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62011CJ0417&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. For mergers, see Council 
Regulation 139/2004, art. 20, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC). 
522 See DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, ch. 11.1.  
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decisions. DG Comp further acknowledges that “Commission decisions must state the reasons on 
which they are based.”523 
United States 
 Under the U.S. court-created doctrine of hard-look review, an agency’s reasoning must 
not be cryptic or confusing. Instead the agency must present its decision in a manner capable of 
judicial comprehension.524 Agencies must respond in a reasoned manner to the major arguments 
raised, explain how the agency resolved any significant problems, and show how that resolution 
led the agency to its ultimate determination.525 Brief, conclusory statements are insufficient.526 
The discussion should ensure that all the “major issues of policy were ventilated” and disclose 
“why the agency reacted to them as it did.”527 An agency “cannot simply declare its ‘expertise’; 
it must exercise that expertise and demonstrate sufficiently that it has done so.”528 
International norms 
 There is an international consensus that agencies should disclose the reasoning 
underlying their decisions. The OECD succinctly states that “decisions should provide clear 
detailed description of the case facts, the applicable rules and the reasons for the legal and factual 
findings” to make judicial review possible.529 The OECD also requires that agency decisions 
provide “sufficient detail so as to identify the basis and rationale for the decision.”530 A proper 
explanation of the court’s reasoning plays a critical role in avoiding corrupt decisions, providing 
a sense of fairness, providing guidance to the public, promoting public confidence, and in 
supporting judicial review. Finally, the ICN emphasizes, “All final written enforcement decision 
on violations should include detailed explanations of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
evidence relied upon, party arguments, and sanctions.”531 
f. Obligation to respond to relevant and significant arguments made by the respondent 
 Only U.S. and EU law obligates agencies to respond in their decisions to the respondent’s 
major arguments. Chinese agencies sometimes do so in practice. 
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China 
 Although Chinese law obligates agencies to review the evidence and arguments 
submitted by parties, it does not obligate agencies to answer the respondents’ arguments in their 
decisions.532 However, the agencies have done so in practice in an increasingly detailed 
manner.533 Chinese agencies emphasize that they consider all arguments made by respondents, 
but they often do so internally and do not share all responses with respondents. Moreover, 
Chinese agencies emphasize that they sometimes respond to the respondents’ arguments during 
face-to-face communications. 
 However, anti-monopoly enforcement cases are subject to the same set of criteria of 
judicial review in an administrative court as other types of administrative penalty cases. 
Therefore, the court’s position on the respondent’s right to statement and defense in other 
administrative penalty cases can be applied to anti-monopoly administrative litigation cases that 
may arise in the future. In Zhang Yiwu v. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),534 
the court held that CSRC established Zhang’s illegal facts as “divulging insider information to Li 
Jiemiao” in the Administrative Penalty Advance Notice. Zhang Yiwu subsequently made 
statements and defense against only such notified illegal facts. However, CSRC concluded in the 
final punitive decision that “Zhang Yiwu and Li Jiemiao were collectively engaged in insider 
trading,” which was inconsistent with the facts, reasoning and basis set forth in the advance 
notice. The court thus determined that not only did CSRC fail to inform Zhang of the facts, 
reasoning or basis for the punitive decision, it also deprived Zhang of the rights for statement and 
defense. In the end, the court annulled the administrative penalty on the defendant. This is 
evidence that an administrative litigation affords much higher protection of the respondent’s 
right of statement and defense, which helps discipline the anti-monopoly enforcement agency. 
European Union 
 In contrast, DG Comp ordinarily responds to the parties’ significant arguments in its 
decisions. DG Comp states that the “Commission decisions must state the reasons” on which its 
conclusions are based.535 This should ordinarily push the Commission to respond to the 
respondents’ major arguments. Moreover, DG Comp states that it will consider “relevant third 
parties’ arguments” when appropriate.536 Finally, The ECJ’s recent decision in the Intel case 
requires the General Court to consider all the arguments raised by the parties.537 This obligation 
may affect DG Comp as well. 
United States 
 In judicial enforcement actions, U.S. enforcement agencies must necessarily respond to 
the major arguments being advanced by the parties. In administrative enforcement actions, U.S. 
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law requires the FTC to respond to the parties’ major arguments in its decisions. Under the U.S. 
doctrine of “hard-look” review, the agency must respond to “relevant” and “significant” 
arguments.538 The response must be sufficient to ensure that the major policy issues were 
ventilated and disclose why the agency reacted to them as it did.539  
International norms 
 There is an international norm that agencies should respond to important arguments made 
by respondents. Paragraph 3.5 of the ICN Guidance on Investigative Process states, “Agencies 
should ensure that the evidence and information obtained during an investigation receive 
appropriate consideration.”540 The OECD further concludes that agency decisions should 
“include[e] consideration of the parties’ contentions.”541 
2. Differences in Law and Practice 
 There are no areas in which the three jurisdictions are similar in law and practice; five 
areas where the jurisdictions differ as a matter of law; and one area where they are similar in law, 
but different in practice. 
Differences in law 
Separation of investigatory and decisionmaking staff. None of the three jurisdictions maintains 
perfect separation of investigatory and adjudicatory functions. In all three, the highest level of 
the agency votes on whether to initiate an investigation and whether to assess liability. U.S. law 
does entrust, however, initial adjudicatory responsibility to ALJs whose compensation, 
advancement, and removal are governed by an outside agency. U.S. law also imposes strict 
restrictions on communications between investigatory and adjudicatory personnel. The EU and 
China do less to ensure separation of functions. Although both jurisdictions internally make 
efforts to monitor decisions on liability, the same staff members that investigate respondents 
ultimately help determine whether they are liable.  
Publication of decisions. While EU and U.S. agencies are required to publish their decisions, 
only some Chinese agencies are subject to such obligations. MOFCOM was required to publish 
decisions that blocked or attached conditions to mergers, but the agency did not need to publish 
unconditional clearances. NDRC and SAIC also adopted the practice of publishing its decisions, 
although there are significant exceptions involving sensitive information. In general, Chinese 
agencies are starting to publish decisions with increasing frequency. 
Obligation to give reasons in decision. While EU and U.S. agencies are obligated to articulate 
the reasons for their determinations in their published decisions, Chinese agencies are not. In 
practice, however, Chinese agencies have sometimes articulated reasons in an increasingly 
detailed manner, especially more recently.  
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Disclosure of economic evidence, assumptions, and methodology underlying decisions. Unlike 
U.S. agencies, neither EU nor Chinese agencies are legally obligated to disclose the economic 
evidence, assumptions, and methodology underlying their decisions. Nevertheless, the EU’s DG 
Comp normally does so, and Chinese agencies are starting to do so with increasing frequency.  
Responses to relevant and significant arguments made by respondents. Only EU and U.S. 
agencies are obligated to publicly respond to major arguments made by respondents. In contrast, 
Chinese agencies emphasize that they internally consider the respondents’ arguments.  
Differences in practice  
Description of the essential facts upon which each decision is based. In China, the EU, and the 
U.S., the competition agency must describe the essential facts upon which its decision is based. 
In practice, though, the decisions of Chinese agencies are comparably short. Recently, Chinese 
agencies have begun to make some of their decisions more detailed. 
E. Commitments/Settlements 
 All three jurisdictions vary widely in respect to settlements, which are quite common. 
Competition authorities and parties under investigation often find it mutually advantageous to 
enter into settlement agreements instead of proceeding to a full adjudication on the merits. The 
process of obtaining consent decrees is typically much faster and avoids the high costs of 
adversarial proceedings. Moreover, the parties under investigation are often more forthcoming 
with information when a settlement is proposed, and they can avoid an official admission of 
liability. As a result, settlements are legal in all three jurisdictions. 
China 
 Article 45 of the Anti-Monopoly Law permits enforcement agencies to suspend an 
investigation if the investigated party commits to specific measures that can eliminate the 
consequences of their suspected unlawful behavior.542 This commitment system is not used for 
cartels or mergers. Modeled on the Article 9 of the EU’s Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
commitment system, Article 45 is a way for the investigated party to come to a mutual 
agreement with the antitrust enforcement agency without having to litigate the matter, benefiting 
both parties by saving time and litigation costs. Under the commitment system, an investigated 
party may apply to an agency for a suspension. And the suspension would make a termination of 
the investigation possible without a formal decision to penalize the party being made, if the 
commitments have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the authority. The application must 
include (1) facts of the party’s involvement in the alleged monopoly, (2) measures it commits to 
taking to eliminate the harm caused by its alleged monopolistic conduct, (3) the time period in 
which it can perform its commitments, and (4) any other proposed commitments.543 The 
commitment proposal is negotiated between the party and agency, and if ultimately accepted, the 
 
542 See AML, supra note 91, art. 45. 
543 See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 93, art. 15; SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases, 
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agency may suspend the investigation.544 The party must then submit written reports on its 
performance of its commitments, and the agency must supervise its performance.545 If the party 
fulfills its commitments to the satisfaction of the agency, the agency can, at its discretion, 
terminate the investigation.546 The agency has the authority to resume the investigation, 
however, if the party fails to perform its commitments, there are material changes in facts on 
which the suspension was granted, or the suspension was granted on the basis of incomplete or 
untrue information provided by the party.547 
European Union 
 In the EU, one must distinguish two very different procedures for ending an investigation 
without a formal decision stating a violation of EU Competition Law: Commitment decisions in 
Art. 102 TFEU cases and settlements in Art. 101 TFEU cases. The Commission initially used a 
number of informal mechanisms to settle disputes on a case-by-case basis, including its leniency 
program.548 The European Commission began formalizing its settlement rules in 2003 by 
adopting a regulation that explicitly authorizes the Commission to accept commitments for non-
cartel cases. These commitments do not establish an infringement or impose a fine. Instead, they 
make the commitments offered by the companies legally binding, thereby bringing suspect 
behavior (and the need for further investigation) to an end.549 DG Comp and the relevant NCAs 
also consider and accept commitment proposals during merger control proceedings.550 
 Distinct from these commitment decisions, the Commission introduced a separate 
settlement procedure for cartel cases in 2008.551 Cartel settlements are still formal decisions, but 
they aim to simplify and expedite the procedure leading to the adoption of a formal decision, and 
also reward parties for participating in the procedure by reducing fines by 10%.552 
 The European Commission has the discretion to determine which cases are suitable for a 
settlement procedure.553 After the Commission gathers and analyzes the relevant evidence, it 
may invite the parties to express their interest in engaging in settlement discussions.554 The 
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Commission will then begin bilateral settlement discussions.555 A party who seeks to settle must 
formally declare its interest and submit a settlement submission (1) acknowledging liability for 
infringement, (2) indicating the maximum fine the party anticipates the Commission will levy, 
(3) confirming that the Commission has given the party the opportunity to be heard, (4) 
confirming that the party will not request access to the file or a formal oral hearing, (6) and 
agreeing to receive the Statement of Objectives and final decision in an EU language.556 The 
Commission then issues a Statement of Objections detailing the objections raised against the 
parties, although the Statement of Objections is typically much shorter for commitments than for 
standard procedures, and the party will agree to the contents of the statement.557 A final decision 
can then be adopted by the Commission. 
United States 
 In the U.S., most cases, whether criminal or civil, are resolved via settlements.558 Of 367 
individual defendants charged between 1996 and 2005 with criminal antitrust violations, 307 
resolved their cases with a plea bargain. The DOJ also settles almost all civil cases and rarely 
takes any to trial. From 2011 to mid-2016, the FTC settled 26 non-merger civil cases and 
litigated 4, while settling 82 merger cases and litigating 7.559 During the same period, the DOJ 
settled 24 non-merger civil cases and 46 merger cases, only litigating 2 and 2 respectively.560 
 The DOJ pursues settlements by filing consent decrees or civil consent judgments in a 
U.S. federal district court to obtain relief without having to go to trial. Consent decrees, however, 
cannot be used to settle certain severe horizontal conduct cases such as price-fixing and market 
allocations, which are instead prosecuted criminally. The DOJ’s settlement procedures are set out 
in the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, more commonly known as the Tunney 
Act, which was enacted to address concerns of abuse of agency discretion in antitrust 
settlements. The Tunney Act establishes a process for public scrutiny of and comment on 
proposed settlements and allows for participation by interested parties and the public.561 The 
court must accept the settlement proposed by the DOJ if it is within the “reaches of the public 
interest,”562 which gives the DOJ broad discretion over the remedy.  
 The FTC Rules of Practice create a settlement process that is parallel to the one imposed 
by the Tunney Act.563 Settlements are negotiated by FTC staff, senior management, and 
sometimes a Commissioner. The FTC staff is encouraged to pursue settlement negotiations, and 
any investigated party must be afforded the opportunity to propose a settlement.564 Proposed 
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settlements are detailed in a consent order, and the Commission votes to approve the order.565 If 
the Commission approves the order, the parties and the staff will execute an Agreement 
Containing Consent Order (ACCO) detailing the critical representations and waivers. Parties 
agree to waive their rights to judicial review and acknowledge the finality and enforceability of 
the consent order. In the ACCO, the parties will also confirm receipt of a complaint prepared by 
the FTC laying out the factual basis for bringing the case and the alleged violations of antitrust 
law. After execution of the ACCO, the Commissioners will vote again to approve the settlement. 
If a majority of the Commission finds a “reason to believe” that a law has been violated and that 
the proposed consent order provides a sufficient remedy for that violation, the agency will open 
the proposed order for public comment.566 If no changes are warranted after receiving public 
comment, the Commission will vote again for final approval of the consent order.567 
 This section breaks down the settlement process into two steps. 
1. Public scrutiny of proposed settlements 
2. Judicial review of settlements 
1. Procedural Steps of Commitments and Settlements 
a. Public scrutiny of proposed commitments and settlements 
 The three jurisdictions follow different practices with respect to public scrutiny of 
proposed settlements. U.S. law provides for a formal process of notice and comment, while EU 
law requires that any proposed settlement be subject to a “market test” in which complainants 
and interested third parties are invited to submit their observations. Chinese law has not 
traditionally exposed proposed settlements to public scrutiny, although recent reforms to merger 
review procedures now require MOFCOM to submit simple cases to public scrutiny and market 
tests. 
China 
 In China, publication of commitments is not mandatory either before or after their 
adoption. In practice, regarding the termination of investigations upon fulfillment of 
commitments by an undertaking, the enforcement agency will publish a Decision to Terminate 
Investigation, which contains a statement of facts, commitments and their fulfillment. 
Commitment decisions must be issued to investigated parties and must include a description of 
the facts of the alleged violation, the law being allegedly violated, the specifics of the 
commitment, the time limit to perform the commitment, measures of performance, and legal 
liability in the event of non-performance or incomplete performance of the 
commitment.568Additionally, for standard cases, MOFCOM may market test remedy proposals 
by engaging with the public via hearings, investigations, and consultations with experts, 
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representatives of trade associations, other relevant government agencies, and consumers, among 
others.569 
European Union 
 In the EU, proposed cartel settlements are not made available to the public. Article 6(6) 
of Directive 2014/104/EU protects the settlement submissions from disclosure in private follow-
on litigation.570 Final settlement decisions are published, but the decisions are typically shorter 
and less detailed than standard decisions. Specifically, the law requires the publication to state 
the names of the parties, the main content of the decision, and any penalties imposed.571 
Settlement decisions are published in the European Commission’s Official Journal, and although 
it is not required by law, it is common practice for the decision to be published on DG Comp’s 
website.572 
 Public notice is given in cases pursuing a commitment rather than a settlement. Article 
27(4) of the Council Regulation No. 1/2003 states that if the Commission intends to pursue a 
commitment with an investigated party, it must “publish a concise summary of the case and the 
main content of the commitments or of the proposed course of action.”573 This publication is 
often called a “market test notice.”574 The Commission also typically issues a press release and, 
when applicable, delivers the market test to the complainant. Interested third parties are invited 
to “submit their observations” for a specified time period, which must be a minimum of 30 days. 
The case team may additionally orally discuss the commitments with market participants and 
informs the investigated party of the market test results.575 The market test should not be 
misunderstood as requiring the public approval of the commitments. Instead, it is a tool that 
supplies useful information to the Commission on possible improvements to the proposed 
commitments. On occasion, the case team and Commission may make minor or significant 
revisions based on the market test results before formally approving the commitments. The 
market test approach is similarly used in merger control proceedings.576 
 The ECJ has recognized that publication of proposed commitments provides numerous 
benefits. Publication serves the public’s interest to know the reasoning behind Commission 
decisions as fully as possible. Economic operators should know “the sort of behavior for which 
they are liable to be penalized,” persons harmed by the violation should be “informed of the 
details thereof so that they may, where appropriate, assert their rights against the undertakings 
punished, and in view of the fined undertaking’s ability to seek judicial review of such a 
decision.”577 
 
569 See MOFCOM Concentration Review Measures, supra note 371, art. 7. 
570 Directive 2014/104/EU, art. 6(6), 2014 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC). 
571 See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 30(1), 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC). 
572 Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases, Note by the European Union, 
para. 17 (June 2, 2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)22/en/pdf.  
573 See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 27(4), 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC).  
574 See id. 
575 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, 20044 O.J. (L 24) 1, 5. 
576 See DG COMPETITION, BEST PRACTICES ON THE CONDUCT OF EC MERGER CONTROL PROCEEDINGS § 5.2 (Jan. 20, 
2004), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/proceedings.pdf.  
577 See Case T-198/03, Bank Austria Creditanstalt v. Commission 2006 E.C.R. II-1429, para. 77.  
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 Commitment decisions have triggered criticism mainly for two reasons. First, their 
limited publicity raises transparency concerns.578 Second, such decisions do not contribute to the 
development of the case law. Since commitment decisions do not state whether a certain 
behavior violates competition law provisions, such decisions do not increase the predictability of 
Commission decisions in the future.579 
United States 
 Both the FTC and the DOJ have established processes for public scrutiny of and 
comment on proposed settlements. The Tunney Act requires the DOJ to submit to the court and 
publish in the Federal Register the proposed settlement along with a Competitive Impact 
Statement (CIS).580 In it, they must describe the nature and purpose of the proceeding and the 
facts giving rise to the alleged violation of antitrust law; explain the proposed final judgment, 
why it is appropriate, its anticipated effects on competition, how it is in the public interest; and 
describe and evaluate any alternative remedies.581 The proposed judgment and CIS must be 
published in the Federal Register at least sixty days prior to the effective date of the proposed 
settlement, allowing time for interested parties to submit comments and amicus briefs via the 
DOJ’s website.582 The DOJ must also publish a summary of the proposed settlement in a 
newspaper.583 These measures are intended to seek countervailing arguments and alternatives 
from the public or other interested parties and to reduce arbitrary exercises of discretion by 
implementing more transparency. The DOJ must publish all comments received (typically done 
through its website), unless doing so would be so burdensome that the public would be unable to 
benefit from public access to comments. In that case, the court may authorize an alternative 
method of disseminating public comments.584 The DOJ is also required to consider relevant 
comments and publish responses to them in order to ensure that the agency meaningfully 
examines any significant points raised by the public and all relevant alternatives.585 Once the 
agency has completely reviewed all evidence collected, it announces whether it intends to 
finalize the settlement or pursue its complaint in court.586 Parties may propose remedies (e.g., 
divestitures, conduct restriction agreements, etc.) at any point during the investigation, although, 
it is typically at this stage that remedy negotiation takes place.587 
 FTC regulations require the agency to follow a similar process for obtaining public 
scrutiny and input of proposed settlements. Promptly after preliminary approval of the consent 
 
578 Frederic Jenny, Worst Decision of the EU Court of Justice: The Alrosa Judgment in Context and the Future of 
Commitment Decisions, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 701, 637 (2015). 
579 Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC Practice and 
Case Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2008, at 547 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 
2008). 
580 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) & (c)(ii) (2012). 
581 See id.§ 16(b). 
582 See id. § 16(d). 
583 See id. § 16(b). 
584 See id. § 16(b), (d). 
585 See id. § 16(d); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (1968); Home Box Office, Inc. v. 
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
586 See DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 168, at III-117. 
587 See Lisl Dunlop & Shoshana Speiser, Merger Control in the United States: Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS 
(2017).  
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order, the FTC must issue a press release that includes the proposed order, the complaint, and the 
ACCO.588 At the same time, the FTC must place on the public record and publish in the Federal 
Register an explanation of the provisions of the proposed settlement, the relief to be obtained 
thereby, and any other information that it believes may help interested persons understand the 
order. This explanation is commonly known as the “Analysis to Aid Public Comment” and is 
similar to the DOJ’s CIS. The public is invited to comment on the published materials (typically 
published to the FTC website) for 30 days, unless the FTC shortens or extends the time period.589 
Public comments are made public on the FTC website, and although the FTC is not required to 
respond to comments, it regularly addresses significant comments in public statements at the 
time it makes the consent order final. 
International norms 
 In general, international authorities support the use of settlements in antitrust cases, as 
they help “facilitate prompt resolution and help reduce the costs and burdens on parties, 
agencies, and markets.”590 Additionally, they endorse the publication of proposed settlements. 
The OECD notes that publication of proposed settlements helps address a lack of transparency in 
the settlement process, because settlement publications often contain detailed justifications for 
the proposed action.591 These detailed justifications can serve to educate the public about 
competition law as well as inform interested third parties about the proposed settlement’s 
existence and terms.  
 International authorities provide some support for subjecting proposed settlements to 
either third party or public scrutiny. The ICN’s 2018 Annotated ICN Guidance on Investigative 
Process report recommends that enforcement agencies “[c]onsider procedures that allow for 
consultations with market participants to seek perspectives on proposed commitments or 
remedies, as appropriate and within confidentiality rules.”592  
 In 2012, the ICN conducted a survey of 36 member countries asking if the respondent’s 
antitrust regime provided third parties with the opportunity to comment on proposed remedies or 
settlement commitments.593 The responses on this question were a slight plurality for “Yes” in 
mergers (48% Yes, 45% No, 6% Varies), and a plurality and slight majority for “No” in 
dominance cases (38% Yes, 50% No, 12% Varies), cartel cases (32% Yes, 56% No, 12% 
Varies), and other cases (30% Yes, 57% No, 13% Varies).594 The report concludes that there is 
no consistent practice across nations to provide third parties with the opportunity to comment on 
proposed remedies, but did note that many respondents found it valuable to either market test 
proposed remedies, or seek input from third parties through either formal or informal 
channels.595 
 
588 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2017). 
589 Id. § 2.34(c). 
590 ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 2; see also OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 12, at 31. 
591 OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 12, at 31.  
592 ANNOTATED ICN GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 2–3. 
593 ICN TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES, supra note 11, at 26. 
594 See id. 
595 See id. 
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 The same ICN survey asked respondents if the general public is provided with the 
opportunity to comment on proposed remedies or settlement commitments.596 A majority of 
respondents reported “No” in each category: mergers (22% Yes, 72% No, 6% Varies), 
dominance cases (18% Yes, 76% No, 8% Varies), cartel cases (15% Yes, 82% No, 3% Varies), 
and other cases (22% Yes, 74% No, 4% Varies).597 Again, the report concluded that there is no 
common practice among the respondents, but that for those countries which seek public 
comment, the agency has discretion in determining how much public comment will weigh in a 
settlement.598  
 Ultimately, international authorities tend to focus more on encouraging antitrust regimes 
to establish a settlement or consent decree system or on ensuring greater transparency and 
predictability in such a system,599 than on advocating for third party or public scrutiny of 
proposed settlements.  
b. Judicial review of commitments and settlements 
China 
 China’s commitment system has no mechanism for judicial review prior to the issuance 
of a commitment. An investigated party that proposes and negotiates commitments with an 
agency may be held liable for non-performance.600 Parties who are not satisfied with a proposed 
commitment may challenge it in court only after it is finalized.601 However, if the courts consider 
commitment as a decision delivered by the agencies, there might be a possibility to challenge the 
agencies’ decision to suspend the investigation or terminate the investigation by applying for 
administrative reconsideration or bringing an administrative action before court according to 
article 53 of the AML. 
European Union 
 In the EU, judicial review is available for both commitments and settlements. The scope 
of judicial review of commitments is limited to obvious errors of law. 602  
 Settlements, on the other hand, can only be appealed by the involved parties. Although 
the investigated party has acknowledged infringement in the settlement, it can still appeal the 
settlement to the General Court on grounds of the Commission’s “lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or any rule of 
law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.”603 The most common, and most 
 
596 See id. 
597 See id. 
598 See id. at 27. 
599 OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 12, at 19. 
600 See NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 93, art. 18(1); SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases, 
supra note 94, art. 17.  
601 NDRC Anti-Price Procedures, supra note 93, art. 21; SAIC Investigative Procedures for Monopoly Cases, supra 
note 94, arts. 28, 29. 
602 See Case T-76/14, Morningstar, Inc. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:481 (Sept. 15, 2016), para. 46, 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014TJ0076&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
603 See TFEU art. 263(2) and (4). 
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successful, appeal claim between 2007 and 2017 was that the Commission miscalculated the 
amount of the fine charged to the appellant, in violation of the EC’s fining guidelines.604  
United States 
 Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the DOJ, the court must determine 
whether the proposed settlement is in the public interest.605 The court is not required to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing, but may do so.606 The court must weigh a number of factors to determine 
the competitive impact of the proposed settlement, including the termination of the alleged 
violations, enforcement and modification provisions, duration of settlement, anticipated effects 
of alternative remedies considered, if the terms of the settlement are ambiguous, and any other 
competitive considerations the court deems necessary to the evaluation of public interest.607 The 
court must also consider the impact of the proposed settlement on competition in relevant 
markets, the public generally, individuals alleging injury from the violations, as well as a 
consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from the proposed settlement.608 When 
courts consider these statutory factors, however, the DOJ is entitled to “broad discretion to settle 
with the defendant within the reaches of public interest.”609 Approval should be denied only if 
the decree would make a “mockery of judicial power.”610 Thus, the court cannot evaluate the 
best way to resolve the DOJ’s claims, but rather must only make a determination on whether or 
not the proposed settlement is within the reaches of the public interest. Courts have also held that 
subsequent statutory amendments do not materially change this standard.611 Parties to the 
settlement waive further appeals of the consent decree. Additionally, because consent decrees are 
court orders, the DOJ cannot unilaterally modify or terminate them, and parties wishing to do so 
must petition the court. If a consent decree has been violated, the DOJ will institute an action to 
enforce the decree in the court that retains jurisdiction over the case. 
 The FTC does not require court approval prior to issuing a consent order. The FTC need 
only seek approval from the Commissioners. In executing the ACCO, parties waive any right to 
seek judicial review of the consent order.612 If a consent order is violated, the FTC has statutory 
authority to seek penalties and further injunctive relief from federal court.613 
2. Differences in Law 
Public scrutiny of proposed settlements. Each jurisdiction differs in their public scrutiny of 
proposed commitments or settlements. As a matter of practice, but not formal law, Chinese 
 
604 See Dieter Paemen & Jonathan Blondeel, Appealing EU Cartel Decisions Before the European Courts: Winning 
and Losing Arguments, INT’L BAR ASS’N (May 2017), 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=E69A2864-C396-4EE2-9048-
ABBE9FE5B97E#successful. 
605 See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2012). 
606 See id. § 16(e)(2). 
607 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
608 See id. 
609 See id. at 1461. 
610 See id. at 1462. 
611 See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2007). 
612 See 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2017). 
613 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2012). 
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enforcers publish a Decision to Terminate Investigation, which contains a statement of facts, 
commitments and their fulfillment, but are not required to seek public comment. The EU’s 
commitment system, on which China’s system was modeled, does permit public scrutiny through 
market tests. The EU does not, however, publish observations submitted or respond to 
observations publicly. For settlement decisions in the EU, no public scrutiny is mandated. The 
U.S. has the most developed public scrutiny system for both the DOJ, in the form of a CIS and 
invitation for public comment, and the FTC, in the form of an Analysis to Aid Public Comment 
and invitation for public comment. The DOJ is required by the Tunney Act to solicit comments, 
publish them, and respond to them. The FTC solicits comments, but has no formal obligation to 
publish or respond to them. Nonetheless, in practice they typically do so upon issuing the final 
consent order. 
Judicial review. All three jurisdictions vary with respect to ex ante judicial review for 
settlements and commitments. Neither Chinese nor EU law permits judicial scrutiny of proposed 
commitments, although both jurisdictions seem to permit parties to file an appeal after a 
commitment has been entered. The U.S., in contrast, requires judicial review of proposed DOJ 
consent decrees prior to their issuance, but does not require it for FTC consent decrees. However, 
FTC typically subjects its proposed settlements to public comment. DOJ consent decrees can be 
appealed, but FTC administrative consent decrees cannot. 
F. Judicial Review of Final Decisions 
 Judicial review of legal decisions after they have been issued is essential to due process. 
Only through such independent and external review can a legal system ensure that the decision is 
consistent with substantive and procedural law. This is particularly true for administrative 
decisionmaking, in which the same institutional actor serves as investigator, prosecutor, and 
adjudicator. Without meaningful judicial review, the agency runs the risk of exercising 
unfettered, unilateral discretion. 
 The institution of judicial review of administrative decisions in China, established by the 
1989 Administrative Litigation Law, is relatively new. A party dissatisfied with an 
administrative decision by MOFCOM in a merger case must first apply for an administrative 
reconsideration by the agency itself.614 If this internal review does not satisfy the parties, they 
can file an administrative litigation in court.615 In all other cases, the parties have the right to 
choose whether to apply for administrative reconsideration first or to file an administrative 
litigation in court directly.616 However, in 2014, China’s newly enacted Administrative 
Litigation Law expanded judicial review of agency actions, which led to an increase in 
 
614 See AML, supra note 91, art. 53(1); Admin. Reconsideration Law 2017 Amendment (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), art. 7(1) [hereinafter 2017 Admin. 
Reconsideration Law]. 
615 See 2017 Admin. Reconsideration Law, supra note 614, art. 14; AML, supra note 91, art. 53(1). 
616 See AML, supra note 91, art. 53(2); see also STEPHEN HARRIS ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
CHINA 49 (2011) (noting that earlier drafts of the Anti-Monopoly Law required parties to first seek administrative 
review before judicial review, but that the final draft of the law eliminated this requirement to more expressly 
provide a right to judicial review). 
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administrative litigation.617 During the initial period when there were three enforcement 
agencies, the Supreme People’s Court indicated that administrative appeals would be heard by 
intellectual property (IP) tribunals, which are generally established at the intermediate appellate 
level of the Chinese judicial system.618 Currently, administrative appeals from SAMR decisions 
will be heard by the Administrative Tribunal of the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate Court. 
 In the EU, the General Court has unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions in which the 
Commission has fixed a fine.619 Under Article 263 of the TFEU, the General Court typically 
reviews the legality of the Commission decision. Additionally, it exercises de novo review of the 
appropriateness of the fine and has the power to cancel, reduce, or increase that fine.620 The 
decision of the General Court may be appealed to the ECJ, which reviews only the legality of the 
agency’s decision.621 It does not review the facts of the case unless it can be shown that the 
General Court clearly distorted the obvious meaning of the evidence before it.622 However, in the 
2017 Intel case, the ECJ reversed the General Court’s decision for its failure to consider all of the 
major arguments made by the parties. It is worth emphasizing that Intel was a rare setback for 
DG Comp, which has rarely lost in court.623  
 In a U.S. judicial enforcement proceeding, the federal district court makes the initial 
decision, and that decision may be appealed to the federal appellate courts. In administrative 
adjudication before the FTC, the initial decision of the ALJ is first reviewed de novo by the full 
Commission without according any deference to the ALJ’s factual or legal findings. FTC settles 
around 80% of the adjudications it initiates against parties, and these cases are not subject to 
judicial review.624 For cases that are not settled, the Commission’s decision may be appealed to 
the federal appellate courts. Although the judiciary affirmed Commission liability findings in 
only 50% of cases from 1987 to 1996, since 2007 it has affirmed 100% of appealed 
administrative cases in which the Commission found liability.625  
 
 The following section will discuss the way that judicial review of final decisions is 
applied in China, the EU, and the U.S. This section breaks down the process of judicial review 
into six separate steps. 
1. Review of the agency’s adherence to procedural requirements 
2. Consideration only of rationales contained in the record  
3. Consideration only of rationales adopted by the agency 
4. Review of factual findings 
 
617 See He Haibo, supra note 19, at 178 (noting a 55% increase in administrative litigation generally from 2014 to 
2015). 
618 See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 616, at 296–97. 
619 See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 31, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC). 
620 See id.; see also Schweitzer, supra note 27.  
621 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 58, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. 
(C 325) 33, 56 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (“An appeal to the Court of Justice shall be limited to points of law.”); see 
also OECD EU REPORT, supra note 378, at 42.  
622 See DG COMP MANPROC, supra note 196, ch. 26.1.2.5. 
623 See Schweitzer, supra note 27, at 521. 
624 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 
1172 (2014). 
625 See Maureen Ohlhausen, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for Developing the Law or Rubber 
Stamp?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 1, 4 (2016). 
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5. Review of legal conclusions 
6. Review of economic rationales 
1. Procedural Steps of Judicial Review 
a. Review of agency’s adherence to procedural requirements 
 In all three jurisdictions, courts invalidate an administrative decision when the agency 
fails to follow procedural requirements. 
China 
 A Chinese People’s Court has the power to revoke an administrative action entirely or 
partially if it violates a statutory procedural requirement.626 However, courts have historically 
refrained from setting aside agency actions based on procedural violations alone. The 2014 
Administrative Litigation Law gave courts greater power to set aside agency actions based solely 
on procedural violations.627 Indeed, since then, in some cases, the People’s Court has revoked 
some decisions based solely on procedural violations. For example, a court revoked the local 
DRC’s decision to issue a project approval notification solely because of its procedural 
violation.628 But according to the judicial interpretation of Supreme Court, an agency can still 
reach the same decision on remand even after a People’s Court has revoked its action based on 
procedural violations.629 Thus, the substantial impact of such relief for parties seeking a tangible 
remedy is not yet clear. 
European Union 
 EU courts will set aside an agency decision if the Commission violates a procedure and 
such violation prejudices the respondent. In an EU action for annulment, Article 263 TFEU 
provides that the infringement of a procedural requirement that may have influenced the course 
of the procedure or the content of the decision may justify setting aside a Commission 
decision.630 As one commentator observes, “In reaction to an increased awareness of 
fundamental rights and based on ‘general principles of EU law’ derived from the Member States’ 
administrative law traditions, the courts of the Union have started early on to develop tight 
procedural standards that the Commission must adhere to when investigating and prosecuting 
competition law infringements.”631 In United Parcel Service, the General Court articulated the 
 
626 Admin. Litig. Law, supra note 231, art. 70(3). 
627 See He Haibo, supra note 19, at 164–65. 
628 See Zhang v. Dev. & Reform Bur. of Shulan City & Zhengpeng Agric. & Forestry Prod. Dev. Co.吉林省蛟河市
人民法院（2014）蛟行初字第 3号“张某等人诉舒兰市发展和改革局、第三人舒兰市正鹏农林产品开发有
限责任公司行政许可一案”. 
629 See Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Application of the Admin. Litig. Law of the People’s 
Republic of China art. 90 (2015). 
630 See, e.g., Joined Cases T-25/95 and Others, Cimenteries CBR SA v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. II-508, paras. 
240–241; Case T-186/06, Solvay SA v. Commission, 2011 E.C.R. II-2850, paras. 227, 237–238; see also 
Schweitzer, supra note 620. 
631 See Schweitzer, supra note 27, at 496.  
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unforgiving standard that the Commission’s decision will be annulled if “there was even a slight 
chance that [the respondent] would have been better able to defend itself” but for the non-
disclosure of evidence.632 
United States 
 In the U.S., courts reviewing administrative decisions must set them aside if they were 
made “without observance of procedure required by law.”633 Unlike in areas where courts tend to 
defer to agency expertise, judicial review of an agency’s compliance with procedural 
requirements is exacting.634  
b. Consideration only of rationales contained in the record and adopted by the agency 
 As a general matter, China, the EU, and the U.S. adhere to the “closed record” principle 
that permits agency decisions to be upheld only on evidence that is part of the official record. In 
addition, U.S. law permits agency decisions to be upheld only on rationales explicitly invoked by 
the agency in its official decision. 
China 
 Of the three jurisdictions, China is the least committed to the closed record principle. A 
People’s Court reviewing an agency decision has the power to subpoena evidence from other 
organizations and citizens, but may not subpoena any new evidence not in the agency’s record to 
prove the legality of agency’s administrative action.635 The courts have applied this principle to 
exclude evidence not in the agency’s record.636 There are limited exceptions to this principle, 
however. If the complaining party raises an argument or introduces evidence for the first time at 
the litigation stage, the agency can introduce additional evidence to react to this argument.637 
Finally, Chinese law does not limit courts from considering only rationales cited in the agency’s 
official decision. Instead, courts may consider any rationale so long as it is in the record. 
European Union 
 In an EU action for annulment, the Commission decision is reviewed for legality based 
on the reasoning and the evidence put forward in the decision itself.638 Under normal 
circumstances, additional evidence submitted after the administrative proceeding has closed is 
not admissible.639  
 
632 Case T-194/13, United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:144 (Mar. 7, 2017), para. 210, 
curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62013TJ0194&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. 
633 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2012). 
634 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
635 See Admin. Litig. Law, supra note 231, art. 40. 
636 See Ding Xiaohua, The Application of the Exclusive Record Principle in Administrative Litigation, 6 L. 
APPLICATION 71, 71–72 (2007). 
637 See Admin. Litig. Law, supra note 231, art. 36. 
638 See, e.g., Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission, 2004 E.C.R. II-1785, para. 63. 
639 See Case C-195/80, Michel v. European Parliament, 1981 E.C.R. 2861, para. 27. 
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United States 
 Under U.S. general administrative law principles, formal adjudications must be made on 
the record,640 and such record building is even required in some informal adjudications.641 
Consequently, review of administrative actions is traditionally based on the closed record 
principle, which means that the court can only review the evidence that was before the agency at 
the time it made its decision.642 Courts will base their review on the “whole record or those parts 
cited to it by a party.”643 In particular, courts will refuse to rely on any evidence or rationales that 
were not considered and relied on by the agency itself.644 They will also refuse to consider 
positions advanced during litigation that were not adopted by the agency in its formal 
decision.645 This practice, known as the Chenery doctrine, prevents the views of agency lawyers 
from trumping the expertise the agency presumably applied in formulating its initial decision.646 
International norms 
 The propriety of closed record review is supported by paragraph 2.4.16 of the ICC’s 
Recommend Framework of International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement 
proceedings, which states, “During the hearing, the agency should not be allowed to rely on 
theories or evidence not disclosed to the Respondents in the Report.”647 However, the 
desirability of “closed-record” review should depend on how reliable the agency’s adjudicative 
processes are; the more protections that agencies originally offer, the more compelling it is to 
adhere to the “closed-record” principle.648  
c. Review of factual findings 
 The three jurisdictions’ courts vary in their willingness to set aside agency factual 
findings. Chinese law permits more extensive review of agency factual findings than EU or U.S. 
law. 
China 
 In China, the courts conduct a comprehensive reexamination of the facts of the case and 
are not bound by any of the agency’s findings. China requires under the Administrative 
 
640 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
641 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
642 See id.; Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 
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644 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1942). 
645 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972); see also, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971); Overton Park, 401 
U.S. at 419; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 554 U.S. 527, 568 (2008). 
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Litigation Law that the administrative agency as the defendant shall bear the burden of proof for 
administrative actions it has taken and shall produce the evidence and normative documents on 
which such administrative actions are based.649 The courts are able to replace the agency’s 
findings with their own assessment of the facts based on the evidence obtained during the trial.650  
European Union 
 In the EU, the General Court undertakes an exhaustive review of both the Commission’s 
substantive findings of fact and the application of the law to those facts.651 The Court checks if 
the evidence upon which the Commission relied is accurate, reliable, and consistent.652 Article 
32 of the Protocol on the “Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union” authorizes the 
General Court to engage in fact-finding of its own, but in practice such actions are rare.653 The 
ECJ holds that courts “cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion . . . as a basis for 
dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts.”654 However, 
courts are highly deferential towards agency factual findings.655 Indeed, the General Court has 
often been criticized for its superficial review of the Commission’s factual findings.656 But, EU 
courts can and have voided decisions on the grounds that the Commission produced insufficient 
evidence.657  
United States 
 In the U.S., courts may set aside factual findings only if they are unsupported by 
substantial evidence.658 This standard requires more than the existence of any evidence 
supporting the agency’s conclusions of fact.659 Instead, courts “take into account contradictory 
evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.”660 Such review is 
required by the mandate that review take place on the “whole record.”661 In so doing, courts must 
strike a careful balance: “The Board’s findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless 
be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board’s decision 
from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth to the testimony of witnesses or its informed 
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judgment on matters within its special competence or both.”662 The relationship is similar to that 
of a trial court and appellate court, with the appellate court intensively reviewing conclusions of 
law, but disturbing findings of fact only for clear error, although agencies appear to get slightly 
more deference than trial courts.663 The APA framework is supported by the FTC Act, which 
forbids courts from making their own appraisal of the testimony or picking and choosing for 
themselves among uncertain and conflicting inferences.664 The U.S. Supreme Court has found 
this provision to be “essentially identical” to the substantial evidence standard of the APA.665 In 
summary, U.S. courts must carefully examine the factual record and be only somewhat 
deferential to agency factual decisions. 
International norms 
 Jurisdictions must strike a balance in the extent to which their courts disturb agency 
factual findings. In general, since administrative agencies combine prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions, some degree of judicial review of agency fact finding is essential. The European Court 
of Human Rights has emphasized that it is the presence of such judicial review that harmonizes 
administrative enforcement with the right to a fair trial.666 In addition, the OECD has included 
review of factual assessments in its list of areas subject to judicial review and has placed on 
courts the obligation to ensure that “the facts have been accurately found.”667 The OECD also 
expects that “[i]mpartial judges should . . . come to their own appraisal of the law and facts.”668 
The OECD’s Background Note on the Standard of Review recognize that many jurisdictions 
review findings of fact less intensively than conclusions of law, reflecting deference to the 
factfinding expertise of the initial decisionmaker.669 Paragraph 2.7.2 of the ICC Recommended 
Framework for International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings 
similarly calls on courts “to review the evidence used to support the complaint as well as any 
exculpatory evidence not relied upon by the competition authority to come to its own appraisal 
of the facts and evidence.”670 If agencies fail to adhere to strict separation of functions, there is a 
good argument that stronger judicial review of agency factual findings is necessary to ensure 
fairness to the parties. 
 At the same time, courts should hesitate before substituting their judgment on factual 
issues for that of the agency. Appellate bodies are not in a position to evaluate demeanor 
evidence or other aspects that are inherent in taking live testimony. Moreover, agencies possess 
specialized expertise. Thus, the OECD acknowledges that courts should give a degree of 
deference to the agency’s expertise and should take care not to substitute their judgment for the 
agency’s.671 As a result, no clear consensus has emerged as to how searching this review should 
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be and whether the more searching standard adopted by China or the more deferential standard 
employed by the EU and the U.S. strikes the right balance. 
d. Review of legal conclusions 
 Chinese and EU courts engage in de novo review of agencies’ conclusions of law, 
although they consider agency interpretations of the regulations they enact. While U.S. courts 
defer to agency legal interpretations in some situations, they do not defer to agency 
interpretations of the antitrust laws. 
China 
 In China, courts review agency conclusions of law de novo and additionally check for an 
appropriate exercise of discretionary power when agencies set fines.672 Pursuant to China’s 
Administrative Litigation Law, where the wrong laws and regulations are applied to 
administrative actions, the people’s court may revoke or partially revoke its decision, and rule 
that the defendant remakes the administrative actions. Meanwhile, in Hainan Yutai Technology 
Feed Co. Ltd. v. Hainan Administration of Commodities Price,673 the court of first instance held 
that “the determination of the monopoly agreement defined in Article 14 of the AML cannot be 
based solely on whether the parties to the transaction have reached a fixed or limited resale price 
agreement, but shall also include considerations under Article 13.2 of the AML to further 
examine whether the related price agreement has the effect of precluding or restricting 
competition.” The Hainan ACP, as the local DRC in Hainan, based its appeal request on the 
ground that “the first-instance decision has misinterpreted the law.” Then, the court of second 
instance concluded that the case was an administrative case concerning a vertical agreement, and 
“eliminate or restrict competition” is not a legal requirement to determine the legitimacy of 
vertical agreement that restricting the lowest prices for commodities resold to a third party 
according to AML (art. 14). Eventually, at retrial, the Supreme People’s Court finds that, the 
definition of monopolistic agreements in article 13 of AML applies to article 14 on vertical 
monopolistic agreements. Also, the Court holds, to serve the AML’s legislative purpose of 
preventing and halting monopolistic behavior and protecting consumers and public interests, the 
administrative agency’s determination of a vertical monopoly agreement may differ from a civil 
subject’s claim for actual losses caused by the monopolistic conduct in terms of proving 
damages.  
European Union 
 In the EU, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. No deference is given to the 
Commission, as the “margin of discretion” standard of review has been held inapplicable to legal 
interpretations.674 Indeed, courts are expected to undertake a full and exacting scrutiny of the 
 
672 Admin. Litig. Law, supra note 231, arts. 6, 77. 
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Commission’s legal conclusions.675 This non-deferential standard of review extends to the 
Commission’s interpretation of the substantive antitrust statutes.676 
United States 
 The situation under U.S. law is similar. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is for 
the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law” the exact meaning of 
“unfair competition.”677 The Supreme Court later reaffirmed this position, holding that “[t]he 
legal issues presented—that is, the identification of governing legal standards and their 
application to the facts found—are. . . for the courts to resolve,” although courts should “give 
some deference to the Commission’s informed judgment that a particular commercial practice is 
to be condemned as ‘unfair.’”678 Lower courts have interpreted this language as indicating that 
they should apply de novo review to the FTC’s conclusions of law.679 Admittedly, the Supreme 
Court’s Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer to agencies’ conclusions of law with respect to 
statutes they administer.680 Although the FTC has sometimes received Chevron deference with 
respect to other statutes that it administers,681 the FTC generally does not receive Chevron 
deference for its interpretations of the antitrust laws.682  
International norms 
 The Key Points promulgated by the OECD clearly envision that judicial review will 
include legal assessment.683 As noted above, the OECD Key Points specify that “[i]mpartial 
judges should . . . come to their own appraisal of the law and facts.”684 The OECD’s Background 
Note on the Standard of Review recognize that “courts do not usually defer to the legal 
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conclusions reached by first-instance decision makers, whether competition authorities or lower 
courts, since the review of the right application of the law is precisely their task.”685 
e. Review of economic rationales 
 Finally, the jurisdictions differ regarding the depth to which courts will review the 
economic rationales underlying antitrust enforcement actions. Chinese law and EU law have 
historically adopted a deferential approach. U.S. law expects courts to engage in more searching 
scrutiny of the economic rationales on which antitrust decisions are based. 
China 
 It is hard to evaluate this element in current Chinese law because judicial review of 
agency decisions has been rare up until this point. Since Chinese courts can rely on their own 
factual findings, it is possible that China’s courts will closely examine economic evidence when 
relevant cases arise in the future. Of course, this will depend on the willingness of Chinese 
judges to engage with economic theory. Although some judges in other jurisdictions have 
struggled to grapple with complex antitrust economic rationales because of inexperience,686 
Chinese judges can engage with outside economic experts to help them understand economic 
issues. 
 In two recent cases, the Tencent687 and Johnson & Johnson cases,688 the Chinese judges 
examined the proposed economic rationales, suggesting the Chinese judiciary is exploring how 
to fully exercise this responsibility. 
European Union 
 In the EU, courts have historically been reluctant to second-guess the economic theories 
and conclusions advanced by DG Comp and have instead taken care not to substitute their 
judgment for that of the Commission in the decision under review689 by giving agencies a wide 
“margin of discretion.”690 In the case of competition law, this has meant that courts will not 
overturn a decision based on its economic reasoning unless the agency commits a “manifest error 
of appraisal or a misuse of powers.”691 In the 1990s, the General Court employed an economist 
to help it understand economic issues. Today, while judges may have some knowledge of 
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competition law, they generally do not have formal economic training, meaning that litigants 
must carefully present economic arguments to make them understandable.692 
 Over time, the EU courts have gradually strengthened judicial scrutiny of economic 
considerations. Beginning in 2002, the ECJ has emphasized that the margin of discretion “does 
not mean that the Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of 
information of an economic nature.”693 Quite the contrary, courts “cannot use the Commission’s 
margin of discretion . . . as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the 
law and of the facts.”694 This change appears to stem in part from growing concerns that more 
searching review is required to satisfy the ECHR’s standard of fair trials in criminal case, defined 
to apply to any sanction intended to have a punitive and deterrent effect, including competition 
law.695 Courts have also recognized that the need for searching judicial review is particularly 
strong when the agency does not provide a clean separation between prosecutorial and 
adjudicatory functions.696  
 The General Court’s 2017 UPS decision examined the agency’s economic evidence in the 
course of annulling the Commission’s decision to block a merger.697 One set of commentators 
identified this case as a turning point, arguing it demonstrates that “EU judges are increasingly 
willing to scrutinize complex economic appraisals made by the Commission.”698 Future cases 
should provide clarity on how strict the EU’s level of scrutiny is. 
United States 
 Judicial review of agencies’ economic reasoning is more searching under U.S. law than 
under Chinese or EU law. The courts have held that “[r]easoned decisionmaking can use an 
economic model to provide useful information about economic realities” so long as it is 
supported by “empirical confirmation of accuracy” or alternatively “a complete analytical 
defense of [the] model to respond to each objection with a reasoned presentation.”699 In 
particular, courts require agencies to “explain[] the assumptions and methodology used in 
preparing the model”700 and show “a rational connection between the factual inputs, modeling 
assumptions, modeling results and conclusions drawn from these results” as well as “evidence 
that the agency is conscious of the limits of the model.”701 Courts will reject economic models 
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that bear “no rational relationship to the reality it purport to represent”702 or “generate apparently 
arbitrary results particularly where, as here, the agency has failed to justify its choice.”703 
International norms 
 International organizations emphasize the importance of judicial review of agencies’ 
economic rationales. For example, the OECD’s Key Points on Procedural Fairness and 
Transparency acknowledge that judicial review “is particularly important when competition 
agencies are an administrative body” and typically covers economic assessment as well as an 
evaluation of adherence to procedural rules and the factual and legal basis of the decision.704 The 
OECD’s Background Note on the Standard of Review recognizes that courts may grant 
deference to economic assessments or the use of economic models “as long as these are 
supported by sufficient evidence and appropriate analysis (and, depending on the case, 
discussion with the parties).”705 Paragraph 2.7.1 of the ICC Recommended Framework for 
International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings similarly recognizes 
that “[t]he courts, particularly when competition authorities are an administrative body, play or 
should play a significant role in safeguarding due process.”706 
2. Differences in Law and Practice 
 Although China’s limited experience with judicial review of agency decisions 
complicates any assessment of the similarities and differences in the different jurisdictions’ 
approaches to judicial review, there appear to be two areas where the jurisdictions are similar in 
law, and four areas where they differ in law.  
Similarities in law 
Review of agency’s adherence to procedural requirements. All three jurisdictions require their 
courts to set aside agency determinations if they failed to adhere to procedural requirements. 
U.S. judges are particularly demanding in this area. While Chinese judges traditionally showed 
some deference, the 2014 Administrative Litigation Law gave courts greater power to set aside 
agency actions based on procedural violations alone. 
Consideration only of rationales supported by the record and adopted by the agency. All three 
jurisdictions generally adhere to the “closed record” principle, which limits courts to only 
considering evidence that the agencies included in their administrative records. However, only 
U.S. and EU courts strictly limit themselves to considering rationales advanced during agency 
proceedings.  
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704 OECD KEY POINTS, supra note 12, at 30. The OECD acknowledged that the degree of deference given the 
agency varies from country to country. 
705 OECD BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, supra note 13, at 18. 
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Review of legal conclusions. All three jurisdictions review agencies’ legal conclusions de novo. 
The deference that U.S. courts sometimes accord to agency interpretations of the statutes they 
administer do not apply to the antitrust laws.  
Differences in law 
Review of factual findings. Of the three jurisdictions, Chinese judges show the least amount of 
deference to agencies’ factual findings. In contrast, EU and U.S. judges show significant 
deference to agencies’ factual findings.  
Judicial review of economic rationales. U.S. courts scrutinize agencies’ economic rationales 
more closely than Chinese or EU courts, although the Tencent and Johnson & Johnson decisions 
in China and the UPS decision in Europe may reflect greater interest in more searching review of 
economic rationales. 
IV. RECOMMENDED ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
 Much of this report serves an explanatory function, analyzing the similarities and 
differences across the world’s three primary antitrust enforcement regimes. The three 
jurisdictions are remarkably different from each other, in part, because they have different needs 
and societal priorities. Yet for the reasons discussed above, we believe that all three jurisdictions 
would benefit from promoting rational decisionmaking, due process, and transparency. This 
report concludes that three antitrust enforcement procedures are essential to achieving these 
goals.  
A. Judicial Review of Document Requests 
 Allowing ex ante judicial review of document requests promotes fairness to parties and 
transparency. In general, procedures at this phase of agency action help protect against “fishing 
expeditions,” broad searches for wrongdoing without individualized suspicion. Allowing 
administrative agencies to proceed freely in such fishing expeditions is unfair to citizens and 
gives too much power to lower-level bureaucrats, sharpening risks of corruption and decisions 
made for improper reasons. Judicial review of agency requests for information will protect 
against more extreme versions of administrative probing. The feedback given in judicial review 
can also counter the cognitive tendency of agency experts to be overconfident.707 
 We do not suggest particularly severe restrictions on the ability of agencies to seek 
information. Even the United States, which has the most rigorous procedural protections in this 
area, sets only a minimal bar for agencies to satisfy in requesting information. Allowing judicial 
review at this stage of agency action will also promote transparency, helping the regulated 
understand what specific practices are worthy of investigation by the agency and thus worthy of 
avoiding. 
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B. Agency Disclosure of the Evidence on Which It Wishes to Rely 
 By disclosing the economic and legal bases underlying their investigations, agencies can 
ensure fairness to the defendant, better decisionmaking, and transparency. First, disclosure of 
such information is necessary for the respondent to properly defend itself, an essential part of any 
due process regime. Second, such disclosures will have the ultimate effect of strengthening 
agency decisions. If respondents cannot prepare bona fide defenses, an agency’s decisions will 
be weaker and less accurate. This, in turn, will result in more erroneous agency decisions, 
undermining public confidence in the agency. Third, disclosure will promote transparency by 
informing other regulated parties about what actions the agency is taking. This will help warn 
other parties about what behaviors will be prosecuted by the agency, thus leading them to adjust 
their practices to ensure compliance with the law. Such disclosure can be enforced through 
judicial review by only allowing the agency to defend its decision based on information 
disclosed to the parties and specifically referenced in its decision.708  
C. The Right to Legal Representation 
 Consistently honoring the right to legal counsel promotes fairness to the parties and 
rational decisionmaking. The right to counsel ensures that a respondent understands the legal 
proceedings affecting his interests. Although respondents may often be sophisticated parties even 
well-educated people can struggle to understand legal procedures. As Justice Sutherland once 
noted: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law . . . . He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be 
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill 
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.709 
 Without consistently recognizing the right to counsel, there is an omnipresent specter 
looming over every administrative proceeding, creating a risk that it will be tainted by unfairness 
to the respondent, thus upsetting due process. Second, consistently allowing legal representation 
will promote better agency decisionmaking. Skillful lawyers help judges and adjudicators better 
understand the issues at stake by framing them.710 Thus, lawyers can occasionally aid officials in 
their work. More often, lawyers will ensure that respondents articulate their positions in the best 
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light. Administrative decisions are then strongest, and least vulnerable to criticism, if they can 
answer the respondents’ best positions. 
D. Opportunity for Respondents to Answer the Agency’s Arguments Against Them 
Before a Decision Is Made 
 Giving respondents a legitimate opportunity to respond to the agency’s arguments 
promotes fairness to the parties, better agency decisionmaking, and transparency. First, doing so 
fulfills an ancient and fundamental principle of justice captured in the Latin phrase, Audi Alteram 
Partem: Listen to the other side.711 Second, a hearing gives respondents a chance to present 
evidence and make arguments, thereby serving as proxies for a “day in court.” Citizens will 
perceive legal proceedings to be fairer if they have an opportunity to be heard, so much so that 
many litigants will forgo an economically rational settlement option just to get it.712 Third, the 
exercise of considering and responding to these arguments will sharpen agency decisionmaking. 
A rational decisionmaker considers alternative options to the one ultimately pursued, and this 
process directly ensures that decisionmakers go through this important exercise.713 Relatedly, 
failing to engage with the respondent’s arguments can cause the agency to overlook important 
aspects of the problem, exposing it to public criticism later on.714 Finally, a hearing (particularly 
a public one) increases transparency and allows the regulated and broader public to better 
understand the agency’s actions. 
E. Separation of Investigative and Adjudicative Functions 
 The separation of functions can be essential to ensuring fairness to parties and rational 
decisionmaking. First, it is a fundamental principle of fairness that people cannot be judges in 
their own causes. An agency official that has chosen to initiate a complaint and invested 
significant time investigating a party will hesitate to absolve it, because doing so can be seen as 
evidence that the investigation should not have been initiated in the first place.715 While we have 
no reason to think that antitrust enforcement officials are more self-interested than any other 
group of people, the structure within which these enforcers work should incentivize them to 
favor prosecution over dismissals.716 As Judge Richard Posner noted, “An agency that dismissed 
many of the complaints that it issued would stand condemned of having squandered the 
taxpayer’s money on meritless causes.”717  
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 Second, separation of functions guards against faulty agency decisionmaking. As noted 
above, officials that act as both investigator and prosecutor are vulnerable to cognitive biases 
beyond those that normally affect agencies.718 Such officials will be vulnerable to confirmation 
bias, a natural tendency to favor and focus on evidence favoring the prosecution.719 These 
officials will also be susceptible to hindsight bias, the natural desire to justify one’s past efforts 
while looking at evidence in the present.720  
 The solution is, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, to “curtail and change the 
practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge.”721 In the 
leadup to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in the U.S., administrators disagreed 
on how to situate adjudication within the administrative structure. Although some advocated for 
a complete separation by placing the adjudicatory function in courts, others argued that placing 
both functions in a single agency yielded substantial efficiencies. The Administrative Procedure 
Act reflects a compromise between the two positions by allowing matters to be adjudicated by an 
agency official known as an administrative law judge (ALJ), while simultaneously mandating a 
separation of functions within the agency that insulated adjudicatory personnel from ex parte 
communications and from review and evaluation by the agency heads. Everyone agreed that both 
functions should not be lodged in the same person.722 Such a separation of functions serves to 
prevent “a psychological commitment to achieving a particular result because of involvement on 
the agency’s team” from distorting the final decision.723 
 In both the EU and the U.S., the head of the agency undertakes the final administrative 
decisions to charge and to adjudicate. In the case of administrative enforcement in the U.S., the 
decisions are made by all five of the FTC Commissioners. In the case of the EU, the decisions 
are officially taken by the College of Commissioners, although the Competition Commissioner 
receives great deference. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that failure to separate functions 
completely may produce decisions with a clear pro-agency bias. With the FTC, several scholars 
have documented that Commissioners almost never vote to overturn ALJ decisions in situations 
where the ALJ has issued a decision against the investigated party.724 The only complete solution 
to this bias would be judicial enforcement. 
 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has held that permissibility of 
allowing a person to exercise both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions depends on the depth 
of judicial review.725 Even though the EU has not yet accessed the ECHR, the enshrined rights 
belong to the general principles of EU law according to Art. 6 par. 3 TEU. Hence, the 
interpretation of the ECHR by the ECHR is also relevant for the European Courts. The ECHR 
decided that based on Art. 6 ECHR the European lack of separation of powers within the agency 
is adequately counterbalanced by the existing level of judicial review and therefore, does not 
violate Art. 6 par. 2 ECHR. In line with this decision, the ECJ confirmed this view explicitly in 
its Schindler Decision regarding Art. 47 EU Fundamental Rights Charta, which provides for a 
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fair trial and can be seen as equivalent to Art. 6 ECHR.726 The court stated that Art. 47 
Fundamental Rights Charter requires unlimited judicial review of Commission decisions given 
the fact that there is no separation of powers within the Commission.727 The court found that 
As the review provided for by the Treaties involves review by the European 
Union judicature of both the law and the facts, and means that it has the power to 
assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a 
fine, the Court has concluded that the review of legality provided for under 
Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the 
amount of the fine, provided for under Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, is not 
contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection which 
is currently set out in Article 47 of the Charter.728 
Moreover, the ECJ held in 2017 that though judicial review is limited “to the claims of the 
parties, as set out in the forms of order sought in their written pleadings, is not contrary to the 
principle of effective judicial protection, as that principle does not require those courts to extend 
their review to cover aspects of a decision that have not been put in issue in the dispute before 
them.”729 
 Clearly, plenary reconsideration of all issues by a court would cure any defects stemming 
from the administrative decisionmakers’ lack of independence. Conversely, any weakness in 
judicial review makes the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in one 
personnel more troubling. 
F. Publication of Decisions with Sufficient Information 
 The obligation to publish decisions with sufficient information, including the essential 
facts, answers to the respondents’ arguments, and economic analysis, promotes fairness to the 
parties, transparency, and rational decisionmaking. 
 First, publishing decisions promotes fairness to interested parties. Publishing decisions 
helps create precedents to guide future agency action. A fundamental notion of fairness is that a 
legal body should reach the same result when looking at two identical sets of facts.730 Publication 
will help the courts, the regulated, and lawyers push for consistent results, thus promoting basic 
fairness.  
 Second, publication promotes transparency to the public. The law has the potential to 
shape public behavior in profound and often unseen ways.731 The laws can help shape and 
reinforce a nation’s collective social consciousness, ensuring compliance through stigmatizing 
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pressure.732 In order for a citizenry to embrace and be pressured by its country’s laws, its people 
must know the laws.733 More so, as Durkheim explained, people must know when laws are 
violated and punishment is issued, so that they know that a particular element of the collective 
social consciousness is being reaffirmed.734 More specifically, publishing opinions allows the 
regulated – i.e. companies – to understand the law’s expectations for them, lowering future 
enforcement costs and promoting compliance. 
 Third, publication promotes more rational agency decisionmaking in two interconnected 
ways. First, publication enables judicial review, which provides a crucial second look at agency 
decisionmaking, weeding out the occasional irrational decisions that human decisionmakers 
make. Second, publication pushes agency decisionmakers – mindful of the potential for judicial 
review – to carefully articulate their position in a way that can withstand judicial scrutiny. In the 
United States, this usually pushes agency decisionmakers to produce coherent, thorough, and 
well-reasoned decisions. Although decisionmakers can theoretically make well-reasoned 
decisions without putting them into writing for public scrutiny, the process of writing usually 
helps one see weaknesses in one’s own argument and is why written submissions dominate 
advanced legal systems. 
G. The Obligation to Publicly Give Reasons 
 The obligation of a legal authority to give reasons for its decision is a fundamental 
principle of justice. As two European scholars recently observed, it is “inconceivable” to not 
honor this rule.735 However, the obligation to articulate one’s decision in writing does not 
necessarily capture an agency’s need to give its reasons publicly. Indeed, agencies might initially 
prefer to keep their written decisions private. However, an agency’s obligation to publicly give 
reasons for its decisions also promotes transparency, rational decisionmaking, and fairness to the 
parties. 
 First, requiring agencies to publicly give reasons promotes transparency. Permitting 
agencies to produce reasons for their decisions post hoc during judicial review creates a risk that 
judges will be given reasons different from those the agencies relied on at the time of the 
decision. This creates an opportunity for agency officials to hide the true reasons they acted, 
potentially helping to mask arbitrary decisionmaking or corruption. Moreover, this requirement 
helps judges evaluate the true reasons for agency action, enabling them to set aside decisions 
based on improper considerations.736 As Opdebeek and DeSomer observe, “The core idea behind 
the duty to give reasons is that it offers transparency on the level of the motives or justifications 
that have inspired a decision.”737 
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 Second and relatedly, requiring agencies to publicly give reasons promotes more rational 
decisionmaking. If agencies may produce reasons for their decisions post hoc during judicial 
review, they will forward reasons meant to please courts – not necessarily the real reasons they 
originally acted. The primary reason governments employ administrative agencies is to 
concentrate expertise.738 Forcing agencies to publicly give reasons for their decisions helps push 
decisionmakers to make and defend decisions based on expertise. American legal scholars 
capture this idea through the Chenery doctrine, named for a Supreme Court case holding that 
judges will only look to the rationales the agency gave at the time of the decision – not those 
given post hoc during judicial review. As the Court explained in a later case, “Congress has 
delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for 
elaborating and enforcing statutory commands. It is the administrative official and not appellate 
counsel who possesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize . . . .”739  
 Third, an agency’s obligation to publicly give reasons promotes fairness to the parties 
during judicial review. As the OECD explains, “decisions should provide clear detailed 
description of the case facts, the applicable rules and the reasons for the legal and factual 
findings” to make judicial review possible.740 Administrative agencies are given vast amounts of 
concentrated power to bring government expertise to bear on difficult problems; this justifies 
sacrifices by individual citizens. But fairness requires that individual citizens only make 
sacrifices for the sake of agency expertise, not other improper considerations that might have 
contaminated agency decisionmaking. As Jerry Mashaw explains, subjecting a citizen “to 
administrative authority that is unrestrained is [to treat him] as a mere object of the law, not a 
subject with independent rational capacities.”741 In other words, the obligation to state reasons is 
essential to ensuring the dignity of citizens in the face of the modern administrative state.742 As 
Opdebeek and DeSomer explain, “Authority without reason is literally dehumanizing.”743 
Requiring agencies to publicly give reasons for their decisions ensures that their decisions will be 
evaluated according to the merits of the expertise that motivated them. This promotes the 
appropriate amount of fairness to citizens in their interactions with agencies. 
H. Availability of Rigorous Judicial Review of Economic Reasoning 
 Judicial review is essential for promoting reasoned decisionmaking, due process, and 
transparency. It is worth remembering that judges, more than any other branch of government, 
created U.S. administrative law.744 Judicial review promotes reasoned decisionmaking and due 
process. 
 First, judicial review promotes rational decisions by ensuring a rational decisionmaking 
process. While judges are often not experts in substantive antitrust law, they are experts on 
procedures and rational deliberative processes. Indeed, judges’ insights from different areas of 
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law may help them see perspectives that agency officials – occasionally susceptible to tunnel 
vision – overlooked.745 
 Second, judicial review helps protect due process by ensuring that procedural 
requirements are met. As China recognized when it amended its administrative law, agencies 
were not adequately protecting individual rights in their proceedings. Consequently, the 
amendment made it easier for individuals to sue for procedural violations. As the Chinese 
government recognized, judicial review is a potent tool for ensuring procedural compliance by 
agencies.746 
 Third and more substantively, judicial scrutiny of agency economic rationales promotes 
rational decisionmaking and transparency. One of the central justifications for the burdens of 
judicial review is that it ensures agencies are exercising their expertise as intended. Antitrust 
enforcement agencies are supposed to concentrate economic expertise to ensure the nation’s 
economic laws are obeyed. To properly scrutinize and check agency reasoning – a necessary 
prerequisite to the benefits of judicial review – judges must be willing to examine and critically 
evaluate agencies’ economic analyses, if only to counter the cognitive tendency of agency 
experts to be overconfident.747. Of course, a properly balanced system of judicial review does not 
normally let judges displace agency rationales –agency officials, not judges, are the experts. One 
additional, incidental benefit is that judicial scrutiny and explication of agency economic theories 
may promote transparency. Judges will undoubtedly attempt to translate complex economic 
theories into language they can understand. By putting such explications in judicial opinions, 
regulated parties will better understand what the agency expects of them, helping them comply in 
the future. Further, judicial review guards against cognitive biases, such as over-identification.748 
 China has demonstrated its commitment to strengthening its system of judicial review. 
Before the recent reforms, administrative litigation in general had been difficult in China for 
several reasons. First, it was difficult to initiate lawsuits, and it was estimated that around 33% or 
more of attempted suits were not heard by the court in the end.749 Second, as to cases for which 
administrative suits did proceed, judgments were not made since the suits were withdrawn by the 
plaintiffs, which accounts for an estimated 30% to 57% of cases.750 Third, successful plaintiffs 
sometimes encountered difficulty seeing judgments enforced.751 
 However, in November 2014, China passed an amendment to the Administrative 
Litigation law to combat these issues.752 First, the amendment emphasizes the right of citizens to 
file complaints, and provides an appeal if a court declines to accept a complaint.753 Second, the 
law creates sanctions for agencies that improperly coerce a plaintiff to drop his case and gives 
judges more power to nullify agency actions.754 Third, the law imposes monetary sanctions on 
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agency leaders and staff that refuse to honor a court judgment.755 The evidence suggests that the 
reforms have been at least partially successful: from 2014 to 2015, the number of administrative 
cases filed during the year increased to around 220,000, a 55% increase.756 For now, there is not 
enough administrative litigation concerning antitrust issues to support a general evaluation. 
However, although it remains to be seen whether this law will see an increase in judicial review 
of antitrust enforcement agency actions in China, the initial numbers in administrative litigation 
are promising with the amendment to the Administrative Litigation law.  
 All three jurisdiction permit de novo judicial review of interpretations of law and provide 
for substantial review of factual findings as well. There is one area in which the practice with 
respect to judicial review varies across the jurisdiction. Whereas U.S. courts subject economic 
reasoning to hard look review, European courts have given the Commission a wider margin of 
discretion with respect to economic reasoning, overturning decisions on that basis only for 
manifest errors of assessment. However, in recent years—the Intel decision being a landmark 
decision757—the level of deference given to the agency has been reduced by the Court.758 This is 
especially important, since a too deferential judicial review of economic reasoning renders the 
combination of investigative/prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions problematic. 
I. Opportunity for Public Scrutiny and Judicial Review of Settlements and 
Commitments 
 Our final recommendation is to create a process that permits some public scrutiny and 
judicial review of proposed commitments and settlements. We are agnostic whether the public 
scrutiny takes the form of the market test process employed by the EU or the notice-and-
comment approach followed in the U.S. The important element is to ensure that any proposed 
resolution have the benefit of public input. 
 Subjecting settlements and commitments to courts for approval provides several benefits. 
Judicial review ensures that any settlements are in the public interest. In addition, judicial action 
enshrines the settlement in a court order, thereby entitling it to full faith and credit around the 
world. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 As global markets integrate and national economies develop, antitrust law is an essential 
part of a modern legal system. Thus, countries around the world are empowering government 
agencies to enforce antitrust laws. Although agencies are powerful instruments, they also 
threaten due process, transparency, and even rational decisionmaking – the main advantage of 
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their existence. Imposing procedural restrains on enforcement agencies can help countries reap 
the benefits of antitrust laws without incurring the social costs that unrestrained agencies impose.  
 This report forwards three procedural requirements that are essential to achieve rational, 
fair, and transparent agencies. First, agencies must allow investigated parties to access the 
evidence against them. Second, agencies should separate functions – it is fundamentally unfair to 
let a prosecutor be the judge in his own cause. Only strict judicial review can remedy this threat. 
Third, judicial review must be available and rigorous. Without these protections, rational 
decisionmaking, due process, and transparency will be practically impossible for a nation’s 
agencies to achieve.  
 The tenth anniversary of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law provided the impetus for this 
report. As China’s economy makes up an increasingly large share of the global economy, much 
depends on the health of China’s antitrust enforcement system. In comparing China’s procedures 
to those of the U.S. and EU – both of which have much older antitrust enforcement systems – it 
was inevitable that China’s procedures would be relatively less developed. Yet this investigation 
revealed substantial problems with the EU’s enforcement regime, and even some problems with 
the U.S. system, the world’s oldest. While China’s enforcement system has room for growth, this 
report acknowledges that China has made incredible progress in the ten years since it 
promulgated the Anti-Monopoly Law. All three jurisdictions have room for improvement in 
pursuing rational, fair, and transparent antitrust enforcement regimes. The procedures proposed 
in this report can help bolster the three jurisdictions’ systems. If China, the EU, and the U.S. can 
strike the right balance, the global economy will have much to celebrate in the coming years. 
